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A common assumption in the study of conversation is that participants
fully cooperate in order to maximise the effectiveness of the exchange and
ensure communication flow. This assumption persists even in situations
in which the private goals of the participants are at odds: they may act
strategically pursuing their agendas, but will still adhere to a number of lin-
guistic norms or conventions which are implicitly accepted by a community
of language users.
However, in naturally occurring dialogue participants often depart from
such norms, for instance, by asking inappropriate questions, by avoiding to
provide adequate answers or by volunteering information that is not relevant
to the conversation. These are examples of what we call linguistic non-
cooperation.
This thesis presents a systematic investigation of linguistic non-coopera-
tion in dialogue. Given a specific activity, in a specific cultural context and
time, the method proceeds by making explicit which linguistic behaviours
are appropriate. This results in a set of rules: the global dialogue game.
Non-cooperation is then measured as instances in which the actions of the
participants are not in accordance with these rules. The dialogue game is
formally defined in terms of discourse obligations. These are actions that
participants are expected to perform at a given point in the dialogue based
on the dialogue history. In this context, non-cooperation amounts to parti-
cipants failing to act according to their obligations.
We propose a general definition of linguistic non-cooperation and give a
specific instance for political interview dialogues. Based on the latter, we
present an empirical method which involves a coding scheme for the manual
annotation of interview transcripts. The degree to which each participant
cooperates is automatically determined by contrasting the annotated tran-
scripts with the rules in the dialogue game for political interviews. The ap-
proach is evaluated on a corpus of broadcast political interviews and tested
for correlation with human judgement on the same corpus.
Further, we describe a model of conversational agents that incorporates
the concepts and mechanisms above as part of their dialogue manager. This
allows for the generation of conversations in which the agents exhibit varying
degrees of cooperation by controlling how often they favour their private
goals instead of discharging their discourse obligations.
Acknowledgements
These pages close a very long journey, the last part of which started in 2008
when I left Argentina and moved to Milton Keynes in the UK. I embarked on
a PhD as a natural step in my education, but also as a personal challenge.
And what a challenge it was! The experience was thrilling at times, but
also extremely difficult. It would have been impossible to reach this point
without an army of people that played essential roles in different and unique
ways. To them I am deeply grateful and the following lines are my attempt to
put this in writing. Still, words are nowhere nearly enough to communicate
how important they have been over the years.
First and foremost, I thank my supervisors, Paul Piwek and Richard
Power, for their constant guidance, encouragement and understanding. They
received a computer scientist with a formal background and a huge lack of
knowledge in computational linguistics and took on the challenge to turn
him into an independent researcher in an area that builds upon empirical
evidence. Along the way, they coped with my Latin American manners and
patiently taught me to listen to questions and suggestions before attempting
a reply. They gave me enough freedom to do exactly the research project
I wanted, but knew when to show me where I was going down potentially
unfruitful paths. They taught me how to write, leaving “woolly generalisa-
tions” for cafe´ talks. I have immense respect for them and gratitude for the
time they have invested in me. I hope to do them justice in the next stages
of my academic and professional life.
The Open University is a great environment to study and work. Its
unique mission of spreading higher education to “all who wish to realise
their ambitions and fulfil their potential” is beautiful and hugely necessary.
It fills me with pride to be part of this institution. I am thankful to the
Faculty of Mathematics, Computing and Technology for funding my studies,
especially into the initially unplanned fourth year. Many academics in the
Department of Computing and Communications played an essential role in
my progress. Marian Petre and Robin Laney dedicated much time and effort
in teaching me and my colleagues how to do good research. I thank Marian
for having taken an exaggerate amount of time to push me forward when the
task ahead looked impossible. Also Michel Wermelinger, Leonor Barroca,
Anne De Roeck and Alistair Willis helped at different stages along the way.
I am thankful to Hugh Robinson who “grilled” me the first time I presented
my research, with questions that ultimately shaped the project to a great
extent. The members, past and present, of the Natural Language Generation
group were “home”, academically speaking, and provided a safe environment
where I could present my often unpolished ideas. They are Donia Scott,
Sandra Williams, Svetlana Stoyanchev, Allan Third, Eva Banik, Richard
Doust, Sharon Moyo and Tu Anh Nguyen.
Half-way through my studies, I was immensely lucky to take part in a
summer internship at the University of Southern California’s Institute for
Creative Technologies. Working under the supervision of David DeVault,
with David Traum and the rest of the Natural Language Dialogue Group,
was an excellent opportunity, professionally and also personally. I also thank
David DeVault, David Traum, Ron Artstein and Kalliroi Georgila for illu-
minating discussions of my own research.
Milton Keynes would not have been the happy memory it is today
without my dear friends, who would turn any city into the best place to
be. I thank Bethany for her constant company during the first three years
while we shared 36 Warren Bank. She turned an otherwise uneventful flat
into a fairground full of excitement and endless fun, as we built a unique
connection that will last for the rest of our lives. I thank Koula and Jo for
being the other two legs of that sturdy table of friendship and mutual under-
standing. It is impossible for me to name everyone else in the Milton Keynes
gang without forgetting someone. I implicitly and wholeheartedly thank all
of them and here attempt a necessarily incomplete list: Sam, Dave, Lionel,
Andre´s, Katarina, Davey, Paul W, Ben R, Ben D, Marc, Andy C, Andy M,
Adam, Miriam, Jakub, Dinar, Giorgos, Mariano, Lucas, Stephen, Minh, Tu
Anh, Laura, Stefan, Macarena, Joan, Lana, Alexandra, Nadia, Jen, Anna,
Carlos, Sally, Eva, Alba, Thomas, Saad, Vanessa, Philippe, Liliana, Carmen,
Rob, Beck, Amanda, Zdenek, Mic, Carolyn. . . And Paul T.
I also thank those friends elsewhere in the UK: Alejandra, Leandro, Ros,
Duncan, Charlie, Andy, Sergio, Santiago, Tasha and Kirsty. And those
around the world: Ana, Jo˜ao, Tiago, Cristina, Francisca, Fernando, Pablo
and Luis in Portugal; Quitterie, Jano and Nache in France; Abdul, Matias,
Virpa, Peikko and Em in Finland; Aly and Rachel in the US; Damia´n and
Mercedes in Italy; and about a thousand in Argentina. I am thankful to
Maxi, my teacher and friend, for opening so many doors and for recent
collaborations which will hopefully continue for years to come. I thank
those who opened their homes and provided a safe haven for me to work
during the long writing up stage: Bethany and Dave, Miriam and Jakub,
Alejandra and Leandro, Laura and Luciano, Chicho and Silvina. Diego not
only opened his home, but also allowed for a profound connection that has
been essential all along, especially in turbulent times. Over the years and
despite the ocean in between, Dani remained that soulmate I can go to,
whatever the matter and without fear of judgement or incomprehension.
Dermot showed up right before things started to get complicated and
walked with me through the hardest last two years. Without his company,
understanding and support – in every imaginable way – I would have cer-
tainly failed. A lifetime will not be enough to pay back his immense effort.
And finally, I need to thank my beloved family. My parents, Gabriel
and Graziela, endured the distance and were there whenever I needed them,
without necessarily understanding what I was working on and why I was
a student well into my thirties. I thank my brother, Alan, the architect
and traveller who in these years grew up into a man with an amazingly
wise and soothing approach to life. My grandmother, Raquel, endless in
her wisdom, has been my life coach for as many years as I can remember.
Our long and frequent conversations have shown me the way out of many
dark alleys, and they still do today. My aunts and uncles and my many
cousins were a colourful and beautifully noisy group to go back to when
visiting Argentina. I am thankful to Mar´ıa Jose´, my cousin-sister, so full of
much-needed happiness and fresh air.
There are four people without whom reaching the end of this project
would have been impossible: my parents, my grandmother and Dermot.
This thesis is dedicated to them, in infinite gratitude.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
1.1 What is Non-Cooperation in Dialogue? . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2 An Extended Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3 Research Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.4 Why does it Matter? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1.5 Contributions of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.6 Outline of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
2 A Review of Related Work 19
2.1 Overview of the Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2 Notions of Cooperation in Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3 Cooperation in Dialogue Modelling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.3.1 Discourse Obligations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.3.2 Global Dialogue Games . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
2.4 Previous Approaches to Non-Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . 44
2.5 Analysis of Political Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
2.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
i
ii Contents
3 Non-Cooperation, Obligations and Dialogue Games 57
3.1 Overview of the Chapter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.2 Linguistic and Non-Linguistic Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.3 Defining Non-Cooperation in Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.3.1 Non-Cooperation in Political Interviews . . . . . . . . 64
3.3.2 Towards a Revised Definition: Focusing on Core Speech
Acts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
3.4 Discourse Obligations and Dialogue Games . . . . . . . . . . 73
3.4.1 Formalisation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
3.4.2 A Revised Definition of Non-Cooperation in Dialogue 78
3.5 A Dialogue Game for Political Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . 82
3.5.1 Action Labels for Political Interviews . . . . . . . . . 83
3.5.2 An Example Interview Annotated with Action Labels 91
3.5.3 The Dialogue Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4 Measuring Non-Cooperation in Dialogue 99
4.1 Aims and Overview of the Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
4.2 Annotating Political Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.2.1 A Discussion on Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
4.2.2 First Annotation Stage: Segmenting Turns and An-
notating Dialogue Acts and Referent Segments . . . . 110
4.2.3 Second Annotation Stage: Selecting Content Features 121
4.3 Evaluation of the Method (Part 1): a corpus annotation study 135
4.3.1 Materials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.3.2 First Annotation Stage: Segmenting Turns and An-
notating Dialogue Acts and Referent Segments . . . . 139
4.3.3 Aggregating Annotations for the Second Stage . . . . 161
Contents iii
4.3.4 Second Annotation Stage: Selecting Content Features 162
4.4 Assessing Cooperation in Annotated Dialogue . . . . . . . . . 169
4.4.1 Mapping Annotations to Action Labels . . . . . . . . 169
4.4.2 Measuring Cooperation in Dialogue . . . . . . . . . . 173
4.5 Evaluation of the Method (Part 2): a survey study . . . . . . 190
4.5.1 Degree of Cooperation of the Dialogues in the Corpus 190
4.5.2 Eliciting Human Judgement on Cooperation . . . . . . 192
4.5.3 Correlation Analysis Between Survey Results and the
Degree of Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
4.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
4.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
5 Modelling Non-Cooperative Conversational Agents 213
5.1 Non-Cooperative Conversational Agents . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
5.1.1 Dialogue Act and Action Label Taxonomies . . . . . . 217
5.1.2 Information State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
5.1.3 Natural Language Understanding and Generation . . . 221
5.1.4 Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
5.1.5 Conversational Domain . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 227
5.1.6 Dialogue Game . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
5.1.7 Deliberation Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
5.1.8 Control Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
5.2 Dialogue Generation and Levels of Cooperation . . . . . . . . 244
5.2.1 Generating Dialogue D1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
5.2.2 Generating a Fully Cooperative Alternative . . . . . . 258
5.2.3 A Note on p and the Degree of Non-Cooperation . . . 266
5.3 Comparison with Related Approaches . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267
5.4 Prototype Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
iv Contents
5.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
6 Conclusions and Future Work 279
6.1 Original Contributions of the Thesis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 280
6.2 Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 282
6.2.1 Extensions to the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 283
6.2.2 Implementation of Conversational Agents . . . . . . . 283
6.2.3 Applications of the Approach to other Domains . . . . 284
6.2.4 Practical and Commercial Exploitation . . . . . . . . 284
6.3 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 285
Bibliography 287
A Annotation Study Materials 307
A.1 Corpus of Political Interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
A.1.1 First Annotation Stage: Segmenting Turns . . . . . . 308
A.1.2 Second Annotation Stage: Selecting Content Features 310
A.2 Annotation Tool . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
A.3 Annotation Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
B Measuring Cooperation in Dialogue (Output) 313
C Survey for Eliciting Human Judgement 317
C.1 Facsimile of Online Survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
C.2 Dissemination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
C.2.1 Email Message Sent to Research Email Lists . . . . . 326
C.2.2 Facebook Post . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 327
D A Discussion on Modelling Turn Length 329





2.1 Grice’s conversational maxims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.2 Characterisation of information-seeking dialogues . . . . . . . 28
2.3 Architecture of the trains Dialogue System . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.4 Discourse Actor Algorithm of the trains Dialogue System . 37
3.1 Annotated fragment of the Paxman-Howard interview . . . . 66
3.2 Annotated fragment of the Paxman-Galloway interview . . . 67
3.3 Repetition used by an interviewee for producing soundbites . 89
3.4 Repetition used by an interviewer for rejecting replies . . . . 90
3.5 Labelling of complete and incomplete valid replies . . . . . . 91
3.6 A hand-crafted political interview transcript . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.7 Action labels in a (hand-crafted) political interview . . . . . . 93
3.8 Informal dialogue game for political interviews . . . . . . . . 96
3.9 Formal dialogue game for political interviews . . . . . . . . . 97
4.1 Two-step semi-automatic measure of cooperation (overview) . 101
4.2 Stages of the semi-automatic measure of cooperation . . . . . 103
4.3 Overview of the evaluation approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
vii
viii List of Figures
4.4 Flat coding scheme from preliminary investigations . . . . . . 109
4.5 Dialogue Act Taxonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
4.6 Content Feature Taxonomy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
4.7 Overview of the evaluation approach (Part 1) . . . . . . . . . 135
4.8 Annotation tool: main window . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
4.9 Annotation tool: turn annotator window . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.10 Annotator profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
4.11 Annotator familiarity with respect to an interview . . . . . . 140
4.12 Values of K-like coefficients and strength of agreement . . . . 145
4.13 Segment matching criteria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
4.14 Example of a fragment annotated by two coders in which
segmentation differs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
4.15 Aggregating annotations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
4.16 Example of the mapping between annotations and action labels174
4.17 Dialogue game for political interviews (repeated) . . . . . . . 178
4.18 Action labels and dynamic obligations for Interview 1 . . . . 179
4.19 Static and dynamic features for Interview 1 . . . . . . . . . . 183
4.20 Degree of cooperation for the interviews in the annotated cor-
pus (mean with error bars) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
4.21 English proficiency, cultural background and dialogue ana-
lysis expertise of survey volunteers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 194
4.22 Survey question to human observers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
4.23 Feedback comments left by volunteers at the end of the survey197
4.24 Human judgements on participant behaviour and familiarity
of volunteers with the interview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
4.25 Human judgements on participant behaviour and familiarity
of volunteers with the interview (continued) . . . . . . . . . . 199
List of Figures ix
4.26 Human judgement on participant behaviour for the interviews
in the corpus (mean with error bars) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
4.27 Survey results and the degree of cooperation for the political
interviews in the corpus (means with error bars, regression
line and Pearson’s r correlation coefficient) . . . . . . . . . . 201
4.28 Survey results and the degree of cooperation for interviewers
and interviewees (means with error bars, regression line and
Pearson’s r correlation coefficient) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
4.29 Degree of cooperation for the interviews in the annotated
corpus for different values of the dialogue history threshold
(DHT) runtime parameter (mean with error bars) . . . . . . 204
4.30 Degree of cooperation for the interviews in the annotated
corpus for different values of the dialogue history threshold
(DHT) runtime parameter (mean with error bars; continued) 205
4.31 Correlation between survey results and the degree of cooper-
ation for different values of the dialogue history threshold
(DHT) runtime parameter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
4.32 Correlation between survey results and the degree of cooper-
ation for different values of the dialogue history threshold
(DHT) runtime parameter (continued) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
5.1 A (hand-crafted) political interview example (D1) . . . . . . 214
5.2 Elements in a conversational agent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216
5.3 Domain-specific elements in a conversational agent . . . . . . 216
5.4 Control algorithm for political interview agents. . . . . . . . . 240
5.5 A fully cooperative political interview (D2). . . . . . . . . . . 259
5.6 A finite state machine specifying the interviewer prototype . 275
5.7 A finite state machine specifying the interviewee prototype . 276
x List of Figures
A.1 Annotation Tool (main window) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 312
D.1 Exponential decay function for decay rate q = 0.2. . . . . . . 331
D.2 Exponential decay function for decay rate q = 0.8. . . . . . . 331
D.3 Exponential decay function for decay rate q = 2. . . . . . . . 331
D.4 Exponential decay function for decay rate q = 5. . . . . . . . 331
D.5 Probability of success r(k) for q ∈ {0.2, 0.8, 2, 5}. . . . . . . . 332
D.6 Distribution of turn length over 10 trials of the release-floor
function for q ∈ {0.2, 0.8, 2, 5}. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 332
E.1 A hand-crafed political interview transcript . . . . . . . . . . 333
List of Tables
1.1 Some non-cooperative features for political interviews . . . . 10
1.2 Non-cooperation in the Paxman-Howard interview . . . . . . 12
4.1 Political interview fragments in the corpus annotation study . 136
4.2 Familiarity of the annotators with the interviews in the corpus
(first stage) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141
4.3 Number of segments identified by each annotator . . . . . . . 146
4.4 Inter-annotator agreement for segmentation (Krippendorff’s
αU ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
4.5 Number of occurrences and frequency of dialogue act func-
tions in the annotated corpus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
4.6 Inter-annotator agreement for dialogue act functions . . . . . 150
4.7 Pairwise confusion matrix of dialogue act function annotations150
4.8 Number of occurrences and frequency of dialogue act func-
tions in strictly matching annotated segments . . . . . . . . . 154
4.9 Inter-annotator agreement for dialogue act functions in the
set of strictly matching annotated segments . . . . . . . . . . 154
xi
xii List of Tables
4.10 Pairwise confusion matrix of dialogue act function annota-
tions for strictly matching segments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
4.11 Number of occurrences and frequency of dialogue act func-
tions in leniently matching annotated segments . . . . . . . . 157
4.12 Inter-annotator agreement for dialogue act functions in the
set of leniently matching annotated segments . . . . . . . . . 157
4.13 Pairwise confusion matrix of dialogue act function annota-
tions for leniently matching segments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
4.14 Inter-annotator agreement for referent segment annotations . 160
4.15 Number of occurrences and frequency of dialogue act func-
tions in the annotated corpus resulting from aggregating an-
notations of the first stage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
4.16 Familiarity of the annotators with the interviews in the corpus
(second stage) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
4.17 Number of occurrences and frequency of content features in
the annotated corpus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
4.18 Inter-annotator agreement for content features . . . . . . . . 167
4.19 Inter-annotator agreement for content features (excluding an-
notations of coder 7) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
4.20 Mapping annotations to action labels in political interviews . 171
4.21 Degree of non-cooperation for the participants in Interview 1 189
4.22 Degree of cooperation for the interviews in the annotated corpus191
4.23 Human judgement on participant behaviour for the interviews
in the corpus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
4.24 Pearson’s correlation coefficient between survey results and
the degree of cooperation for the political interviews in the
corpus (both aggregated) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202
List of Tables xiii
4.25 Degree of cooperation for the interviews in the annotated
corpus for different values of the dialogue history threshold
(DHT) runtime parameter (means) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
4.26 Pearson’s correlation coefficient between survey results and
the degree of cooperation for different values of the dialogue
history threshold (DHT) runtime parameter . . . . . . . . . . 209
5.1 Mapping between speaker utterances and dialogue moves. . . 223
xiv List of Tables
Chapter 1
Introduction
Most approaches to modelling conversation are based on a notion of full
cooperation between the dialogue participants. Traditional models relying
on intentions (Grosz and Sidner, 1986; Cohen and Levesque, 1991), conver-
sational games (Power, 1979; Carletta et al., 1997), shared plans (Grosz and
Sidner, 1990; Chu-Carroll and Carberry, 1998) or collaborative problem-
solving (Blaylock and Allen, 2005) explain dialogue situations in which par-
ticipants recognise each other’s intentions and, at least to some extent, adopt
each other’s goals when deciding on their actions. These assumptions are
theoretically grounded, as most work in linguistics has considered situations
in which participants share a common goal and cooperate to achieve it by
means of conversation (Grice, 1975; Clark and Schaefer, 1989). They are also
practically sound: dialogue models are usually implemented in the form of
dialogue systems, built for the purpose of providing a service to their users.
In this scenario, failure to cooperate either on the side of the system or of
the user is against the premises on which the system is conceived and used.
In everyday conversation, however, a great many situations do not con-
1
2 Chapter 1. Introduction
form to these assumptions. Consider the example below, in which BBC
presenter Jeremy Paxman questions former UK Home Secretary Michael
Howard with respect to a meeting in 1995 between Howard and the head
of the Prison Service, Derek Lewis, about the dismissal of the governor of
Parkhurst Prison, John Marriott, due to repeated security failures. The case
was given considerable attention in the media, as a result of accusations by
Lewis that Howard had instructed him, thus exceeding the powers of his
office1:
Example 1.1.
Paxman: (. . . ) Are you saying Mr Lewis is lying?
Howard: I have given a full account of this, and the position
is what I told the House of Commons, and let me
tell you what the position is-
Paxman: (interrupting) So you are saying that Mr Lewis
lied?
Howard: Let me tell you exactly what the position is. I was
entitled to be consulted and I was consulted, I was
entitled to express an opinion and I did express an
opinion. I was not entitled to instruct Derek Lewis
what to do, and I did not instruct him what to do
and you will understand and recall that Mr Mar-
riot was not suspended, he was moved, and Derek
Lewis told the Select Committee of the House of
Commons that it was his opinion, Derek Lewis’s
opinion, that he should be moved immediately.
That is what happened.
Paxman: Mr Lewis says: I – that is Mr Lewis – told him
what we had decided about Marriot, and why; he
– that is you – exploded; simply moving the gov-
ernor was politically unpalatable, it sounded in-
decisive, it would be seen as a fudge; if I did not
change my mind and suspend Marriot he would
have to consider overruling me. You can’t both
be right.
Howard: Mr Marriot was not suspended. I was entitled to
express my views. I was entitled to be consulted-
Paxman: (interrupting) Did you threaten to overrule him?
1An extended fragment of this interview can be found in http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Uwlsd8RAoqI (last accessed: September 2013).
3Howard: I was not entitled to instruct Derek Lewis, and I
did not instruct him.
Paxman: Did you threaten to overrule him?
Howard: The truth of the matter is that Mr. Marriott was
not suspended. I-
Paxman: (overlapping) Did you threaten to overrule him?
Howard: -did not overrule Derek Lewis.
Paxman: Did you threaten to overrule him?
Howard: I took advice on what I could or could not do-
Paxman: (overlapping) Did you threaten to overrule him,
Mr. Howard?
Howard: -and I acted scrupulously in accordance with that
advice, I did not overrule Derek Lewis-
Paxman: (overlapping) Did you threaten to overrule him?
Howard: - Mr. Marriott was not suspended.
Paxman: Did you threaten to overrule him?
Howard: I have accounted for my decision to dismiss Derek
Lewis-
Paxman: (overlapping) Did you threaten to overrule him?
Howard: -in great detail, before the House of Commons.
Paxman: I note that you’re not answering the question of
whether you threatened to overrule him.
(Newsnight, BBC, 1997)
While at some level Paxman and Howard are sharing a goal, for otherwise
they would not be having an interview, the exchange is clearly conflictive,
to the point that their behaviour compromises the flow of the conversation.
The fragment below took place seven years after the exchange in Example
1.1, when public awareness of the 1995 affair had dissipated:
Example 1.2.
Paxman: Can you clear up whether or not you did threaten
to overrule Derek Lewis when you were Home Sec-
retary?
Howard: Oh, come on, Jeremy, you are really going to go
back over that again? As...
Paxman: (overlapping) You’ve had seven years to think
about it!
Howard: (overlapping). . . as, as it happens, I didn’t. Are
you satisfied now?
Paxman: Thank you. Why didn’t you say that at the time?
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Howard: I, well, we’ve been over this many, many times. I,
I, I knew that everyone was crawling over every
syllable I said about that, and I wanted to check
very carefully what I said before answering your
question.
(Newsnight, BBC, 2004)
On this occasion, Howard provides an answer almost immediately and the
flow of the conversation contrasts noticeably with that in Example 1.1.
Below is another example. Jeremy Paxman interviews British MP George
Galloway, shortly after his victory in the UK 2005 General Election2:
Example 1.3.
Paxman: We’re joined now from his count in Bethnal Green
and Bow by George Galloway. Mr Galloway, are
you proud of having got rid of one of the very few
black women in Parliament?
Galloway: What a preposterous question. I know it’s very
late in the night, but wouldn’t you be better start-
ing by congratulating me for one of the most sen-
sational election results in modern history?
Paxman: Are you proud of having got rid of one of the very
few black women in Parliament?
Galloway: I’m not- Jeremy, move on to your next question.
Paxman: You’re not answering that one?
Galloway: No, because I don’t believe that people get elected
because of the colour of their skin. I believe people
get elected because of their record and because of
their policies. So move on to your next question.
Paxman: Are you proud-
Galloway: (Interrupting) Because I’ve got a lot of people who
want to speak to me. If you ask that question
again, I’m going, I warn you now.
Paxman: Don’t try and threaten me Mr Galloway, please.
(. . . )
Galloway: You are actually conducting one of the most - even
by your standards - one of the most absurd inter-
views I have ever participated in. I have just won
an election. Can you find it within yourself to re-
cognise that fact? To recognise the fact that the
people of Bethnal Green and Bow chose me this
evening. Why are you insulting them?
2The interview was aired live on 6 May, 2005 and can be found at http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=dKDuhGOqr8E (last accessed: September 2013).
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Galloway: You are insulting them, they chose me just a few
minutes ago. Can’t you find it within yourself even
to congratulate me on this victory?
Paxman: Congratulations, Mr Galloway.
Galloway: Thank you very much indeed.
(Waves, removes microphone and leaves)
(UK General Election, BBC, 2005)
This exchange too differs noticeably from typical political interviews, in
which one of the participants poses more or less impartial questions, while
the other provides clear and relevant answers. The interaction is confronta-
tional from the outset, to the point that the interviewee eventually abandons
the conversation.
The investigation reported in this thesis aims at shedding light on the
nature of non-cooperation in dialogue, by capturing the intuitions that allow
us to distinguish the conversational behaviour of the participants in inter-
actions like in Examples 1.1 and 1.3 from those like in Example 1.2, with
respect to how a dialogue of a certain type – in this case a political interview
– should normally go. Heritage describes the distinctive roles of participants
in news interviews as follows (Heritage, 1998, p. 8):
“the participants -irs [=interviewers] and ies [=interviewees]-
exclude themselves from a wide variety of actions that they are
normally free to do in the give and take of ordinary conversation.
If irs restrict themselves to asking questions, then they cannot
– at least overtly – express opinions, or argue with, debate or
criticize the interviewees’ positions nor, conversely, agree with,
support or defend them. Correspondingly, if ies restrict them-
selves to answers (or responses) to questions, then they cannot
ask questions (of irs or other ies), nor make unsolicited com-
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ments on previous remarks, initiate changes of topic, or divert
the discussion into criticisms of the ir or the broadcasting or-
ganization.”
Walton and Krabbe (1995) in their study of argumentation dialogues
formalise dialogue types by means of precise rules. They conclude that
rigorous models of conversational interaction are useful analytical tools, but
accept that most of the huge variety of everyday conversation escapes it.
Such characterisations are often based on strict rules that capture typical
dialogue situations while leaving out considerable detail. As the examples
above show, actual participant behaviour can diverge from the typical case in
unexpected ways, falling outside such characterisations3. It could be argued
that it is always possible to account for interactions like those in Examples
1.1 and 1.3 by adding further rules to capture the variations present in these
conversations. Still, in the limit this approach would require an additional
set of rules for each possible unconventional behaviour.
At the same time, the rules and patterns captured by formal models are
useful also in exceptional cases. As these models describe expected or per-
missible behaviour in a certain conversational scenario, they provide a basis
against which actual behaviour can be assessed in order to detect deviations.
This research aims at reconciling two worlds, using the insights from formal
models as descriptions of expected, conventional behaviour in the form of so-
cial obligations, but looking at naturally-occurring cases that deviate from
the norm. This, in turn, calls for the definition of non-cooperative con-
versational behaviour and for the techniques to detect this accurately and
reliably, which are at the core of our contribution.
3Consider, for instance, Ginzburg’s QUD model (Ginzburg, 1996) when applied to
dialogue (1), in which Howard repeatedly fails to either accept or reject Paxman’s question.
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1.1 What is Non-Cooperation in Dialogue?
During a conversation, participants interact in many ways. They speak
and listen, decode each other’s utterances, signal understanding, or request
clarifications. They request and provide information, accept questions and
statements, or point out inadequate proposals and offer alternatives. These
are all linguistic tasks that keep the conversation flowing.
In most cases, conversation supports a social activity that determines
how these actions ought to be performed. Successful conversation contrib-
utes to the aims of the social activity. At this level a second layer of in-
teraction is observed, in which participants ask useful questions, provide
truthful information and generally work together towards the completion of
the activity. The latter requires that the individual goals that the parti-
cipants bring to the conversation align without conflict. When this is not
the case, non-cooperation arises. Participants can fail to cooperate at the
level of the social activity, for instance by not providing the information that
the other party needs. This may or may not translate to non-cooperation at
the linguistic level, for instance by remaining totally silent or by diverting
the course of the conversation without stating the reasons for rejecting the
question.
However, participants can still cooperate at the conversational level
without contributing to the goals of the social activity. Consider, for in-
stance, a witness under interrogation in a U.S. trial refusing to answer a
question by appealing to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution4. Such
behaviour will be accepted in the conversational setting as established by
law, although it is not cooperative in relation with the goals of the trial. A
4“No person shall (. . . ) be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself ”.
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linguistically non-cooperative alternative would be the same witness remain-
ing silent, rather than answering or appealing to the Fifth Amendment. To
illustrate further, consider a fictional alternative to the exchange in Example
1.1, where Howard replies by saying “I will not answer that question, as it
is not relevant to whether I exceeded the powers of my office”. This is still
not cooperative for the goals of the interview as it is not contributing in-
formation that could be interesting to the audience, but it is cooperative at
the linguistic level. It would help in preserving the flow of the conversation,
e.g., by triggering a sub-dialogue to solve the disagreement.
The above calls for a treatment of cooperation at two clearly distinctive
levels of interaction: that of linguistic actions and that of social or task-
related activities. This distinction has been addressed before. Attardo
(1997) revisits Gricean pragmatics, relating non-linguistic cooperation to
participants’ behaviour towards realising task-related goals, and linguistic
cooperation to assumptions on their respective behaviour in order to encode
and decode intended meaning. From a computational perspective, Bunt
(1994) relies on a similar distinction for defining dialogue acts. Also, Traum
and Allen (1994) introduce discourse obligations as an alternative to joint
intentions and shared plans, to allow for models of dialogues in which par-
ticipants do not share the same high-level goals and where behaviour is also
determined by “a sense of obligation to behave within limits set by the so-
ciety” (Traum and Allen, 1994, p. 2). Walton and Krabbe (1995) propose
a typology of dialogue based on the initial situation triggering the exchange
and participants’ shared aims and individual goals. Based on their work,
Reed and Long (1997) distinguish cases where participants follow a common
set of dialogue rules and stay within a mutually acknowledged framework
from a stronger notion in which their individual goals are in the same dir-
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ection.
The research in this thesis is about linguistic cooperation, understood as
participants following the discourse obligations imposed upon them by the
social activity in which they are engaged. We do not deal with cooperation
at the task-level directly and the main focus is on cases in which dialogue
participants purposefully fail to follow their obligations, regardless of their
motivations for doing so.
1.2 An Extended Example
The approach we will develop in the central chapters of the thesis roughly
amounts to identifying a set of features that distinguish cooperative from
non-cooperative linguistic actions. The extent to which a dialogue parti-
cipant is non-cooperative will then be related to the number of such features
with respect to the size of the participant’s contributions.
As an approximation of the technique we propose in full later, consider
the examples of linguistic misbehaviour listed in Table 1.1, grouped following
three aspects of conversation: turn-taking, joint projects and speech acts.
We call these non-cooperative features (NCFs). The number of occurrences
of these features will determine the degree of non-cooperation (DNC) of an
exchange.
Turn-taking rules (Sacks et al., 1974) establish that speakers make their
contributions at adequate places and in particular ways. Interlocutors in a
political interview are expected to respect transition-relevance places, open-
ings and closings according to social conventions.
Joint projects (Clark, 1996) refer to participants’ accepting or rejecting
each other’s proposals. In political interviews a question can be accepted
explicitly or implicitly by providing a direct answer, and rejected explicitly
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Turn-Taking For both speakers:
• interrupting
• overlapping
• ending the exchange abruptly
Joint Projects Interviewer fails to either:
• accept answer
• ask next relevant question
• move to next topical issue
• state irrelevance of answer
Interviewee fails to either:
• accept question
• give relevant answer
• reject question
Speech Acts Interviewer either:
• expresses personal opinion
• argues, debates with or criticises
interviewee’s position subjectively
• agrees with, supports or defends
interviewee’s position subjectively
Interviewee either:
• asks (non-CR) question
• makes irrelevant comment
• initiates change of topic
• criticises interviewer
Table 1.1: Some non-cooperative features for political interviews
by stating how it fails to focus on matters of relevance. Likewise, replies can
be accepted explicitly or implicitly by asking a next relevant question or by
moving on to a new topical issue.
Speech Act theory (Searle, 1979) classifies utterances according to their
associated force and propositional content. Going back to Heritage’s com-
ment, in a political interview participants can fail to restrict their speech
acts to the force and content expected for their role. Non-cooperative fea-
tures related to speech acts include the interviewer expressing a personal
opinion or criticising subjectively the interviewee’s positions, and the inter-
viewee asking questions (except for clarification requests) or making irrelev-
ant comments.
As an example, consider another fragment of the Paxman-Howard inter-
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view introduced in Example 1.1, annotated with NCFs (O: overlap; JPF:
joint project failure; UC: unsolicited comment; I: interruption; TC: topic
change):
(1) P[11] : Uir.1 (overlapping) Did you threaten to overrule him? O
H[12] : Uie.1 . . . Mr. Marriot was not suspended. JPF
P[13] : Uir.2 Did you threaten to overrule him? JPF
H[14] : Uie.2 (pauses) I have accounted for my decision to dis-
miss Derek Lewis. . .
P[15] : Uir.3 (overlapping) Did you threaten to overrule him? O
H[16] : Uie.2 . . . in great detail before the House of Commons. UC
P[17] : Uir.4 I note that you’re not answering the question
whether you threatened to overrule him.
H[18] : Uie.3 Well, the important aspect of this which it’s very
clear to bear in mind. . .
JPF
P[19] : Uir.5 (interrupting) I’m sorry, I’m going to be frightfully
rude but. . .
I
H[20] : Uie.4 Yes, you can. . .
P[21] : Uir.6 (overlapping) I’m sorry. . . O
H[22] : Uie.4 (overlapping) . . . you can put the question and I
will give you, I will give you an answer.
O
P[23] : Uir.7 . . . it’s a straight yes-or-no question and a straight
yes-or-no answer:
Uir.8 did you threaten to overrule him?
H[24] : Uie.5 I discussed the matter with Derek Lewis.
Uie.6 I gave him the benefit of my opinion.
Uie.7 I gave him the benefit of my opinion in strong
language, but I did not instruct him because I
was not, er, entitled to instruct him.
UC
Uie.8 I was entitled to express my opinion and that is
what I did.
UC
P[25] : Uir.9 With respect, that is not answering the question
of whether you threatened to overrule him.
H[26] : Uie.9 It’s dealing with the relevant point which was
what I was entitled to do and what I was not en-
titled to do,
TC
Uie.10 and I have dealt with this in detail before the
House of Commons and before the select commit-
tee.
UC
For each participant, the degree of non-cooperation (DNC) is computed
as the proportion of utterances with one of more occurrences of these non-
cooperative features. Table 1.2 summarises non-cooperative features, utter-
ances and the degree of non-cooperation for each participant.
The core of this thesis is dedicated to providing precise definitions for the
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Paxman (ir) Howard (ie)
Interruptions 1 0
Overlaps 3 1
Project Failures 1 2
Unsolicited Comments 0 4
Topic Change 0 1
Total ncfs 5 8
Utterances 9 10
DNC 0.56 0.80
Table 1.2: Non-cooperation in the Paxman-Howard interview
concepts above, to proposing and evaluating sound mechanisms for reliably
measuring linguistic non-cooperation in dialogue and to devising a model of
conversational agents that can incorporate these elements in conversation.
1.3 Research Question
Our research question reads as follows:
RQ: What elements are needed in a computational model of
conversational agents so that they can exhibit and cope
with non-cooperative as well as cooperative linguistic be-
haviour in dialogue, in particular in the domain of political
interviews?
This research belongs in the area of computational pragmatics: the study
of language in use or language in context (Levinson, 1983) from a computa-
tional perspective. This involves finding computational models of phenom-
ena occurring in language use and evaluating the accuracy of those models.
By computational model, we mean an abstract description of a process, sys-
tem or phenomenon that can be implemented as a computer program (i.e.,
that is computable). Let us explain the meaning of the main terms in the
statement of the question and justify their use:
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• computational model of conversational agents: as we explained
above, computational models are abstract descriptions that are com-
putable. In our case, the model will ultimately describe the parti-
cipants in a conversation (i.e., the conversational agents). This in-
cludes rules of expected behaviour for dialogues in the domain, in-
dividual goals, conversational obligations, priorities associated with
goals and obligations and a dialogue management component.
• elements: this refers to the aspects of the model that are either
general to most dialogue situations or specific to the domain in which
we have focused our research5. This means that although we focus
part of the research on a specific domain, we expect the conclusions
we draw to apply to conversation in general.
• cooperative and non-cooperative linguistic behaviour in dia-
logue: this distinction is central to our research and was hinted at
above. Intuitively, it refers to whether participants do or do not be-
have as is expected for the type of dialogue in which they engage. This
will be defined rigorously in Chapter 3 and exhaustively evaluated in
Chapter 4.
• exhibit and cope with: this means that the agents should be able,
not only to produce cooperative and non-cooperative linguistic beha-
viour, but also to detect it in their interlocutors and eventually reason
about it as part of the decision processes that motivate their actions.
• political interviews: this is the domain in which we will focus our
5For example, the rules of expected behaviour will apply only to dialogues in the
domain, while the mechanism by which cooperation is measured and the ability of agents
to decide whether they will discharge an obligation or behave following their private goals
are properties that would apply to dialogues of any type.
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study of non-cooperative conversational behaviour. It is intended to
provide a well-defined set of scenarios, scoping the research in a way
that is suitable for concrete empirical analysis.
1.4 Why does it Matter?
The motivation for addressing this question is to extend the state-of-the-art
of computational dialogue modelling to cases in which the conversation flow
is compromised to some extent but without reaching complete breakdown.
Shedding light on the nature of linguistic non-cooperation in dialogue prom-
ises to yield a better understanding of conversation, and will certainly be
of use in the analysis – manual, semi and fully automatic – of natural lan-
guage interactions and on applications such as human-like virtual personal
assistants, tutoring agents, sophisticated dialogue systems, and role-playing
virtual humans.
The assumption that dialogue is regarded as an activity that is – or
should be – inherently cooperative, has deprived alternative situations of
much attention. This is worsened by a lack of clarity in what is considered
non-cooperation in dialogue. As discussed in Chapter 2, this has led to
studies of conflict and strategic actions in conversation that belong in the
realm of non-cooperative behaviour at the level of the social activity, but
still assume that participants are cooperative in their linguistic actions.
Looking for an answer to the research question proposed above would
shed light on several areas:
• For general knowledge, this research would provide a better under-
standing of dialogue structure and pragmatics by looking at phenom-
ena that have not been addressed before.
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• In the area of dialogue systems, virtual humans and conversational
agents, a generalization of our results would allow for the development
of systems that deal with non-cooperative conversational behaviour
and/or that behave non-cooperatively (according to their goals), res-
ulting in increased flexibility, robustness and closeness to how humans
interact using language.
• Direct applications of an accurate model of non-cooperative linguistic
behaviour in dialogue to the analysis of natural, everyday conversation.
• For the empirical domain, it would provide a better understanding of
the actions of interviewers and politicians during an interview, of the
consequences these have on the dynamics of the dialogue and of how
all this is perceived by the audience.
1.5 Contributions of the Thesis
This thesis makes the following original contributions to knowledge:
• A definition of cooperative and non-cooperative linguistic behaviour
in dialogue, which combines the notions of discourse obligations and
dialogue games to specify appropriate behaviour, and allows for the
detection of inappropriate actions. The definition is formalised and
fully specified for the political interview conversational setting.
• A coding scheme for the manual segmentation, annotation and clas-
sification of linguistic behaviour in political interviews. The coding
scheme is supported by domain-independent tools, and evaluated for
reliability on a corpus of political interviews.
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• A domain-independent, automatic method for measuring non-coop-
erative linguistic behaviour empirically in annotated dialogue. The
method is fully implemented, and evaluated for validity on a corpus of
political interviews.
• A domain-independent, formal and implementable model of conversa-
tional agents that incorporates the concepts and mechanisms above,
combining them with the other elements and functions involved in con-
versation. We show how this addition allows for the generation of a
wider range of dialogues, by manipulating parameters that control how
agents weigh discourse obligations and private goals when deciding on
their contributions.
1.6 Outline of the Thesis
Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature with the aim of connecting our work
with previous research. The chapter is structured around the notion of co-
operation in dialogue, focusing first on how other authors have addressed
the distinction between cooperation at the level of the linguistic action and
cooperation at the level of the underlying social activity. Next, the focus is
on linguistic cooperation and on how the concepts that allow us to define
it have been approached in traditional models of dialogue. This is followed
by a discussion on how non-cooperation has been conceived and incorpor-
ated in computational theories of dialogue and where this differs from the
approach we take in this work. The chapter concludes with a discussion on
the nature and analysis of political interviews with the aim of understanding
the empirical domain and what should be considered linguistic cooperative
behaviour in such a conversational setting.
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Chapter 3 presents the conceptual framework for the study of non-
cooperation in dialogue used in the rest of the thesis. This includes precise
definition of linguistic cooperation and non-cooperation, based on the inter-
connected notions of global dialogue games and discourse obligations. These
concepts are formalised and illustrated in the context of political interviews.
The chapter closes with a detailed set of rules that specify expected beha-
viour in political interviews which is used in the examples of the rest of the
thesis and in the empirical evaluation of the approach.
Chapter 4 describes and evaluates a semi-automatic method for meas-
uring linguistic non-cooperation in naturally-occurring political interviews.
The method consists of two steps. In the first step, dialogue transcripts are
segmented and coded following a proposed scheme for qualitatively classi-
fying the contributions of the speakers. In the second step, the annotated
data is automatically analysed with respect to rules that specify expected
behaviour in political interviews. The result of this automatic analysis is a
dialogue marked up with cooperative and non-cooperative features. These
features lead to a score for each speaker that indicates the extent to which
the participant behaved according to the expectations associated with their
role in the dialogue, which we interpret as the degree of cooperation of the
participant with respect to the conversational setting. The chapter includes
an extensive evaluation of the reliability of the coding scheme, analysing
inter-annotator agreement for segmentation and for both annotation stages
on a corpus of political interviews. The validity of the method is assessed by
analysing the correlation between the resulting scores and human judgment
on the same interview transcripts elicited by means of a survey.
Chapter 5 presents a model of conversational agents that can exhibit
and deal with varying degrees of linguistic cooperation. With a focus on
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dialogue management, the concepts, structures and algorithms introduced
and evaluated earlier in the thesis are incorporated in the agents’ architec-
ture. The mechanisms by which these elements work together are formalised
and illustrated with an example from the political interview conversational
setting. It is shown how a simple change of parameters can lead to inter-
actions with very different degrees of linguistic cooperation. The chapter
closes with a discussion on the differences and similarities of the modelling
approach with related research and with the description of a prototypical
system that incorporates some of the elements in the model.
Chapter 6 concludes, with a list of the contributions of the thesis and
a discussion of future work.
. . . we may not be sure whose shoulders we are standing on,




A Review of Related Work
This chapter presents a review of research on dialogue pragmatics and com-
putational dialogue modelling in the light of cooperation. The discussion
starts by considering different notions of cooperation from the field of prag-
matics. Next, we look at how cooperation and non-cooperation have been
addressed in existing approaches to dialogue modelling and analyse in some
detail those that are closer to the one put forward in this thesis. Finally, we
discuss relevant research in the analysis of political interviews, the domain
of our empirical investigations.
2.1 Overview of the Chapter
The notion of cooperation between dialogue participants is recurrent in the
analysis and modelling of conversation. This is because conversation requires
that participants work together coordinating their actions. However, con-
versation supports social activities in which participants do not necessarily
share the same goals. This often leads to compromises in the extent to which
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they cooperate and to unexpected phenomena emerging in the dynamics of
the interaction. Over the next four sections we look at relevant research in
the philosophy of language, pragmatics, computational linguistics, conver-
sation analysis and dialogue systems design. We examine relevant concepts
from theories of conversation that lend themselves as starting points to the
study of non-cooperative behaviour. We also consider technical aspects of
these theories when implemented as part of a conversational agent or of a
dialogue system. As we will argue, although many of these approaches deal
with non-cooperation at the level of the activity supported by the conver-
sation, they still assume that participants are linguistically cooperative. In
contrast, our research is aimed at formalising and studying, systematically,
some of the phenomena that emerge when these restrictions are relaxed and
participants can be non-cooperative also at the linguistic level.
The empirical domain from where we draw our examples and the data for
the corpus study presented in Chapter 4 is that of political interviews. We
will briefly present key contributions from sociolinguistics and other discip-
lines on systematic studies of this dialogue type. In Chapter 3, these insights
are developed into a set of rules, capturing behaviour that is conventionally
expected from interviewers and interviewees throughout an interview.
Section 2.2 focuses on notions of cooperation in dialogue, reviewing tra-
ditional literature and grounding the claim that cooperative and non-co-
operative behaviour do indeed happen at different levels of the interaction.
Section 2.3 looks at how cooperation is specified and at the role it has played
in the analysis and modelling of dialogue. It also discusses the concepts that
have been used in the past to model cooperative dialogues and those that
we will build on to put together our approach. Section 2.4 focuses on how
non-cooperative behaviour has been characterised in the past and on the
2.2. Notions of Cooperation in Dialogue 21
ways in which these models fail to account for linguistic non-cooperation.
Finally, Section 2.5 looks at how political interviews are conventionally char-
acterised, what inappropriate behaviours have been identified on either role
and why they provide a rich domain on which to carry out the empirical
studies that support this thesis.
2.2 Notions of Cooperation in Dialogue
An assumption that interlocutors fully cooperate is at the core of most
of the traditional literature on the pragmatics of dialogue. For instance,
Grice’s notion of conversational implicature provides an explanation for
coherence in the following example (Grice, 1975, p. 51):
Example 2.1.
A is standing by an obviously immobilized car and is approached
by B; the following exchange takes place:
(1) A: I am out of petrol.
B: There is a garage round the corner.
Nothing in B’s contribution explicitly indicates that the garage is open at
the moment and that it has petrol for sale. However, as A assumes that
B is trying to help, he or she can conclude that B thinks it to be the case.
This information about the garage is not logically entailed by B’s words; it
is implicated.
For reasoning about such cases, Grice provides a descriptive framework,
starting with the Cooperative Principle (Grice, 1975, p. 45):
Make your conversational contribution such as is required, at the
stage at which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of
the talk exchange in which you are engaged.
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The principle is then divided into conversational maxims: a set of ra-
tional principles which Grice grouped following the Kantian categories of
Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner (or Modality), as shown in
Figure 2.1. Grice established a relation between the maxims and the Cooper-
ative Principle (CP): if the maxims are followed, the principle is observed.
Conversely, assuming the principle holds, observance or exploitation of the
maxims, allows the listener to work out what the speaker is really trying to
say. This notion is called conversational implicature. Despite appear-
ing as imperatives, as has been noted e.g. by Prince (1982), the CP and
the maxims are of most use if regarded as presumptions that speakers and
listeners can exploit for conveying and inferring meanings that are not lo-
gically entailed by their utterances. For example, if we assume the speaker
is trying to help, the mention of a garage in Example 2.1 implicates that
it is open and selling petrol, as otherwise he or she would be violating the
Maxim of Relation. Maxims can also be exploited, that is flouted with the
Maxim of Quantity:
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the
current purposes of the exchange).
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.
Maxim of Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true.
1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.
Maxim of Relevance: Be Relevant.
Maxim of Manner: Be perspicuous.




Figure 2.1: Grice’s conversational maxims (Grice, 1975, pp. 45–46)
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purpose of inducing an implicature. Consider the following example:
Example 2.2.
(2) A: How did you find the restaurant last night?
B: It was cheap and the toilets were clean.
B certainly knows, for instance, about the quality of the food. The omission
of this information is an apparent violation of the Maxim of Quantity, which
implicates that the food in the restaurant was not good.
Furthermore, speakers can also covertly violate or overtly opt out from
the maxims or from the CP. Grice refers to these possibilities, although he
does not elaborate on them any further (Grice, 1975, p. 49):
A participant in a talk exchange may fail to fulfill a maxim in
various ways, which include the following:
1. He may quietly and unostentatiously violate a maxim; if
so, in some cases he will be liable to mislead.
2. He may opt out from the operation both of the maxim
and of the CP; he may say, indicate or allow it to become
plain that he is unwilling to cooperate in the way the maxim
requires. He may say, for example, I cannot say more; my
lips are sealed.
Although extremely influential, Grice’s ideas have been often criticised
as being too vague, e.g. by Kiefer (1979), Sperber and Wilson (1982) and,
more recently, Frederking (1996) and Clark (1996, pp. 141–146); limited by
intercultural differences, e.g. by Keenan (1976), later contested by Prince
(1982); or applicable only to cases in which there is a strong sense of co-
operation between the interlocutors, e.g. by Asher and Lascarides (2008;
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in press). Most of these shortcomings are evident if Grice’s maxims and
the CP are regarded as rules or guidelines that strictly govern the beha-
viour of participants in a conversation. Grice might have contributed to
the misconception, as he states: “For a time, I was attracted by the idea
that observance of the CP and the maxims, in a talk exchange, could be
thought of as a quasi-contractual matter, with parallels outside the realm of
discourse” (Grice, 1975, p. 48).
One consequence of regarding Grice’s framework as normative is that
very little attention has been paid to cases in which the operation of the
CP cannot be assumed1. This behaviour, which Grice referred to as opting
out, does not necessarily lead to a breach of expected or rational behavior.
Recall, for instance, the example introduced in the previous chapter of a
witness under interrogation in a US trial who refuses to answer a question
by appealing to the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution. Prince (1982)
presents a convincing analysis of the social role of the maxims in each cat-
egory, emphasising that they are of most use when taken as presumptions,
i.e. as underlying hypotheses that speakers and listeners can exploit for con-
veying and inferring meanings that are not logically entailed by the utter-
ances. This is also the approach taken by Levinson (1983) when discussing
Grice’s work.
The cooperative principle refers to the “accepted purpose or direction
of the talk exchange”. Although vague, this mention of purpose or direc-
tion could be taken to mean shared purposes or common goals. In fact,
Grice does mention these when he elaborates on the concepts of exchange
1An exception is Asher and Lascarides (in press) who propose an extension to previous
work (Asher and Lascarides, 2003) that explains the derivation of implicatures even when
Gricean cooperation cannot be assumed. The authors use a notion of safety to relate im-
plicatures derived outside the CP with the speaker’s public commitments and distinguish
between three levels of cooperation: basic, rhetorical and Gricean. We come back to this
work and the connections with our approach later.
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and engagement as they are used in the statement of the CP. He refers to
“cooperative efforts; and each participant recognises in them, to some ex-
tent, a common purpose or set of purposes, or at least a mutually accepted
direction” (Grice, 1975, p. 45) and assumes that “each party should, for
the time being, identify himself with the transitory conversational interests
of the other” (Grice, 1975, p. 48). This contributes to the claim that the
notion of cooperation put forward by Grice is strong (Asher and Lascarides,
2003; Asher and Lascarides, in press), that is one in which participants have
a common goal and willingly adopt each others intentions. In the rest of
this section we see how cooperation has been characterised at levels that are
in a sense weaker than proposed by Grice.
Attardo (1997) revisits Gricean pragmatics, identifying two levels of co-
operation related, respectively, to linguistic and non-linguistic goals. He
claims that Grice’s definition of the CP exhibits a “systematic ambiguity”
in this regard. Attardo supports his view by showing how some implicatures
in the examples given by Grice (1975) are worked out relying on goals that
must be shared beyond that particular conversational exchange. In At-
tardo’s view, linguistic cooperation refers to assumptions on the speakers’
behaviour in order to encode and decode intended meaning. Non-linguistic
cooperation is related to the behaviour of the participants towards real-
ising the goals they intended to achieve by means of the exchange. Attardo
goes on by proposing an additional principle of non-linguistic cooperation,
which he calls Perlocutionary Cooperative Principle (PCP), regard-
ing Grice’s CP as relevant only to the linguistic level – an interpretation of
Grice’s work which is debatable, as it follows from the previous paragraph.
Attardo does not claim that the theory based on Grice’s CP is wrong, but in-
stead proposes this explicit distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic
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cooperation as an expansion. The article includes an analysis of the relation
between the PCP and other “principles” such as politeness or self-interest,
which in Attardo’s view override the PCP. Unfortunately, his discussion
on the violation of the PCP is inconclusive and limited to observing the
interdependence of the CP and PCP for working out implicatures, which
follows directly from the fact that Grice intended his CP to account for
both linguistic and (at least at some level of the interaction) non-linguistic
cooperation. Attardo is sceptic about the possibility of meaningfully viol-
ating or flouting the PCP, somewhat close to Grice’s initial temptation to
regard the CP as a quasi-contractual matter. This stance seems to suggest
that violating the PCP would be irrational and therefore unworthy of at-
tention. From such a normative perspective, the PCP would suffer from
the same criticisms and shortcomings that were identified in relation to the
normative interpretation of Grice’s CP.
Asher and Lascarides (2008) also identify two levels of cooperation in
Grice’s approach: a first level related to how meaning is encoded by the
participants (Clark, 1996) and a second level in which the CP and the con-
versational maxims are followed. In recent work (Asher and Lascarides, in
press), they explicitly address the problem of coherence in strategic conversa-
tion – e.g. courtroom cross-examinations – in the absence of full cooperation
between the participants. In this case, they distinguish between three levels
of cooperation: basic and rhetorical cooperation governing respectively
linguistic meaning and speech act coherence, and full or Gricean cooper-
ation relating to the alignment of conversational goals. Assuming basic co-
operation, the authors focus on rhetorical cooperation and provide a formal
mechanism for drawing implicatures even when the CP does not hold. They
propose a property of safety to determine when implicatures conveyed in
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settings in which Gricean cooperation cannot be assumed can be taken as
public commitments. Asher and Lascarides refer to plans for empirical work
to extend their approach beyond the naturally-occurring, yet isolated ex-
amples they use in the article (Asher and Lascarides, in press, p. 49). The
first steps in these directions are reported in the context of the STAC Project
(Asher et al., 2012; Afantenos et al., 2012).
A different approach to distinguishing between goals in conversation is
proposed by Walton and Krabbe (1995). In the context of natural argument-
ation (or informal logic), they develop a formal, normative framework aimed
at identifying situations that lead to fallacy2. In doing so, they define a ty-
pology of dialogue given by the initial situation (precondition) that triggered
the exchange, the joint aims assumed to be shared by the participants and
their individual goals (which can be at odds). Walton and Krabbe identify
six main types of dialogue in their framework: persuasion, negotiation, in-
quiry, deliberation, information-seeking and eristic3 – Figure 2.2 shows their
characterization of information-seeking dialogues. In the course of a conver-
sation, participants usually reach situations in which the preconditions for
a dialogue of a different type are met. The change from one dialogue type
into another is called dialectical shift and must be acknowledged by both
parties. When the second dialogue appears as a sub-dialogue of the first (i.e.
when the second dialogue ends the first one resumes from the point where
it was left) the shift is called a functional embedding.
Walton and Krabbe addressed the problem of formally modelling persua-
sion dialogue from a game-theoretic perspective. They limited their study
to persuasion dialogue as it was directly relevant to natural argumentation.
2In informal logic, a fallacy is an argument that appears as valid but has flaws in the
reasoning from the premises to the conclusion.
3Eristic dialogues are essentially verbal fights; arguing for the sake of conflict.
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Information-Seeking Dialogue
Initial Situation Personal Ignorance
Main Goal Spreading Knowledge & Revealing Positions
Participants’ Aims Gain, Pass on, Show, or Hide Personal
Knowledge
Side Benefits Agreement, Develop Reveal Positions, Influ-
ence Onlookers, Add to Prestige, Vent Emo-
tions
Subtypes Expert Consultation, Didactic Dialogue,
Interview, Interrogation
Figure 2.2: Characterisation of information-seeking dialogues (Walton and
Krabbe, 1995, p. 66)
Building on an example (presumably artificial, given the absence of sources),
they identified a set of strict rules for two subtypes of persuasion dialogue
(permissive and rigorous) and defined a third type as the functional em-
bedding of a rigorous persuasion dialogue within a permissive persuasion
dialogue. The dialectic shifts at the transitions between both types were
also modelled by a strict set of rules, defining what was a licit shift and
what was not. The authors claim that their model is general enough to
account for dialogues like the example and their thesis is that if both par-
ticipants follow the rules and all shifts are licit, the argument is valid. On
the other hand, failure to follow the rules or to perform licit shifts results in
fallacy.
The limitations of this approach are mainly related to the lack of em-
pirical support. Walton and Krabbe accept that a formal account can only
deal with an idealization of the type of dialogue it addresses. Nevertheless,
they consider the attempt to provide a mathematically precise description
of (a certain class of) dialogue to be worthwhile, even if it does not apply to
the vast complexity of naturally occurring conversation. We agree with this
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view, which is especially appealing if we attempt to approach dialogue phe-
nomena from a computational perspective, but reckon that resulting models
would be greatly improved if they were supported (and inspired) by stronger
empirical evidence.
An analysis of Walton and Krabbe’s framework from the perspective of
cooperation appears in an article by Reed and Long (1997). The authors pro-
pose a definition of cooperation in dialogue that, they claim, acts at the level
of the discourse, as opposed to the utterance-by-utterance notion of cooper-
ation in Grice’s CP. In their view, participants are cooperative if they follow
a common set of dialogue rules, and stay within a mutually acknowledged
framework. This means that interlocutors agree on the type of dialogue (in
Walton and Krabbe’s sense) in which they engage, adhere to the set of rules
and main goal of that type and respect the rules for licit functional embed-
ding when shifting from one type of dialogue to another. The authors use
the term collaboration4 to refer to a notion stronger than cooperation in
which the individual goals of both participants point in the same direction.
They continue with an analysis of Walton and Krabbe’s typology in terms of
cooperation and collaboration and conclude that all dialogue falling in the
classification is inherently cooperative. This is consistent with Walton and
Krabbe’s conclusion that, for natural argumentation, failure to follow the
rules they identified for persuasion dialogue results in fallacy. However, it is
not clear what are the consequences of breaking the rules for other types of
dialogue and Reed and Long do not address this issue in their article.
4Although we adopt the distinction between what Read and Long call cooperation and
collaboration, in the sequel we will abandon these terms in favour of the more explicit (and
less arbitrary) linguistic cooperation and task-level cooperation. Coincidentally, the
term collaboration is used by Allwood et al. (2000) to denote a notion weaker than that of
ideal cooperation (Allwood, 1976) which involves the participants cognitive and ethical
mutual consideration, joint purposes and trust. This is a use of the words cooperation
and collaboration with a meaning somewhat opposite to that intended by Reed and Long.
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We agree with the authors in that their definition of cooperation operates
at a more global level in the discourse than that of Grice. Furthermore, it
allows for an analysis of a participant’s behaviour from a perspective that
includes the obligations or presumptions determined by the social setting,
the individual goals of each party and the benefits they expect from the
exchange – that is, the same aspects Walton and Krabbe considered for
establishing their typology of dialogues5.
From the discussion so far, it is clear that cooperation in dialogue can
be addressed from several perspectives. The notion of expected behaviour is
recurrent in the literature. Determined by low-level conversational mechan-
isms, social convention, institutional settings or participant roles, underlying
assumptions on speakers behaviour are relevant to the resulting structure
of the conversation. This is also evident in the short examples of non-
cooperative behaviour we presented in the previous chapter. Consider for
instance the following turns from the interview in Example 1.1 in Chapter
1:
(27) paxman: I note that you’re not answering the question
whether you threatened to overrule him.
(. . . )
(32) howard: You can put the question and I will give you an
answer.
and this fragment from the interview in Example 1.3:
5As discussed in the next section, Bunt (1994) also looks at these aspects when defining
how dialogue acts operate on context. He uses the term social context to refer to the
institutional setting of the dialogue, the roles of the participants and their communicative
rights and obligations at any point in the dialogue. Individual goals are also part of the
account and fall under what Bunt calls cognitive context.
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(30) galloway: You are actually conducting one of the most -
even by your standards - one of the most absurd
interviews I have ever participated in.
In both cases, participants appeal to underlying assumptions on the expec-
ted behaviour associated with their respective roles in a political interview.
When Galloway classifies the current interview as absurd, he does so by
contrasting it with other instances, certainly closer to the convention. Like-
wise, when Paxman notes that Howard is not answering the question, he
does so on the basis that interviewees are expected to give an answer, as in
fact Howard confirms shortly after. These aspects of political interviews are
discussed in detail in Section 2.5.
We close this section on two notes. First, Gricean maxims are of better
use when regarded as underlying assumptions that participants can utilise
to increase the amount of information conveyed by their utterances. Ana-
logously, awareness of expected behaviour determined by the type of conver-
sation – and awareness that those expectations can be disregarded – offer an
interesting perspective from which dialogue can be analysed and modelled.
Second, cooperation can be observed at several levels. At each of these
levels, a set of (usually tacit) rules, norms or conventions is followed by co-
operative participants when producing and interpreting their contributions.
Two very distinctive levels can be identified in the research discussed above:
linguistic cooperation6, in which participants adhere to a set of linguistic
conventions and mutual expectations specific to the conversational setting
6Asher and Lascarides (in press) further divide this level into basic cooperation
(Clark, 1996) which relates to how meaning is encoded (e.g. whether the participants
speak the same language, or use specific jargon with the same meaning) and rhetorical
cooperation which refers to what dialogue acts are expected in response to the acts of
the others party. In these terms, we will assume that basic cooperation is the case and
focus on a notion of cooperation closer to Asher and Lascarides’s rhetorical cooperation.
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that preserve the dynamics of the conversation; and task-level coopera-
tion, in which the individual goals of the participants with respect to the
underlying task are aligned.
2.3 Cooperation in Dialogue Modelling
As we mentioned in the previous chapter, most computational models of
dialogue are constructed on the assumption that participants are cooper-
ative. These assumptions are reasonable, as such models are developed in
the context of dialogue systems: software systems that have a natural
language dialogue component as part of their interface.
Dialogue systems are built for the purpose of providing a service to their
users. In this scenario, failure to cooperate, either on the side of the system
or of the user, is against the premises on which the system is conceived and
used. Examples of early academic dialogue systems include artemis (Sadek
et al., 1997), verbmobil (Wahlster, 1993) and trains (Allen and Schubert,
1991). artemis is a spoken information-seeking system based on principles
of rationality (Cohen and Levesque, 1990) and intentionality (Sadek, 1992;
Sadek et al., 1996). verbmobil is a speech-to-speech translation system
that works as a mediator between two users speaking different languages,
relying on dialogue acts (Bunt, 1994) and plan recognition (Jekat et al.,
1995; Alexandersson et al., 1997).
trains is a planning system for the transportation domain, which was
influential in developing and trying new ideas for dialogue modelling. We
describe the system in some detail below, as the theoretical approach to
dialogue management is closely related to ours. Before, we discuss two
concepts that are relevant to cooperation and dialogue modelling: dialogue
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acts (Bunt, 1994) and discourse obligations (Traum and Allen, 1994)7.
In the speech act tradition (Austin, 1962; Searle, 1969; Searle, 1979),
dialogue is structured as a sequence of actions performed by the speaker
with associated force and propositional content. Dialogue acts8 (Bunt,
1994) are an extension of speech acts to include features from turn-taking,
adjacency pairs and grounding. Originating from the field of conversa-
tion analysis (Schegloff, 1968), it was first proposed by Sacks et al. (1974)
that dialogue participants take turns for making their contribution at ad-
equate places and in particular ways. These shifts are governed by a set
of turn-taking rules. Adjacency pairs, also originate from conversation
analysis and refer to conversational structures composed of two parts pro-
duced by different speakers (e.g. question-answer, greeting-greeting, offer-
acceptance/rejection). Grounding, or establishing a common ground,
refers to the process by which participants agree on the set of things they
mutually believe, know or assume (Clark and Schaefer, 1989). Grounding is
divided in two phases (Clark and Brennan, 1991, p. 130):
Presentation phase: A presents utterance u for B to consider.
He does so on the assumption that, if B gives evidence e or
stronger, he can believe that she understands what he means by
u.
Acceptance phase: B accepts utterance u by giving evidence
e that she believes she understands what A means by u. She
does so on the assumption that, once A registers that evidence,
he will also believe that she understands.
7Although they are not part of this review, other influential notions like cognitive states
(Allen and Perrault, 1980; Allen, 1995) and plans (Grosz and Sidner, 1990; Chu-Carroll
and Carberry, 1998) are also present in the trains system.
8Dialogue acts are closely related to conversational moves (Power, 1979; Carletta
et al., 1997) and conversation acts (Traum and Hinkelman, 1992).
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Traum (1994) revisited the notion of grounding and proposed a computa-
tional theory of the mechanisms involved in achieving a common ground in
natural dialogue.
Bunt proposes dialogue acts as “functional units used by the speaker to
change the context” (Bunt, 1994, p. 3) and identifies in them three proper-
ties: utterance form, communicative function and semantic content.
Changes to the linguistic context are determined by the utterance form,
while communicative function and semantic content relate to the force and
propositional content of a speech act, respectively. From a context-changing
perspective, the communicative function determines the significance of the
semantic content in the new context. Bunt gives the following example
(Bunt, 1994, p. 4):
For instance, a dialogue act with the utterance form “Does it
rain?”, the communicative function yes/no question and the
proposition it is raining as semantic content, has the effect
of adding the utterance Does it rain? to the linguistic context,
and creating in the addressee (among other things) the belief
that the speaker wants to know whether the proposition it is
raining is true.
The notion of context proposed by Bunt considers five categories: lin-
guistic, semantic, physical, social and cognitive. Each category is
further divided into global and local. Global aspects for each category
remain constant during the conversation but local context changes as the
dialogue progresses. The framework is completed by distinguishing between
dialogue control and task-oriented dialogue acts, depending on whether
their communicative function is intended to control the interaction or con-
cerned with the underlying task.
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Discourse obligations (Traum and Allen, 1994) were introduced as an
alternative to joint intentions (Cohen and Levesque, 1991) and shared plans
(Grosz and Sidner, 1990) to allow for models of dialogue in which parti-
cipants do not have the same high-level (i.e. non-linguistic, task-level) goals
but still engage in conversation. In this view, conversational behaviour is
determined, not only by participants’ goals, but also by “a sense of oblig-
ation to behave within limits set by the society that the agent is part of.”
(Traum and Allen, 1994, p. 2). Obligations are obtained from rules that
encode discourse conventions and updated dynamically along the course of
the conversation. In the case of conflict between goals and obligations, the
latter are favoured. The authors consider the possibility of an agent pursu-
ing its goals at the expense of violating obligations, but they do not analyse
the consequences of this any further. In fact, as we discuss below, the imple-
mented system on which they tried these ideas always discharges obligations
before considering any private goals.
We return now to the trains dialogue system (Allen and Schubert, 1991;
Traum and Allen, 1994), and more specifically to the dialogue manager com-
ponent, from the perspective of cooperation. As usual in most dialogue sys-
tems, the dialogue manager (see Figure 2.3) controls the structure of the
conversation towards a high-level, task-related goal. In the case of trains
this amounts to obtaining a transportation plan according to the require-
ments of the user. The dialogue manager connects the dialogue acts – or
conversation acts, as they are called in trains – that result from interpret-
ing the user’s utterances with domain-specific tasks modules. It then decides
what dialogue acts to perform based on the outcome of these modules, and
sends them to the natural language generation module that produces the
utterances as the system’s next move. This is specified by the algorithm in
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(Traum and Allen, 1994, p. 4)
Figure 2.3: Architecture of the trains Dialogue System
Figure 2.4. The priorities for goals, intended contributions and obligations
are in the following (fixed) order:
1. Discourse obligations associated with adjacency pairs
2. Weak obligation: don’t interrupt the user
3. Intended contribution
4. Weak obligation: grounding
5. Discourse goals: plan negotiation
6. High-level discourse goals: form a shared plan
From these priorities and the algorithm it is clear that the conversational
behavior of the system is cooperative in the sense that obligations will be
discharged before any private goals are considered. This is consistent with
the purpose of the system, designed to assume the user’s private goals as
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(Traum and Allen, 1994, p. 5)
Figure 2.4: Discourse Actor Algorithm of the trains Dialogue System
its own9. Obligations are addressed much earlier than private goals are
considered. However, the emphasis on obligations turns the approach into a
powerful mechanism for addressing issues unaccounted for by other models.
In the rest of the section we look at a line of research that emerged from
the introduction by Traum and Allen (1994) of discourse obligations, as it
provides a suitable context in which to frame our contribution.
2.3.1 Discourse Obligations
By proposing to focus on discourse obligations for explaining the actions
of speakers in conversation, Traum and Allen (1994) initiated a line of re-
search developed further by Poesio and Traum (1997; 1998), Matheson et
9This is similar to intention-based approaches to cooperation in which systems assume
the user’s intentions as their own and then reason to act following those intentions. Galliers
(Galliers, 1988) calls this kind of unconditional cooperation benevolence.
38 Chapter 2. A Review of Related Work
al. (2000) and Kreutel and Matheson (1999; 2000; 2001; 2003b). The model
of conversational agents presented in Chapter 5 draws elements from these
works, which we summarize below.
Poesio and Traum Theory (PTT)
PTT was first proposed by Poesio and Traum (1997; 1998) on the basis that
participants’ actions in a conversation be part of the common ground, with
the aim of providing a unified treatment for discourse context in reference
resolution, intention recognition and dialogue management. The authors
claim that including explicitly the occurrence of conversation acts, as op-
posed to just their (domain-dependent) propositional content, as part of the
dialogue situation that is agreed upon between participants, represents a
shift from modelling the meaning of contributions to modelling their use.
This, in turn, allows considering pragmatic information in the deliberation
process for managing the dialogue.
The dialogue acts in PTT are taken from Conversation Act (CA) theory
(Traum and Hinkelman, 1992): an extension of the theory of speech acts, to
consider aspects from turn-taking, adjacency pairs and grounding. In speech
act theory, a locutionary act (i.e. an utterance) usually generates several
illocutionary acts (e.g. inform, request, accept). These are called core
speech acts in CA and are required to be grounded before taking full effect.
Grounding is achieved by means of grounding acts (e.g. acknowledge,
request repair). CA also considers turn-taking (e.g. take turn, keep-turn,
release-turn) and argumentation acts (e.g. elaborate, clarify). The latter
are complex, domain-dependent acts, that can take whole conversations to
complete and could be regarded as the dialogue games as we use them in
our thesis (see section on global dialogue games below). The following table
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lists the four types in increasing order of complexity10(Poesio and Traum,
1997):
Discourse Level Act Type Example
Sub Utterance Unit Turn-taking take-turn, keep turn, release-turn
Utterance Unit Grounding initiate, continue, acknowledge,
repair, request-repair, request-
acknowledge
Discourse Unit Core Speech Act inform, yes-no-question, evaluate,
suggest, request, accept, reject
Multiple DUs Argumentation Acts elaborate, summarize, clarity,
question-and-answer, convince
To represent the occurrence of conversation acts in the common ground,
Poesio and Traum use a reinterpretation of Muskens’ compositional drt
(Muskens, 1994), where DRSs representing the propositional content of con-
versation acts are seen as transitions between dialogue situations.
Poesio and Traum (1998) continue their proposal on the treatment of
conversation acts in the representation and dynamics of the dialogue situ-
ation (now called conversational score), with emphasis on aspects not stud-
ied in previous works on speech acts: grounding and participants’ obliga-
tions. The paper focuses on core speech acts and grounding acts, using a
task-independent dialogue act taxonomy based on the Discourse Resource
Initiative (1997) (dri):
• Locutionary acts, representing the utterances of speakers.
• Core speech acts, further classified in terms of their effects on social
attitudes (e.g. obligations) to be addressed in the conversation:
– forward-looking function: introduce new social commit-
ments (obligations). Obligations can be imposed on the speaker
(e.g. commit) or on the hearer (e.g. info-request) and can be
conditional (e.g. offer-accept).
10Utterance Units are intonation phrases, i.e. the spoken analogue to written sentences.
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– backward-looking function: a response to previous acts
(e.g. accept, answer). Usually discharge obligations, but can
also introduce new ones (e.g. answer introduces an obligation for
the hearer to acknowledge the answer).
• Grounding acts: have the effect of moving information from ungroun-
ded to grounded sections of the conversational score.
Each dialogue participant keeps a conversational score: a record of the
dialogue acts, as well as public beliefs, intentions and social commitments
of each participant, with grounded and ungrounded information. Each act
leads to an update of the conversational score with one or more discourse
units. Discourse units are are first added to the score as ungrounded units.
Grounding acts cause a transfer of these units to the grounded section of
the score. Forward-looking acts typically introduce discourse obligations
once they are grounded. In contrast, appropriate backward-looking acts
discharge obligations. These effects are specified by means of update rules
with preconditions on the current state of the conversational score and effects
representing the changes.
Matheson et al. (2000) implemented part of PTT in the context of the
TRINDI project using the TrindiKit dialogue engine (Larsson et al., 2000;
Larsson and Traum, 2000) and information states update rules (Traum and
Larsson, 2003). The theory was implemented as the EDIS dialogue sys-
tem with a focus on dialogue management, more specifically, on aspects of
grounding and on the management of obligations. Discourse obligations are
tied to dialogue acts by means of update rules. Obligations are introduced
by applying these rules when the specified dialogue acts are grounded in in-
formation states that satisfy their preconditions. An obligation is discharged
when the dialogue act it refers to appears, grounded, on the dialogue his-
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tory. The system uses intentions to represent speaker goals, but maximum
cooperation is assumed: the system always chooses to meet its obligations
before paying attention to its goals. This accounts for behaviours like those
that initially motivated Traum and Allen’s (1994) introduction of discourse
obligations: e.g. participants responding at all to questions they do not
wish to answer. This policy also means that non-cooperative behaviour
is precluded, as participants must act against their wishes whenever their
obligations are in conflict with their goals.
Obligation-Driven Dialogue Modelling
The modelling approach proposed in this thesis is closest to that taken by
Kreutel and Matheson (1999; 2000; 2003a; 2003b). In a series of papers and
building on Poesio and Traum’s theory, the authors focus their attention
on discourse obligations and show how several of the structures used as
primitives in other approaches, such as Grosz and Sidner’s (1986) intentions,
Carletta et al.’s (1997) conversational games and Ginzburg’s (1996; 1997)
question under discussion, can be derived from a model based on obligations.
In addition, the approach is able to account for phenomena left unexplained
by these approaches or that require controversial assumptions, such as Boella
et al.’s (1999) proposition that cooperation results form the assumption
that participants aim at all times to avoid offending each other so that the
dialogue progresses smoothly.
Kreutel and Matheson (2001) explore the suitability of obligation-driven
modelling for explaining strategic behaviour in discussion scenarios, as op-
posed to cooperative behaviour in which the participants assume each other’s
intentions to motivate their own actions. The authors illustrate their model
with a few handcrafted examples and do not attempt an empirical study as
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the one we present in Chapter 4.
Kreutel and Matheson regard conversational cooperation essentially in
the same way we do in this thesis: participants are conversationally cooper-
ative if they act according to their obligations. They refer to cooperation
at the level of intentions as traditional cooperation and this is where their
model accounts for strategic acting. In other words, participants in their
model are conversationally cooperative, contrary to where the focus of this
thesis rests. We will come back to this in the Section 2.4.
2.3.2 Global Dialogue Games
A notion central to our conception of cooperation is that of a dialogue
game. The term has been used extensively in the literature to refer to
different concepts. In this thesis, a dialogue game will denote a set of rules
that apply to entire conversations. When needed, we will use the phrase
global dialogue game to emphasise the difference between our notion and
others with similar names in the literature.
Global dialogue games share some characteristics with Levinson’s (1979,
p. 368) notion of activity type:
“it refers to any culturally recognized activity, whether or not
that activity is co-extensive with a period of speech or indeed
whether any talk takes place in it at all. In particular I take
the notion of an activity type to refer to a fuzzy category whose
focal members are goal-defined, socially constituted, bounded,
events with constraints on participants, setting, and so on, but
above all on the kinds of allowable contributions. Paradigm ex-
amples would be teaching, a job interview, a jural interrogation,
a football game, a task in a workshop, a dinner party and so on.”
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The main difference would be that, while Levinson considers an activity type
as a “fuzzy category”, our dialogue games are precisely defined by means
of formal rules, as exemplified towards the end of Chapter 3. These rules
are then used as the basis for the definition of cooperative conversational
behaviour and also specify the effects of the participants’ contributions. This
is consistent with Levinson’s conclusions that activity types play a central
role in language usage in two special ways: constraining what actions are
considered allowable contributions to each activity, and helping determine
how contributions are to be interpreted (Levinson, 1979, p. 393).
Global dialogue games are closer to the notion Walton and Krabbe (1995)
utilise in their study of informal logic and argumentation dialogues, building
on the dialectical systems Hamblin (1970) used for studying fallacies. As
mentioned earlier in the chapter, Walton and Krabbe propose a typology of
dialogue types by specifying elements such as the participants, the initial and
final dialogue situations, the actions available to the participants and, among
these, those that are suitable for the role of each participant at specific
points in the dialogue, etc. Several authors have built on their approach
to model other types of conversation, including human-computer debate
(Maudet and Moore, 2001), computer-mediated crosslingual communication
(Piwek et al., 2007) and purchase negotiation, argumentation and conflict
resolution in agent communication for multi-agent systems (McBurney and
Parsons, 2009; Karunatillake et al., 2009).
Piwek (1998, Chapter 6) also builds on Hamblin’s dialectical systems
and draws on insights from discourse and conversation analysis to model a
number of naturally occurring conversational structures in terms of a con-
versational game. Piwek’s games are divided into conversational stores
that contain dynamic informational elements of the conversation, and con-
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versational rules that constrain the timing and content of the participants’
contributions and how these affect the conversational store. Analogous to
the use of discourse obligations proposed by Traum and Allen (1994), Piwek
shows how commitments in the conversation store can be used to account
for the pressures on the dialogue participants to react in specific ways to as-
sertions, imperatives and questions, as an alternative to less flexible, stack-
based models. A similar approach is reported by Beun (2001) for enabling
the generation of coherent elementary dialogues.
Ginzburg (2012, Chapter 4) describes a notion similar to our dialogue
games to characterise coherent dialogues and states that “the dialogue ana-
lyst describes conventionally acceptable moves and the effects they give rise
to among conversation participants in terms of information states.” (Gin-
zburg, 2012, p. 61). A dialogue is coherent in this context if there is a
sequence of information states that results from applying these rules to the
participants’ contributions. As our focus is precisely on dialogues in which
rules are not followed, it is not clear how Ginzburg’s approach would deal
with such cases which, by his definition, would be regarded as incoherent.
As said earlier, global conversational games are not to be confused with
what in the literature has often been referred to as dialogue games or similar
terms (Levin and Moore, 1977; Carlson, 1983; Mann, 1988; Carletta et al.,
1997; Pulman, 2002). These local dialogue games are extensions of speech
acts to consider goals and span short exchanges, also called conversational
procedures (Power, 1979), conversational games (Kowtko et al., 1992;
Pulman, 1997; Lewin, 2000) and dialogue macrogames (Mann, 2002).
2.4 Previous Approaches to Non-Cooperation
There have been previous approaches to modelling dialogue on the basis
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that participants are not always fully cooperative. The first approach we
will consider belongs to an area of research in which the construction of
dialogue models relies strongly on a detailed description of the user, i.e. a
user model (Wahlster and Kobsa, 1986). With the aim of analysing a
user’s perception of the user model in a dialogue system and the speaker’s
strategies for maintaining a certain image in the listener, Jameson (1989)
presents an extensive study for modelling bias, individual goals, projected
image and belief ascription in conversation.
The study is realised by simulating a series of increasingly less cooper-
ative situations in the domain of job interviews, where participants are ex-
pected to project a certain image, hide biased opinions, etc. For each utter-
ance, the speaker selects a certain comment, by computing the expected
impression it will make in the hearer, with respect to the image the speaker
is trying to project. For anticipating the effect of a comment in the hearer
(i.e. the impression), Jameson departs from Gricean pragmatics and pro-
poses pragmatic interpretations as a basis for reasoning. He claims this
mechanism to be more general than implicatures, as it does not rely on a
notion of cooperation. Pragmatic interpretations operate as follows:
• Possibility p is not ruled out by comment c (possibly silence);
• but then, if p were true, comment c’ would have been made instead
of c, since it would have had a more desirable impact on the listener’s
impression;
• therefore p is apparently not realized.
Jameson implemented some of these ideas, in the context of used cars sales,
by means of a dialogue system that can assume different roles (Jameson et
al., 1994).
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These contributions show that user-model approaches to dialogue mod-
elling are flexible enough to account for situations of an arbitrary degree of
intricacy. However, as noted, e.g. by Taylor et al. (1996) the level of detail
required in the characterisation of the user and the complexity of mechanism
for reasoning about user models can lead to problems like infinite regress in
nested beliefs (speaker’s beliefs about the hearer’s beliefs about the speaker’s
beliefs. . . ). In the same article, Taylor et al. show that nested beliefs are
not necessary when participants are assumed to cooperate in the conversa-
tion, if cooperation is restricted to the absence of deception. Taylor (1994)
addressed non-cooperative dialogue behaviour by implementing cynic, a
dialogue system able to generate and recognise deception using a reasoning
mechanism equivalent to a theorem prover. A notion of non-cooperation
limited to deception is weaker than the one we address in this research.
More recently, Traum (2008) brought attention to the need for compu-
tational accounts of dialogue situations in which a broader notion of co-
operation is not assumed. As possible applications of such models, he lists
intelligent tutoring systems, bargaining agents, personal assistants acting on
behalf of their owners and role-playing training agents. These applications
have in common that systems cannot afford to adopt the goals of their users
as it happens, for instance, in the dialogue systems mentioned above. Traum
also provides a list of “behaviours of interest” (along the lines of the non-
cooperative features we identified in Chapter 1): unilateral topic shifts or
topic maintenance, avoidance, competition, unhelpful criticism, withholding
of information, lying and deception, antagonism, etc.
Traum’s work on non-cooperative dialogue is mainly aimed at creating
virtual humans – or embodied conversational agents (Cassell, 2001) – with
abilities to engage in adversarial dialogue. Traum et al. (2005; 2008a)
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present a model of conversation strategies for negotiation, implemented as
a virtual human that can be used for teaching negotiation skills. A recent
version of the system (Plu¨ss et al., 2011; Traum, 2012) supports cooperative,
neutral and deceptive behaviour, and also is able to reason in terms of secrecy
in order to avoid volunteering certain pieces of information. Yet another
model, with applications in the domain of training in tactical questioning,
is presented by Traum et al. (2007) and Roque and Traum (2007). It can
engage in dialogues like the following:
Trainee Hello Hassan
Hassan Hello
Trainee How are you doing?
Hassan Well, under the circumstances we are fine
Trainee I’d like to talk about the marketplace
Hassan I hope you do not expect me to tell you anything
Trainee I just want to know why people aren’t using the marketplace
Hassan I don’t feel like answering that question
Trainee I think you know something about a tax
Hassan I am simply doing business. It is rude of you to imply
otherwise
(Traum et al., 2007, p. 72)
Both models include variables representing trust, politeness and emo-
tions, and a set of strategies which are selected depending on the values of
those variables. These components were developed based on studies of the
respective domains and are therefore restricted to them (Roque and Traum,
2007, p. 38).
It must be noted that, despite being adversarial in nature, the kind of
conversational scenarios studied by Traum et al. are modelled by means of
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rules, i.e. the strategies for negotiation and tactical questioning identified
by the authors. These rules are followed by the interlocutors, in accordance
with the values of certain variables. This means that the dialogues accounted
for by these models are adversarial but cooperative under our characterisa-
tion of non-cooperative dialogue. From this perspective, it is not clear how
effective these models are to account for cases in which participants fail to
follow their strategies; an issue at the core of the investigation we present
here.
Along similar lines, the work of Kreutel and Matheson (2001; 2003b)
described in the previous section accounts for non-cooperative behaviour
at the level of the task, what the authors call strategic acting. At the
conversational level, however, their models – as well as those of Traum and
Allen (1994) and Matheson et al. (2000) – always discharge a speaker’s
obligations before considering their private goals. In our research, we re-
move this limitation and look at ways in which the resulting phenomena
can be characterised, analysed, measured and incorporated into models of
conversational agents.
2.5 Analysis of Political Interviews
Before moving on to introducing the conceptual framework we will use in
the rest of the thesis, let us discuss key research in the analysis of political
interview dialogue: the domain of our empirical studies. Below, we review
relevant literature on the analysis of this type of dialogue, discussing early
insights from sociology, conversation analysis and more recent ones from
social psychology and political science.
As Heritage (1985), Greatbatch (1986; 1988) and Clayman (1988) inde-
pendently point out, the use of interviews as a means for producing news
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content has changed notoriously since the outset of broadcasting. In the
1970s interviewers went from a mostly deferential style in which interviews
functioned as venues for interviewees (e.g. politicians) to present informa-
tion (e.g. party policy) unchallenged, to more adversarial exchanges in which
journalists would set specific lines of questioning and press for meaningful
answers.
This change brought notoriety to the news interviews as a distinct con-
versational genre and attracted the attention of researchers from the social
sciences. Conversation analysts have classified news interviews extensively
as an instance of institutional talk (Heritage and Greatbatch, 1991; Clay-
man and Heritage, 2002). This is a larger class of conversations in which
the actions of the participants are distinctively restricted by their institu-
tional roles. As such, participants in news interviews restrict their beha-
viour according to a pre-allocated subset of possible actions: interviewers
ask questions and interviewees respond to those questions. As Greatbatch
(1988, p. 404) notes:
These constraints on the production of types of turns operate
with respect to the institutional identities interviewer/interviewee
and specify that the incumbents of these roles should confine
themselves to asking questions and providing answers, respect-
ively.
Following this, the author identifies some ramifications of these constraints
(Greatbatch, 1988, p. 404):
1. IRs and IEs systematically confine themselves to producing
turns that are at least minimally recognisable as questions
and answers, respectively.
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2. IRs systematically withhold a range of responses that are
routinely produced by questioners in mundane conversa-
tion.
3. a. Although IRs regularly produce statement turn compon-
ents, these are normally issued prior to the production of
questioning turn components.
b. IEs routinely treat IRs’ statement turn components as
preliminaries to questioning turn components.
4. The allocation of turns in multiparty interviews is ordinarily
managed by IRs.
5. Interviews are overwhelmingly opened by IRs.
6. Interviews are customarily closed by IRs.
7. Departures from the standard question-answer format are
frequently attended to as accountable and are characterist-
ically repaired.
Heritage and Greatbatch (1991) and Clayman and Heritage (2002) report
on analogous sets of conventions that emerge from performing conversa-
tion analysis of news interviews. They ascribe a normative character to
these conventions, supported by the institutional setting and the represent-
ational roles of the participants: interviewers represent the public and/or
the broadcasting company, while politicians represent their parties and/or
governmental offices. These representative roles in turn translate, respect-
ively, into requirements for neutrality and into accountability (Heritage and
Greatbatch, 1991, p. 96):
These institutionalized reductions and specialization of the avail-
able set of conversational options are, it should be stressed, con-
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ventional in character. They are culturally variable; they are
sometimes subject to legal constraints; they are always vulner-
able to processes of social change; they are discursively justi-
fiable and are often justified by reference to considerations of
task, efficiency, fairness, and so on in ways that the practices
making up the conversational “bedrock” manifestly are not. As-
sociated with these various institutional conventions are different
participation frameworks (Goffman, 1979), with their associated
rights and obligations, different footings and different pattern-
ings of opportunities to initiate and sanction interactional activ-
ities.
As Schegloff (1988) notes while analysing an infamous exchange between
CBS Evening News anchor Dan Rather and then American vice-president
George H. Bush during the coverage of the 1988 presidential campaign, par-
ticipants do not necessarily act always within the pre-established normative
institutional framework. A specific type of conversation is achieved through
the interaction rather than predetermined by the context. In extreme cases,
an exchange that started as an interview can become a conversation of a
different type, such as a confrontation in the case of the Rather-Bush en-
counter11.
In the following quote – already presented on page 5 of the Introduc-
tion –, Heritage refers to some of the actions by which interviewers and
interviewees can depart from the convention12 (Heritage, 1998, p. 8):
11A transcript of the Bush-Rather exchange is available at http://www.ratherbiased.
com/transcript.htm and a video at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FqwQw3THRvU
(last accessed: September 2013).
12Heritage’s analysis uses a broad notion of turn-taking. Instead, we will limit the use
of the term to refer to the system of rules which governs how interlocutors take the floor
in a conversation (Sacks et al., 1974). The actions mentioned by Heritage above will be
regarded as speech acts.
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“the participants -irs [=interviewers] and ies [=interviewees]-
exclude themselves from a wide variety of actions that they are
normally free to do in the give and take of ordinary conversation.
If irs restrict themselves to asking questions, then they cannot
– at least overtly – express opinions, or argue with, debate or
criticize the interviewees’ positions nor, conversely, agree with,
support or defend them. Correspondingly, if ies restrict them-
selves to answers (or responses) to questions, then they cannot
ask questions (of irs or other ies), nor make unsolicited com-
ments on previous remarks, initiate changes of topic, or divert
the discussion into criticisms of the ir or the broadcasting or-
ganization.”
After this passage, the author holds that in practice these restrictions are
occasionally not observed, but only as departures from the expected be-
haviour and often resulting in problematic and even sanctionable courses
of action. Deviations are thus sanctionable and participants are aware
of this. Conversational analysts use examples of deviations and their con-
sequences to support the claim that the news interview dialogue setting is
both distinctive and normative, that is, participants are expected to confine
themselves to the conversational actions allowed to their roles according to
the dialogue genre (Heritage and Greatbatch, 1991, p. 106).
Further examples of departures from the norm are referred to as vi-
olative talk. Greatbatch (1986) studied agenda shifting procedures: a
mechanism employed by interviewees to divert the topic of an interview to-
wards their own agenda. Clayman (1988) analysed issues with interviewer
neutrality, such as bias and subjectivity.
From a blend of social psychology and political science, following Har-
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ris (1991), Bull and colleagues (Bull and Mayer, 1993; Bull, 1994) studied
instances of equivocation, systematically classifying the different ways in
which politicians fail to answer questions properly. This work was later ex-
tended to include interviewers’ face-threatening actions among the causes
for equivocation (Elliott and Bull, 1996; Bull, 2003; Bull, 2008), identifying
a class of questions called avoid-avoid for which any answers would result
in a negative outcome for the interviewee, triggering the need of avoidance.
Finlayson (Finlayson, 2001) analyses the problem of the political inter-
view as the clash between two worlds: the political world of discussion,
negotiation and compromise versus the journalistic world of the forensic
pursuit of truth. The clash Finlayson poses as a fundamental problem, is
precisely why political interviews exist in the first place. This is also the
reason why we have chosen this as the domain for our empirical investig-
ations: a situation, conflictive in nature, to which two participants come
voluntarily, agreeing on their goals in the large (spreading information) but
potentially not in the small (what information to spread and how). This
often forces them to consider carefully the course of the conversation and
often leads to the deviations identified and analysed by researchers in the lit-
erature above, that is to what we here understand by instances of linguistic
non-cooperation.
2.6 Summary
Cooperation in dialogue has been studied in different disciplines, from philo-
sophy and the pragmatics of language, to conversation analysis, computa-
tional linguistics and dialogue systems design. Philosophers and theoretical
linguists have claimed that participants in a conversation adopt a set of prin-
ciples in order to maximise the efficiency and effectiveness of communication.
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Computational linguists and dialogue systems designers have traditionally
taken these assumptions as preconditions for the successful completion of an
underlying task which conversation generally supports.
However, there is a recurrent distinction in the literature between cooper-
ation at the level of the task supported by the conversation and cooperation
at the level of the linguistic exchange itself. Although these kinds of co-
operation are often related, in strict terms participants can cooperate or
fail to cooperate independently at either level. This allows us to focus on
cooperation at the level of the linguistic exchange, especially on the often
neglected case of non-cooperation. Although some research has been done
in task-level non-cooperation, which focuses on situations in which the task-
related goals of the participants are at odds, it has been generally assumed
that participants still cooperate at the linguistic level.
Efforts in computational linguistics and dialogue system design have
tried to model non-cooperative behaviour scenarios, including negotiations
and other instances of strategic talk, to a level of precision that gives rise
to computational models. Unfortunately, the instances of non-cooperative
behaviour in these approaches have been modelled explicitly, by means of
specific rules for non-cooperation, which has limited the scope and breadth
of phenomena they account for. Previous approaches to modelling dia-
logue without relying on full cooperation between the parties are based
on rather complex descriptions of the interlocutors (user models), regard
non-cooperative behaviour only as deception or account for exchanges that,
yet adversarial, are cooperative in the sense that participants are following
rules or strategies that describe their expected behaviour.
Still, research in these areas has lead to a number of concepts with a
potential to address non-cooperative behaviour, namely dialogue games and
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discourse obligations. The key point is thus to abandon the direct rule-based
approach for modelling non-cooperation explicitly and take a perspective in
which expected, cooperative behaviour is specified by means of precise rules.
Non-cooperation emerges then as a deviation from such expectations. This
presupposes that there is a set of norms that define cooperative behaviour
and that these norms can be explicated to the extent that they can be
formalised and eventually implemented.
In order to do this, we look at the literature of political interviews and see
that there is a set of underlying conventions that they try to adjust to. The
empirical analysis of political dialogue suggests that such – usually implicit
– norms are operative in conversation: if people deviate from these norms,
their behaviour becomes an explicit topic of the conversation itself. The
terminology used strongly suggests this, speaking of sanctionable behaviour,
violative talk or equivocation to refer to these behaviours. Our focus is on
non-cooperation in political interviews. We will use these insights to propose
a set of explicit rules for political interviews, a global dialogue game, which
then will be used in the rest of the thesis to systematically measure and
model non-cooperation in terms of violations to the rules of the game.





This chapter presents the conceptual framework used in the rest of the thesis
for measuring and modelling non-cooperation in dialogue. It defines what
we understand by non-cooperation in dialogue and demarcates the aspects
of conversation we address in detail, discussing the simplifying assumptions
for those we leave for future consideration. It also explains how discourse
obligations and global dialogue games are combined to represent the norms
and conventions associated with a specific conversational setting, ending
with a detailed example from the domain of political interviews, which plays
a central role in the rest of the thesis.
3.1 Overview of the Chapter
As discussed in Section 2.2, cooperation in dialogue can be observed at
different levels of the interaction. In Section 3.2, we establish a clear dis-
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tinction between cooperation in the activity of maintaining a conversation
and cooperation in the performance of an underlying task. These are re-
spectively referred to as linguistic and non-linguistic cooperation. The
focus of this research is on linguistic non-cooperation and thereafter, unless
explicitly stated, the terms “cooperation” and “non-cooperation” refer to
the linguistic level.
A general definition of linguistic non-cooperation of a speaker with
respect to a conversational setting is given in Section 3.3. We illustrate with
examples from the domain of political interviews and motivate an explora-
tion of the phenomenon in greater detail. We arrive at a compromise between
an increased level of detail and the manageability of the research project by
focusing on core speech acts. At the end of the section, we discuss briefly
the assumptions in regard to other aspects of conversation that facilitated
this compromise, such as turn-taking, grounding and non-verbal behaviour.
Section 3.4 posits discourse obligations and global dialogue games
as suitable representations of the norms and conventions associated with a
conversational setting. We discuss how these can be used to refine the defin-
ition of linguistic non-cooperation. A detailed dialogue game dealing with
core speech acts in the political interview setting is described and formalised
in Section 3.5. Later in the thesis, this device is used for measuring linguistic
non-cooperation in naturally-occurring political interviews (Chapter 4) and
for modelling conversational agents that can cope with and exhibit dialogue
behaviour with different degrees of cooperation (Chapter 5).
3.2 Linguistic and Non-Linguistic Cooperation
As discussed in the previous chapter, participants in a dialogue can cooper-
ate at different levels of the interaction. Here, we consider and illustrate
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the differences between two of these levels: cooperation in maintaining the
flow of the conversation, for instance by asking appropriate questions at
appropriate times and by providing relevant answers in response to those
questions, and cooperation in achieving the goals of an underlying task, for
instance by helping uncover the truth on a certain matter or by making
important information available to a wider audience.
Dialogue generally supports an underlying activity. For the moment we
focus on dialogue where this consists of a task or set of tasks that the parti-
cipants aim to complete with the assistance of verbal interaction. Examples
of such activities include the assessment of a student’s knowledge via oral
examination, the negotiation of the price of goods or services through bar-
gaining, the gathering of evidence by means of courtroom cross-examination
and many others.
The nature of the underlying activity and the associated social context
impose constraints on the conversational behaviour considered acceptable
for each dialogue participant. At the same time, conversational behaviour
affects how successfully participants perform the underlying task. In the
general case however, cooperation at one of these two levels of interaction
does not directly translate to cooperation at the other level. This was illus-
trated earlier by the case of the witness under interrogation in a US trial,
who could acceptably decline to answer a question by appealing to the Fifth
Amendment thus being non-cooperative in relation with the goals of the
cross-examination. Non-cooperation at the conversational level can result
in lack of cooperation at the level of the task – take as an example the
same witness remaining silent, rather than answering or appealing to the
Fifth Amendment. However, there are cases in which unconventional or un-
expected conversational behaviour can contribute in the completion of the
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underlying task. For instance, although sanctionable in courtroom cross-
examinations, leading questions could help a sincere but forgetful witness
remember important details that become evidence.
To illustrate the distinction further, recall the following fragment from
Example 1.1 in Chapter 1:
Turn Speaker Speech
(1) Paxman (interrupting) Did you threaten to overrule him?
(2) Howard I, I, was not entitled to instruct Derek Lewis, and I
did not instruct him.
(3) Paxman Did you threaten to overrule him?
(4) Howard The truth of the matter is that Mr. Marriott was
not suspended. I-
(5) Paxman (overlapping) Did you threaten to overrule him?
(6) Howard -did not overrule Derek Lewis.
Howard’s responses do not constitute relevant answers to the interviewer’s
question, nor do they work as explicit rejections. Therefore, they are non-
cooperative at both levels of interaction, as they do not contribute to the
common goals of the political interview task and also disrupt the dynamics of
the conversation leading Paxman to pose essentially the same question over
and over. Consider however, a fictional alternative in which Howard replies
to the question by saying ‘I will not answer that question, as it is not relevant
to whether I exceeded the powers of my office’ would not be cooperative in
terms of helping achieve the goals of an interview – widening the spread
information, uncovering the truth, clarifying pressing issues, etc. However,
it would be contributing at the linguistic level as it helps in preserving the
flow of the conversation, for instance by triggering a sub-dialogue to solve
the disagreement or by convincing the interviewer to drop the question and
move on.
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As detailed in the previous chapter, the distinction between linguistic
and non-linguistic (also called task-related, high-level or social) coopera-
tion has been addressed before. Attardo (1997) revisits Gricean pragmatics,
relating non-linguistic cooperation to participants’ behaviour towards real-
ising task-related goals, and linguistic cooperation to assumptions on their
respective behaviour in order to encode and decode intended meaning. From
a computational perspective, Bunt (1994) relies on a similar distinction when
defining dialogue acts. Also, Traum and Allen (1994) introduce discourse
obligations as an alternative to joint intentions and shared plans, to allow
for models of dialogues in which participants do not share the same high-
level goals and where behaviour is also determined by “a sense of obligation
to behave within limits set by the society” (Traum and Allen, 1994, p. 2).
Walton and Krabbe (1995) proposed a typology of dialogue based on the
initial situation triggering the exchange and participants’ shared aims and
individual goals. Based on their work, Reed and Long (1997) distinguish
cases where participants follow a common set of dialogue rules and stay
within a mutually acknowledged framework from a stronger notion in which
their individual goals point in the same direction. Boella et al. (1999) dis-
cuss the role of intentions in cooperation and distinguish between dialogue
and domain goals. Dialogue goals are further subdivided in conversational
and linguistic goals, assuming that participants align their conversational
goals avoiding to offend each other so that the dialogue proceeds smoothly.
Linguistic goals relate to the production and interpretation of utterances.
With the above distinction clear, it must be noted that in the rest of
the thesis we do not deal explicitly with non-linguistic cooperation. This
means that we do not consider shared goals as part of our approach, nor
do we include the reasoning of the participants in terms of each others’
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private goals. The task-related goals of each party are considered private
and whether they point in the same direction or are in conflict is orthogonal
to how we deal with linguistic non-cooperation. From this point on, for the
sake of brevity and unless explicitly indicated, the terms cooperation and
non-cooperation will refer to the linguistic level. Further, these notions
apply also to cases in which the underlying activity cannot be described in
terms of tasks and goals. Arguably, exchanges such as small talk and phatic
conversation do not qualify as task-oriented dialogues. However, these types
of dialogue do serve social purposes (e.g. for politeness or to increase fa-
miliarity between the parties) and therefore it is possible to identify a set
of –usually tacit and culture-bound– rules or conventions on how to take
part in them adequately allowing for the identification of non-cooperation
regardless of the absence of tasks and goals.
3.3 Defining Non-Cooperation in Dialogue
Conversational behaviour can be accounted for either from a normative per-
spective in terms of how participants ought to behave, or from a descriptive
perspective in terms of how participants do actually behave (Piwek, 2006).
In a normative approach, the interaction is often characterised by means of
rules that participants are expected to follow when they engage in conversa-
tion (Walton and Krabbe, 1995). These rules are determined by contextual
aspects linked to, among others, the type of exchange, the purpose of the
conversation and social conventions. In these terms, following the definitions
in the previous section, participants are cooperative when they stick to the
rules and stay within the restrictions imposed by these norms. Consistently,
participants are non-cooperative when they break the rules or fail to observe
the constraints associated with their respective roles in the type of exchange
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in which they engage.
Normative approaches lead to idealisations of the conversational settings
they deal with. This is because larger sets of rules result in more complex
models and the consequences of cumbersome models, such as interference
among rules, their precedence and combined effects, are harder to track or
predict. On the one hand, idealisations are desirable when the aim is mainly
that of formalising phenomena for precise reasoning and automation. On
the other hand, they inevitably lead to non-conforming interactions that fall
outside of the model being left unaccounted for. In what follows we explain
how, by relying on the idealisation of a dialogue setting, we account for in-
teractions that deviate from the norm. That is, we describe how participants
do actually behave by relying on a characterisation of how they ought to
behave, thus combining in a same account elements from the descriptive and
normative approaches to dialogue modelling.
Deviations, as discussed above, are what we call non-cooperation in dia-
logue. Here, we characterise a class of behaviours that occur in natural con-
versation and later in the chapter devise a set of rules which when broken
by speakers result in non-cooperation. We therefore propose the following
operational definition:
The behaviour of a speaker is non-cooperative if it fails to comply
with at least one of the rules that specify the speaker’s role in
the current conversational setting.
The instances of non-cooperative behaviour, that is whenever one of the
rules that specify the speaker’s role is broken, are called non-cooperative
features. The number of occurrences of these features will then determine
the extent of non-cooperation of each speaker in a given exchange. In this
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way, non-cooperation in dialogue is a matter of degree, ranging from
total non-cooperation in which each of the speaker’s actions fails to comply
with at least one rule and total cooperation in which all their actions are in
accordance with the rules specifying their role.
3.3.1 Non-Cooperation in Political Interviews
We illustrate the definition above by giving an example from the political
interview conversational setting. In Section 2.5 of the previous chapter we
discussed a range of empirical studies on the nature of political interviews.
Heritage, Greatbatch and Clayman analyse the distinctive organization of
news and political interviews and describe how the institutions associated to
each speaker restrict their roles (Clayman, 1988; Heritage and Greatbatch,
1991; Heritage, 1998; Greatbatch, 1988; Clayman and Heritage, 2002; Her-
itage, 2005). They note that in practice these restrictions are occasionally
not observed, but only as departures from the expected behaviour and of-
ten resulting in problematic and even sanctionable courses of action. These
sanctionable courses of action correspond with what we defined above as
non-cooperative behaviour.
These insights and the literature on the analysis of political interviews
discussed in Chapter 2 indicate that there is a consensus regarding the speak-
ers roles in terms of what is acceptable during the conversation and what
is not. An operational definition of non-cooperative behaviour specific to
the roles of interviewer and interviewee in political interviews can thus be
as follows:
• Non-cooperation of interviewers with respect to the political in-
terview conversational setting happens whenever they:
1. express personal opinions;
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2. argue, debate with or criticise the positions of the interviewee;
3. agree with, support or defend the positions of the interviewee;
4. criticise or attack the interviewee or their organisation;
5. after a response from the interviewee, they neither:
– move on to the next question; nor
– state that the response is not a relevant answer;
6. interrupt or speak simultaneously with the interviewee;
7. end the exchange abruptly or threaten to do so.
• Non-cooperation of interviewees with respect to the political in-
terview conversational setting happens whenever they:
8. ask questions of the interviewer (with the exception of CRs);
9. provide incomplete answers;
10. make unsolicited comments;
11. initiate changes of topic;
12. criticise or attack the interviewer or their organisation;
13. after a question from the interviewer, they neither:
– provide a suitable answer; nor
– state that the question will not be answered;
14. interrupt or speak simultaneously with the interviewer;
15. end the exchange abruptly or threaten to do so.
For illustration, consider the fragments in Figures 3.1 and 3.2. The utter-
ances of each speaker are numbered and annotated with the behaviours they
exhibit from the list above.
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Turn Speaker Utt. Speech Features
(11) paxman ir.1 (overlapping) Did you threaten to overrule
him?
6
(12) howard ie.1 Mr. Marriot was not suspended. 10,13
(13) paxman ir.2 Did you threaten to overrule him? 5
(14) howard ie.2 I have accounted for my decision to dismiss
Derek Lewis-
(15) paxman ir.3 (overlapping) Did you threaten to overrule
him?
5,6
(16) howard ie.2 (overlapping) -in great detail before the House
of Commons-
10,13,14
(17) paxman ir.4 I note that you’re not answering the question
whether you threatened to overrule him.
(18) howard ie.3 Well, the important aspect of this which it’s
very clear to bear in mind-
11,13
(19) paxman ir.5 (interrupting) I’m sorry, I’m going to be
frightfully rude but-
6
(20) howard ie.4 (interrupting) Yes, you can- 14
(21) paxman ir.6 (overlapping) I’m sorry- 6
(22) howard ie.4 (overlapping) - you can put the question and
I will give you, I will give you an answer.
(23) paxman ir.6 (overlapping) -it’s a straight yes-or-no ques-
tion and a straight yes-or-no answer:
ir.7 did you threaten to overrule him?
(24) howard ie.5 I discussed the matter with Derek Lewis.
ie.6 I gave him the benefit of my opinion.
ie.7 I gave him the benefit of my opinion in strong
language, but I did not instruct him because
I was not, er, entitled to instruct him.
ie.8 I was entitled to express my opinion and that
is what I did.
9
(25) paxman ir.8 With respect, that is not answering the ques-
tion of whether you threatened to overrule
him.
(26) howard ie.9 It’s dealing with the relevant point which was
what I was entitled to do and what I was not
entitled to do,
11,13
ie.10 and I have dealt with this in detail before the
House of Commons and before the select com-
mittee.
10
Figure 3.1: Fragment of the Paxman-Howard interview (Example 1.1
in Chapter 1) annotated with the behaviours in the definition of non-
cooperation in political interviews. The numbers in the right-most column
correspond with those in the definition on Page 64.
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Turn Speaker Utt. Speech Features
(01) paxman ir.1 We’re joined now from his count in Bethnal
Green and Bow by George Galloway.
ir.2 Mr Galloway, are you proud of having got
rid of one of the very few black women in
Parliament?
4
(02) galloway ie.1 What a preposterous question.
ie.2 I know it’s very late in the night, but
wouldn’t you be better starting by congrat-
ulating me for one of the most sensational
election results in modern history?
8,11
(03) paxman ir.3 Are you proud of having got rid of one of
the very few black women in Parliament?
4,5
(04) galloway ie.3 I’m not- Err, Jeremy, move on to your next
question.
(05) paxman ir.4 You’re not answering that one?
(06) galloway ie.4 No, because I don’t believe that people get
elected because of the colour of their skin. I
believe people get elected because of their
record and because of their policies. So
move on to your next question.
(07) paxman ir.5 Are you proud- 4,5
(08) galloway ie.5 (Interrupting) Because I’ve got a lot of
people who want to speak to me.
10,14
ie.6 If you ask that question again, I’m going, I
warn you now.
15
(09) paxman ir.6 Don’t try and threaten me Mr Galloway,
please.
5
( . . . )
(28) galloway ie.7 You are actually conducting one of the most,
even by your standards, one of the most ab-
surd interviews I have ever participated in.
12
ie.8 I have just won an election. 10
ie.9 Can you find it within yourself to recognise
that fact?
8, 11
ie.10 To recognise the fact that the people of
Bethnal Green and Bow chose me this even-
ing.
10,11
ie.11 Why are you insulting them? 8
(29) paxman ir.7 I’m not insulting them, I’m not insulting you 1,5
(30) galloway: ie.12 You are insulting them, they chose me just
a few minutes ago.
ie.13 Can’t you find it within yourself even to con-
gratulate me on this victory?
11
(31) paxman: ir.8 Congratulations, Mr Galloway. 5
(32) galloway: ie.14 Thank you very much indeed. 15
(Waves, removes microphone and leaves)
Figure 3.2: Fragment of the Paxman-Galloway interview (Example 1.3
in Chapter 1) annotated with the behaviours in the definition of non-
cooperation in political interviews.
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Preliminary studies based on a similar definition lead to encouraging
results (Plu¨ss, 2009; Plu¨ss, 2010). A fully cooperative dialogue is regarded
as the ideal situation in which participants always do what is best to pre-
serve the functioning of the conversation. In a political interview, this would
refer to cases in which questions are answered directly and in a complete
way, these answers are accepted without comments by the interviewer who
goes on with the next question on the agenda, interlocutors speak in turn
without interruption or overlapping, etc. The degree of non-cooperation of
each participant was measured as the ratio between the utterances exhibit-
ing one or more of the behaviours in the definition and the total number of
utterances of the speaker. The rationale behind this measure was to capture
the proportion of cases in which a speaker had made a decision on what to
say and the contribution displayed at least one of the behaviours defined
as non-cooperative. In the example in Figure 3.1, for instance, these values
are 5/8 = 0.625 for the interviewer (Paxman) and 7/10 = 0.7 for the inter-
viewee (Howard). The respective values for the interviewer and interviewee
in the fragment in Figure 3.2 are 6/8 = 0.75 and 10/14 = 0.714. Subsequent
attempts to apply the scheme reliably on a larger corpus of interviews, how-
ever, showed that the definition required a higher level of detail. Some of
the shortcomings include:
• Ambiguity: for example, a personal opinion expressed by the inter-
viewer in support of the views of the interviewee could be classed as 1
or 3 (or both);
• Non-exclusive categories: an interviewee avoiding a question by shift-
ing the agenda, for instance, falls under three categories (10, 11 and
13), and even four if the shift is introduced by asking a question of the
interviewer (8);
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• Imprecision: for example, it is not clear what constitutes a question
or an answer, the criteria for determining relevance and suitability of
the contribution are underspecified, etc.;
• False positives: interruptions can be cooperative, for instance, when
the listener detects an error or misunderstanding in the speaker utter-
ance, a timely interruption can help preserve the flow of the conversa-
tion1;
• Forced ratio: utterances are not the best unit for computing the degree
of non-cooperation as one utterance can exhibit more than one of the
behaviours in the definition;
• Coarse granularity: all the behaviours contribute the same towards
non-cooperation, with an interruption, for instance, being equally non-
cooperative as an attack or the covert avoidance of a question.
3.3.2 Towards a Revised Definition: Focusing on Core Speech
Acts
The definition above covers several aspects of the actions participants make
in conversation: from the organisation of turns, to the establishment of a
common ground and the type of function and propositional content asso-
ciated with contributions. Put in terms of dialogue acts, according to the
classification used by Poesio and Traum (1997; 1998) with elements from
Conversation Acts Theory (Traum and Hinkelman, 1992) and the Discourse
Resource Initiative (Initiative, 1997; Allen and Core, 1997) the rules apply
at one or more of the following levels:
1For other cases of cooperative interruptions, see for instance the work of Aist (1998)
and Mostow et al. (2003) on an automated reading tutor, and of Smith et al. (2011) on
companion ECAs.
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Turn-Taking: regarding interruptions, overlapped speech and closings;
Grounding: indicating what constitutes evidence of understanding, such
as adequate continuations;
Core Speech Acts: restricting the functions (questions, answers) and
contents (adequate, relevant) that are expected from the role of each
participant;
Argumentation Acts: dealing with the global flow of the conversation
and the sequences that are considered adequate for the type of inter-
action.
In order to deepen the level of detail in the definition of non-cooperation,
we will not be dealing with aspects of turn-taking and grounding and instead
focus on core speech and argumentation acts. This means that we make the
following simplifying assumptions2:
• participants do not interrupt each other nor do they speak simultan-
eously;
• non-verbal behaviour and prosodic features do not affect the function
and content of core speech acts;
• grounding is always achieved correctly, that is participants understand
flawlessly at all times what the other party contributed and provide
adequate evidence indicating that this is the case;
• the global argumentation act is always one and the same: the polit-
ical interview, we will not consider subdialogues or transitions into
dialogues of a different type (e.g. clarification, negotiation, confronta-
tion, debate).
2These phenomena are ignored when analysing naturally-occurring dialogue.
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These assumptions set the scope for the results in the thesis and open
directions for future research. From the point of view of a speaker holding
the floor, interruptions and overlapped speech require monitoring, reasoning
and responding to the behaviour of the other party even when they do not
hold the floor. For instance, a speaker who decides to stop talking when
interrupted by the other interlocutor would be more cooperative than one
deciding to continue speaking, raising the voice, etc. The generation or
prediction of interruptions requires that the listener interprets the utterances
of the speaker while they are being produced so as to decide on whether to
start a contribution before receiving the floor. Current work along these
directions includes the treatment of barge-in interruptions for companion
embodied conversational agents (Crook et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2011) and
the flourishing area of research know as incremental dialogue processing
(DeVault et al., 2009; DeVault et al., 2011; Schlangen and Skantze, 2011;
Rieser and Lemon, 2011; Traum et al., 2012).
The processes involved in establishing a common ground (Clark and
Brennan, 1991; Traum, 1994) lend themselves to displays of non-cooperation.
In the presentation phase (Clark and Brennan, 1991), for instance the use
of ambiguous utterances and implicatures could lead to defensible or non-
committal contributions (Benotti, 2009; Benotti, 2010; Asher, 2012; Asher
and Lascarides, in press) and become sources of mismatches in the common
ground. In the acceptance phase, the evidence of understanding could also
be misleading or ambiguous. For example, an interviewee providing ambigu-
ous indication of their understanding of a question but responding with an
irrelevant comment could defensibly claim that the question had been mis-
understood if the response is challenged by the interviewer. Recent research
on degrees of grounding (Roque and Traum, 2008; Brown-Schmidt, 2012)
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and on listener feedback (Buschmeier and Kopp, 2012; Bunt, 2012) are of
relevance for future work on non-cooperation along these lines.
Clarification subdialogues (Schegloff, 1987; Purver, 2004) are related to
grounding and occur in most types of interaction. These exchanges are
governed by their own set of rules, often independently from those in the
containing dialogue. They should be considered separately from the normal
flow of the conversation and should be analysed based on their own rules.
For instance, an interviewee asking a question of the interviewer as a request
for clarification would not be considered in violation of the rules of political
interviews. As we assume grounding is flawless, we will not deal with cooper-
ation in clarification subdialogues here. When present in naturally occurring
conversation, as in Turns (05) and (06) in Figure 3.2, these exchanges are not
annotated. Recent research on the analysis and generation of clarification
requests (Rieser and Moore, 2005; Purver, 2006; Schlangen and Ferna´ndez,
2007; Skantze, 2007; Benotti, 2009; Ginzburg, 2012; Cooper, 2013) will be
relevant to future work in order to account for these subdialogues.
Finally, to extend the approach to other types of dialogue (Walton and
Krabbe, 1995; Traum et al., 2008b) would involve devising adequate explicit
or implicit rules and conventions that govern the exchange. Recent and cur-
rent research in computational linguistics and dialogue systems has focused
on a great many such types: negotiation (McBurney et al., 2003; Traum et
al., 2005; Traum, 2008; Plu¨ss et al., 2011), argumentation and persuasion
(Piwek, 2008; Georgila et al., 2011), tutoring (Lu et al., 2007; Litman et al.,
2010; Dzikovska et al., 2010; Dzikovska et al., 2012), expository dialogues
(Stoyanchev and Piwek, 2010b; Stoyanchev and Piwek, 2010c), courtroom
interrogation (Asher et al., 2012; Asher and Lascarides, in press), etc.
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We will return to the issues above when describing future lines of re-
search in Chapter 6. Core speech acts were chosen to analyse the definition
in greater depth as they are of salient relevance to dialogue management,
which is the focus of Chapter 5 when modelling non-cooperation in conver-
sational agents. Core speech acts also allow for a rich set of well-defined
phenomena specific to political interviews to be analysed in the context of
non-cooperation. These are the focus of the remainder of this chapter and
of the empirical studies described in Chapter 4.
3.4 Discourse Obligations and Dialogue Games
In this section, we propose a combination of discourse obligations (Traum,
1994) and global dialogue games (Hamblin, 1970; Walton and Krabbe, 1995)
as a device to represent the rules and conventions associated with a dialogue
type. A global dialogue game is a description of the conversational situ-
ation. For each speaker role, it specifies what actions are allowed (and
therefore which ones are not), what contents are adequate for each contri-
bution, what actions the participants are conventionally obliged to perform
as a consequence of actions that have been performed earlier in the dialogue
by themselves or by the other party, and so forth.
Contrary to other uses of the term (Levin and Moore, 1977; Carlson,
1983; Mann, 1988; Carletta et al., 1997; Pulman, 2002), dialogue games
here refer to the entire dialogue and not just to local, goal-directed ex-
changes, such as a question-answer pair3. Hamblin (1970) studied fallacies
using similar descriptions, which he called dialectical systems. Fallacies
result from speakers breaking the rules of the dialectical system for valid ar-
3These local dialogue games and closely related notions have also been called con-
versational procedures (Power, 1979), conversational games (Kowtko et al., 1992;
Pulman, 1997; Lewin, 2000) and dialogue macrogames (Mann, 2002).
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guments. The approach was extended to the analysis of informal logic and
argumentation dialogues by Walton and Krabbe (1995). They proposed a
classification of dialogue types based on the initial situation, the individual
and shared goals of the participants and mechanisms by which they can
switch licitly between dialogues of different types4.
Along these lines, a global dialogue game can be thought of as a contract
participants subscribe to by agreeing on a specific type of interaction. At
the core of the game there is a set of rules that capture the conventions
associated with the dialogue type. Participants are expected to act according
to these rules. Traum and Allen (1994) first pointed at this “social pressure”
and proposed discourse obligations as an alternative to joint intentions
(Cohen and Levesque, 1991), shared plans (Grosz and Sidner, 1990) and
conversational games (Power, 1979; Kowtko et al., 1992) to allow for models
of dialogue in which participants do not have the same task-level goals and
therefore would not always adopt each other’s intentions, agree on a shared
plan or accept to engage in a particular (local) conversational game. In this
view, behaviour is not only determined by participants’ goals, but also by “a
sense of obligation to behave within limits set by the society that the agent
is part of” (Traum and Allen, 1994, p. 2). The typical example is that of
someone responding at all to a question they do not wish to answer instead
of remaining silent.
Discourse obligations have been used for modelling several aspects of dia-
logue management (Jameson and Weis, 1995; Matheson et al., 2000; Kreutel
4Walton and Krabbe (1995) discussed in detail the rules for argumentation dialogues.
Several authors have based on their approach to model other types of conversation, includ-
ing human-computer debate (Maudet and Moore, 2001), computer-mediated crosslingual
communication (Piwek et al., 2007) and purchase negotiation, argumentation and conflict
resolution in agent communication for multi-agent systems (McBurney and Parsons, 2009;
Karunatillake et al., 2009)
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and Matheson, 2003b)5. However, as far as we know, discourse obligations
have always been used in connection with general phenomena of conversa-
tion. We take this one step further and think of obligations as determined
by the type of dialogue, rather than fixed for all interactions. That is, the
correct handling of obligations is determined by the dialogue game.
Discourse obligations then follow naturally from the rules of global dia-
logue games and are associated with linguistic cooperation in the following
way: when obligations are honoured, the rules of the game are observed and
the result is linguistic cooperative behaviour. Non-cooperative behaviour is
thus by definition beyond the descriptive reach of dialogue games. Adding
explicit rules to account for the variations present in non-cooperative conver-
sations would require an additional set of rules for each possible unconven-
tional behaviour. In this framework, we focus on cases in which obligations
are not honoured, much in the same way as Hamblin focused on breaking
the rules of valid dialectical arguments in the analysis of fallacies, rather
than considering explicitly all the possible ways in which a fallacy could
take place (Hamblin, 1970, Chapter 1).
3.4.1 Formalisation
Below we formalise the elements that make up a dialogue game.
Action Labels
The rules of a dialogue game are formulated in terms of the actions that
participants perform during a conversation. These actions will be represen-
ted as labels that capture those aspects of the speaker’s contributions that
5Kreutel and Matheson (2000) showed how from a model of dialogue based on obligation
it is possible to reconstruct the structures used by intention-based approaches. In the
same paper they hint at the possibility of using obligations – instead of, e.g. intentions
and politeness (Boella et al., 1999) – to study cooperation in dialogue.
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are necessary for applying the rules. They result from an analysis of the
function and content of the contributions, the details of which are presented
and discussed at length in Chapter 4.
For the time being, we assume that dialogue transcripts have been annot-
ated according to a taxonomy T of conversational actions, so that each turn
is associated with a sequence of labels that characterise the speaker’s actions
in the turn. Chapter 4 presents a coding scheme for naturally-occurring
political interviews and shows how annotations in that coding scheme can
be mapped to the action labels used here. The labels that represent conver-
sational actions have the following structure:
(〈ID〉) : 〈action name〉[@(〈referent ID〉)] [〈binary flags〉]
In their simplest form, action labels are formed by an identifier in paren-
thesis, 〈ID〉, and the name of the action, 〈action name〉. The elements in
square brackets are optional:
• 〈referent ID〉 is the identifier of a previous action referred to by the
current action, and
• 〈binary flags〉 are action-specific binary flags, examples include whether
the action is repeated or new in the dialogue, whether a reply to a
question is complete or incomplete, etc.
Labelled Dialogue
A labelled dialogue D is a sequence of turns 〈t1; . . . ; tn〉. Each turn ti is
a pair (si, Li), where si is the speaker and Li is a sequence of instances of
action labels with adequate values for the parameters (identifier, references
and binary flags as applicable). Speakers alternate in each turn, so si 6=
si+1, for i ∈ {1 . . . n − 1}. Also, further restrictions on what labels can
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appear associated with each speaker in a correctly annotated dialogue can
be specified for pairs (si, Li).
Obligations
As mentioned above, obligations are actions that participants are expected
to perform as soon after their introduction as possible. Assuming S is the
set of speakers, we represent obligations as pairs (s, l) in which s ∈ S is the
speaker upon whom the obligation is imposed and l is an action label.
Dialogue Game
A dialogue game G is a triple (Allow, Introduce,Discharge), where each
element is a set of rules, respectively, of the form:
(a) [s : L], where s is a speaker and each L is a subset of the labels in the
annotation taxonomy. Such a rule specifies that speaker s is obliged
to limit his or her actions to those in L.
(b) [(s, l) ; o], where s is a speaker, l is a label in the taxonomy and
o is an obligation. Such a rule specifies that action l, if performed
by speaker s in the dialogue, creates an obligation o = (so, lo) that
specifies that speaker so is expected to perform action lo.
(c) [la  lb], where la and lb are labels. Such a rule specifies that action
la implicitly performs action lb. These rules define a binary relation
: T × T that we assume reflexive, so for any l ∈ T , l  l. Together,
these rules define the way obligations are discharged.
Discourse obligations are mandates on the speakers that constrain and
motivate conversational behaviour. They are updated, that is introduced
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and discharged, dynamically along the course of the conversation. Obliga-
tions are to be discharged as soon as possible. This means that if a speaker’s
actions impose any obligations on him or herself, these are expected to be
discharged within the same turn. On the other hand, if the speaker’s actions
impose obligations on the other speaker, these should be discharged in the
turn immediately after.
We can distinguish between static obligations and dynamic obliga-
tions. Static obligations are those that limit what actions participants are
allowed to take according to their role in the conversation as specified by the
rules in Allow. Dynamic obligations are introduced and discharged along
the dialogue as a consequence of the actions that participants actually take.
They are introduced according to the rules in Introduce, and discharged
according to those in Discharge.
3.4.2 A Revised Definition of Non-Cooperation in Dialogue
In the context of the definitions above, linguistic non-cooperation of a dia-
logue participant with respect to a conversational setting equates to the
participant violating the rules of the dialogue game for that conversational
setting. From this perspective, each turn in a dialogue is associated with
an amount of cooperation and an amount of non-cooperation. The amount
of cooperation is given by the number of dialogue rules directly conformed
with in the turn, whereas non-cooperation is determined by the number
of rules directly violated in the turn. We refer to instances in which rules
are conformed with as cooperative features and to instances in which
rules are broken as non-cooperative features. These notions, extended
to all the turns of a participant, lead to the amount of cooperation and
non-cooperation in the entire dialogue.
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Participants can break the rules of the game in two ways: (a) by per-
forming a conversational action that is not allowed for their role and (b) by
failing to perform an action they were obliged to perform. Instances of (a)
are violations of static obligations, which we call static non-cooperative
features. Instances of (b) are violations of dynamic obligations, which
we call dynamic non-cooperative features. An analogous distinction
is made for cooperative features, called, respectively, static cooperative
features and dynamic cooperative features.
The degree of cooperation of each dialogue participant is thus the
ratio between the number of cooperative features – static and dynamic –
and the total number of features of that participant. In general, this value
can be obtained for the entire conversation and for any continuous fragments.
In the rest of the section, we formalise the concepts above. Chapter 4
describes a method to compute the dynamic obligations of participants in
each turn of a dialogue. It also explains how to compute static and dynamic
cooperative and non-cooperative features and the degree of non-cooperation.
Dynamic Obligations
Formally, for a dialogueD = 〈t1; . . . ; tn〉, where each ti is a turn, we represent
dynamic obligations as a sequence OD = 〈OD,0;OD,1; . . . ;OD,n〉, where each
OD,i is a list 〈o1, . . . , ok〉 of the obligations after turn ti, and OD,0 is the list
of obligations before the dialogue starts. As before, each obligation oi is a
pair (si, li), where si is a speaker and li is an action label.
Obligations are updated in each turn of the dialogue. This means that,
for each turn ti, OD,i is computed based on OD,(i−1) by discharging existing
obligations and introducing new ones6:
6Recall that the implicit performance relation  is reflexive, so for any label l it is
l  l.
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• An obligation o = (s, l) ∈ OD,i−1 is discharged in turn ti = (si, Li)
if s = si and lj  l for some label lj ∈ Li. To discharge several
obligations in the same turn, we generalise this definition in the obvious
way.
• An obligation o is introduced in turn ti = (si, Li) if there is a rule
(s, l) ; o in the game such that s = si and lj  l, for some label
lj ∈ Li (meaning that obligations are introduced by implicitly per-
formed actions). To introduce several obligations in the same turn, we
generalise this definition in the obvious way.
Those obligations in OD,(i−1) that are not discharged in turn ti are car-
ried over to OD,(i).
Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Features
As said above, cooperative and non-cooperative features are instances of,
respectively, observed and neglected static and dynamic obligations:
Static cooperative features: actions performed by the speaker that
are allowed for his or her role in the dialogue.
Static non-cooperative features: actions performed by the speaker
that are disallowed for his or her role in the dialogue.
Dynamic cooperative features: obligations on the speaker that
were discharged in the current turn.
Dynamic non-cooperative features: obligations on the speaker
that were not discharged in the current turn.
Formally, for a dialogue D = 〈t1; . . . ; tn〉 features are grouped in two
sequences, SFD = 〈sf1; . . . ; sfn〉 and DFD = 〈df1; . . . ; dfn〉, of static and
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dynamic features, respectively. The elements in both sequences are triples
(si, Ci, NCi) where si is the speaker in turn ti, Ci is the list of cooperative
features and NCi is the list of non-cooperative features (static for sfi and
dynamic for dfi).
Static Features. These are determined by checking, in each turn, whether
the actions performed by the speaker are allowed for his or her role as
specified in the dialogue game. If an action is in the the speaker’s set of
allowed actions, then it constitutes a static cooperative feature, otherwise it
becomes a static non-cooperative feature. Formally, this means that in turn
ti = (si, Li), for each l ∈ Li if l ∈ L, with [si : L] a dialogue game rule in
G(1) = Allow, then l is an element of Ci in sfi = (si, Ci, NCi). Otherwise,
l is an element of NCi.
Dynamic Features. These are determined by the speaker’s actions and
obligations in each turn. If an obligation on the speaker has been discharged
within the turn, then it constitutes a dynamic cooperative feature, otherwise
it becomes a dynamic non-cooperative feature. Formally, this means that





which so = si has been discharged in the current turn, so lo is a dynamic
cooperative feature and thus an element of Ci in dfi = (si, Ci, NCi)
7. On the
other hand, an obligation o = (so, lo) ∈ OD,i for which so = si has not been
discharged in the current turn, so lo is a dynamic non-cooperative feature
and thus belonging in NCi.
7Obligations that are introduced and discharged in the same turn are an exception
to this rule, as they will not show up in OD,(i−1) nor in OD,i, but they still constitute
dynamic cooperative features. In the implementation of the method described in Chapter
4 we address this by using an additional structure to handle such cases.
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Degree of Non-Cooperation
With the static and dynamic features for each turn, we can take the propor-
tion of them that are non-cooperative as an indicator of the extent to which
each participant acted outside the rules of the game. This is the degree
of non-cooperation of a dialogue participant with respect to a dialogue





where cfD,s is the number of cooperative features – both static and dynamic












Note that, although these definitions are here expressed for the entire dia-
logue, the same applies if any subsequence of turns is considered.
3.5 A Dialogue Game for Political Interviews
This section presents a dialogue game for the core speech acts in political
interviews. We start by specifying the conversational actions that dialogue
participants do during the conversation by giving the set of possible action
8Recall that the elements in the sequences of static and dynamic features SFD =
〈sf1; . . . ; sfn〉 and DFD = 〈df1; . . . ; dfn〉 are triples (si, Ci, NCi), where si is the speaker
in turn ti, and Ci and NCi are the associated lists of, respectively, cooperative and non-
cooperative features. Components of triples are accessed by indexation, so for instance
|sfi(2)| denotes the length of the second component of triple sfi, i.e. of the list of static
cooperative features Ci of the i-th turn.
3.5. A Dialogue Game for Political Interviews 83
labels. Later, we present the rules for the political interview dialogue game,
grounding them on the literature and providing examples. We formalise
these concepts and ultimately present a dialogue game structure used in
the rest of the thesis to illustrate the approach to measuring and modelling
linguistic non-cooperation in dialogue applied to political interviews.
3.5.1 Action Labels for Political Interviews
The labels in political interviews have the following structure:
(〈ID〉) : [〈validity prefix 〉-]〈action name〉[@(〈referent ID〉)] [〈repeated & complete flags〉]
Note that the differences with respect to general definition presented in the
previous section are an optional validity prefix as part the action name and
two specific binary flags. Below we describe these elements in further detail
and provide examples.
Identifiers and Action Names
Instances of action labels are identified by numbering them sequentially as
they appear in the dialogue, so 〈ID〉 ∈ N.
Action names can take one of five possible values:
- statement: an assertion that conveys information and is not in re-
sponse to a request from the other party. Examples include preambles
to questions and voluntary comments unrelated to the topic of the
interview or to the question under consideration.
- question: a request for the other party to provide some informa-
tion. Examples include direct questions, and assertions that invite
comments or opinions9.
9As stated in Section 3.3.2, clarification requests are not considered questions in this
study and are left unlabelled.
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- reply: an assertion providing information in response to a request
from the other party. Examples include complete and partial replies
to questions, as well as assertions that although made in response to
a question fail to provide any of the information requested without
explicitly declining to answer10.
- acceptance: a positive reaction to a previous contribution from the
other party. This means explicitly agreeing with an assertion or to a
request or contribution the other participant has made. Examples in-
clude agreeing to answer a question, or stating that a reply successfully
answers a question.
- rejection: a negative reaction to a previous contribution from the
other party. This means explicitly contradicting an assertion, refusing
to agree to a request or dismissing an answer as inadequate. Examples
include, declining to answer a question, stating that a reply is not
informative enough, etc.
Valid and Invalid Actions
Some of the actions are further classified as valid or invalid depending on
their content, on the context in which they take place and on the role of the
speaker. A qualifier prefix is added to the action name indicating whether
the action is valid or invalid. We distinguish valid from invalid actions for
all statements, questions and replies, but not for acceptances and rejections.
The criteria for validity are based on the discussion on the analysis of polit-
ical interviews in Chapter 2.
10Responses to clarifications requests (e.g. verbatim repetition of previous contributions
or rephrases) are not considered replies in this study and are left unlabeled.
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Statements. These informative actions are often used by interviewers to
set up the context for a question, for instance by providing facts and figures
or quotations. The criteria for validity are as follows:
- valid-statement: new assertions by the interviewer, in which the
information provided is objective and relevant to the topic of the in-
terview, and in which any quotations and figures are accurate. In the
(rare) cases of interviews that start with a statement from the inter-
viewee, these too are considered valid, provided that the information
conveyed is accurate and relevant to the topic of the interview11.
- invalid-statement: any assertions by the interviewee that are not in
response to a question by the interviewee, with the exception of those
in the first turn of interviews that start with a statement by the inter-
viewee, which are invalid only if they are either repeated, inaccurate
or irrelevant to the topic of the interview. Also, any assertions made
by the interviewer that are either repeated, subjective, inaccurate or
irrelevant to the topic of the interview or of the line of questioning.
Questions. These requests for information are used by interviewers to
elicit information from the interviewee and to set the topical agenda. The
criteria for validity are as follows:
- valid-question: requests for information made by the interviewer,
which are neutral, relevant to the current state of affairs and which
the interviewee is in a position to answer.
- invalid-question: any questions posed by the interviewee12. Also,
11Note that objectivity is not a requirement for the validity of statements made by the
interviewee.
12With the exception of clarification requests that are left unlabelled.
86 Chapter 3. Non-Cooperation, Obligations and Dialogue Games
information requests by the interviewer, which have no answers or
which the interviewee is not in a position to answer, requests for per-
sonal, private or irrelevant information and loaded questions which
convey controversial assumptions, accusations or personal attacks.
Replies. These assertions are used by interviewees to provide the inform-
ation required by interviewers. The criteria for validity are as follows:
- valid-reply: any new assertions made by the interviewee in response
to a question from the interviewer, which provide (all or part of) the
information requested.
- invalid-reply: any replies by the interviewer in response to questions
from the interviewee13. Also, assertions made by the interviewee in
response to a request for information, which are irrelevant, inaccurate
or repeated.
As for the rest of the elements in the dialogue game, the distinction
between valid and invalid contributions is grounded on social conventions
and current practices in political interviews. It is worth noting, however,
that validity is functional to classifying the contents of the actions of the
dialogue participants, much in the same way as we distinguish between state-
ments and questions based on an action’s function. Validity therefore does
not have a direct connection with cooperation as the latter depends on the
obligations resulting from rules of the dialogue game. It is possible to think
of conversational situations in which invalid actions are among the licit op-
tions allowed to the speakers – and sometimes even expected from them14.
13Again, except for responses to clarification requests, which are left unlabelled.
14As an extreme example, BBC Radio 4 show The Unbelievable Truth is described
by the broadcaster as “the game show in which panellists are encouraged to tell lies”
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As mentioned in Chapter 2, at the end of Section 2.5, in hybrid political
interviews (Hutchby, 2011) the neutrality requirement for interviewers is
dropped, which would allow for (at least some) invalid questions to be licit
in discharging obligations and therefore instances of cooperative behaviour.
References
The labels of responsive actions, that is replies, acceptances and rejections,
include a reference to the action label they respond to. A reply action label,
for instance, would include a reference to the question it is an answer to. As
references point to previously identified actions, they too are represented as
natural numbers. A restriction applies, as referents must appear earlier in
the dialogue, so 〈referent ID〉 ∈ {1, . . . , 〈ID〉 − 1} ⊂ N, where 〈ID〉 is the
identifier of the current action. Furthermore, we only consider responses to
actions of the other speaker, so references are limited to the identifiers of
the action labels performed previously by the other party.
Binary Flags: Repetition and Completeness
Two aspects of the contents of conversational actions escape the classifica-
tions of validity discussed above and are treated at a broader level by the
dialogue game: whether a question is repeated and whether a reply to a
question is complete, in the sense that it provides all the information re-
quested.
New and Repeated Contributions. The role of repetition in dialogue
is an area of research in itself. Bazzanella (2011) notes that a characteristic
of repetition, from a pragmatic perspective, is its polyvalence. Repeating
(http://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/b007mf4f, last accessed: May 2013). Players take
turns to lie about a given subject, trying to include fragments of truth without being
detected by the other panellists.
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utterances can serve different purposes and have diametrically opposite ef-
fects (e.g. express agreement or disagreement). In political interviews, we
pay attention to self-repetition – speakers repeating something they them-
selves said earlier in the dialogue – that is intentional and that is not in
response to a clarification request. Bazzanella refers to this as intended
redundancy and identifies functions such as stressing a point, increasing
emphasis and marking agreement or disagreement. We limit our study to
intended self-repetition of questions and replies.
For replies, repetition is one of the causes of invalidity as indicated above.
This is because, in ideal circumstances – what the dialogue game ultimately
describes – once relevant and sufficient information has been made explicit
there should not be a need to expose it again. Interviewees tend to resort
to unnecessary repetition in an attempt to emphasise the specific messages
they intend to deliver. Bull and Mayer (1993) identify repetition of answers
to previous questions as one of the ways in which politicians avoid answer-
ing questions. The term soundbite has recently been associated with this
behaviour by politicians during interviews or public speeches. The example
in Figure 3.3 shows a case in which essentially the same answer is given by
the interviewee to the successive questions by the interviewer15.
For questions, verbatim repetition often indicates that a satisfactory
answer has not been received. Example 1.1 in Chapter 1 illustrates rather
well how repetition of a question can be used – a dozen times – by the
interviewer to reject an invalid reply. This is made clear by the explicit
rejection in turn (11) as shown in Figure 3.4.
15This fragment is part of Interview 2 from the corpus study described in Chapter 4. A
complete transcript can be found at http://mcs.open.ac.uk/nlg/non-cooperation/.
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Turn Spkr. Speech
(1) Miliband These strikes are wrong at a time when negotiations are still go-
ing on. But parents and the public have been let down by both
sides because the government has acted in a reckless and provocat-
ive manner. After today’s disruption, I urge both sides to put aside
the rhetoric, get round the negotiating table and stop it happening
again.
(2) Green I listened to your speech in Wrexham where you talked about the
Labour Party being a movement. A lot of people in that that move-
ment are the people who are on strike today and they’ll be looking
at you and thinking ’Well, You’re describing these strikes as wrong.
Why aren’t you giving us more leadership as the leader of the Labour
movement?’
(3) Miliband At a time when negotiations are still going on I do belie ve these
strikes are wrong. And that’s why I say both sides should, after
today’s disruption, get round the negotiating table, put aside the
rhetoric, and sort the problem out. Because the public and parents
have been let down by both sides. The government has acted in a
reckless and provocative manner.
(4) Green I spoke to Francis Maude before I came here and the tone he was
striking was a very conciliatory one. Do you think there’s a difference
between the words they are saying in public and the attitudes they
strike in private behind the negotiations? Are the negotiations in
good faith would you say?
(5) Miliband What I say is that the strikes are wrong at a time when negotiations
are still going on. But the government has acted in a reckless and
provocative manner in the way it has gone about these issues. After
today’s disruption, I urge both sides to get round the negotiating
table, put aside the rhetoric, and stop this kind of thing happening
again.
Figure 3.3: Repetition used by an interviewee for producing soundbites
Complete and Incomplete Replies. As stated above, whether a re-
sponse to a question constitutes a valid reply depends on the extent to which
the information requested is provided. Analysing equivocation in political
interviews Bull and Mayer (1993) and Bull (2003) argue that incomplete
replies are somewhere between valid and invalid replies, as the information
conveyed is relevant but insufficient. In the case of valid multi-barrelled
questions for instance, or when the interviewer asks several questions in the
same turn, the interviewee can reply to only part of these. In the latter case,
individual questions are labelled separately and reply labels would indicate
the question they address in their reference. This allows tracking what
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Turn Spkr. Speech
(1) Paxman (interrupting) Did you threaten to overrule him?
(2) Howard I, I, was not entitled to instruct Derek Lewis, and I did not instruct
him.
(3) Paxman Did you threaten to overrule him?
(4) Howard The truth of the matter is that Mr. Marriott was not suspended. I-
(5) Paxman (overlapping) Did you threaten to overrule him?
(6) Howard -did not overrule Derek Lewis.
(7) Paxman Did you threaten to overrule him?
(8) Howard I have accounted for my decision to dismiss Derek Lewis in great
detail, before the House of Commons.
(9) Paxman It’s a straight yes-or-no question and a straight yes-or-no answer: did
you threaten to overrule him?
(10) Howard I discussed the matter with Derek Lewis. I gave him the benefit of
my opinion. I gave him the benefit of my opinion in strong language,
but I did not instruct him because I was not entitled to instruct him.
I was entitled to express my opinion and that is what I did.
(11) Paxman With respect, that is not answering the question of whether you
threatened to overrule him.
Figure 3.4: Repetition used by an interviewer for rejecting replies
questions have been answered and which ones have not. In multi-barrelled
questions, on the other hand, several pieces of information are requested
by the same action and only one label is used. Providing all necessary in-
formation could then take several reply actions, none of which on its own
would constitute a complete reply. The completeness flag allows for dealing
with this situation at the level of a turn. New, accurate and relevant yet
incomplete individual replies are labelled as valid replies with an incomplete
flag, until the interviewee has provided for all the information requested, at
which point the action is labelled as a valid reply with the complete binary
flag. The fragment in Figure 3.5 illustrates this16. Incomplete replies are
not considered non-cooperative features, provided that at least one reply ac-
tion in the turn is complete. If none of them are, then one non-cooperative
feature is considered at the end of the turn as the interviewee has failed
to meet the obligation of providing all the information requested in a valid
16This fragment is part of Interview 1 from the corpus study described in Chapter 4. A
complete transcript can be found in Appendix A.
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question.
Turn Spkr. Speech Action Label
13 Brodie This is echoing what George Bush said isn’t
it about how we will go not just for the per-
petrators but for those who harbour him,
(16) : valid-statement
and you are talking about the Taliban? (17) : valid-question N
14 Blair Well, for all those people who have been
in a position where they have been help-
ing or harbouring terrorism, the way that
it operates, camps that are dedicated to
training people in it. These are people
trained in these camps who go out and
basically wreak havoc wherever they can,
killing many, many innocent people. And
although what happened last week is obvi-
ously an atrocity almost beyond our imagin-
ation, it is not an isolated incident, in that
sense, there has been a history going back
over several years.
(18) : valid-reply@(17) I
Now you mention the Taliban, the Taliban
have a very clear choice, the Taliban either
cease to help or harbour those that are fer-
menting terrorism or they will be treated
as part of the terrorist apparatus them-
selves. Now they have that choice and they
should consider very, very carefully the con-
sequences that they face at this moment of
choice.
(19) : valid-reply@(17)C
Figure 3.5: Labelling of complete and incomplete valid replies
3.5.2 An Example Interview Annotated with Action Labels
Figure 3.6 shows a (hand-crafted) political interview. The same fragment is
annotated with the labels above in Figure 3.7(a). A semi-automatic method
for arriving at such annotation is described and evaluated in Chapter 4.
Once labelled, a dialogue is represented as a sequence of turns, each one
with a speaker and a list of action labels. In the example, the dialogue is
represented as shown in Figure 3.7(b) which, formalised as explained below
is the input to the method for measuring non-cooperation described in the
next chapter.
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Let me try to explain this.
The numbers are worse than we expected, but this 
Government is working hard to correct the situation. Interviewee
How do you explain the rise in the inflation rate for the 
last quarter, Mr Chancellor?
Interviewer
But how do you explain the increase in the inflation rate?
Interviewer
It was due to a combination of seasonal factors and a 
sudden rise in the price of commodities on the 
international market. 
But we are working hard to correct the situation. Interviewee
I suppose you don't expect me to answer that question.
Interviewee
That's clear enough.
Could you please tell us the price of a pint of milk in 
China?Interviewer
Figure 3.6: A hand-crafted political interview transcript
Formalisation
The action label taxonomy for political interviews is formalised as: TPI =
{valid-statement, invalid-statement, valid-question, invalid-
question, valid-reply, invalid-reply, acceptance, rejection}. In a
political interview dialogue DPI each turn ti is a pair (si, Li), where si ∈ {ir,
ie} is the speaker and Li is a sequence of instances of action labels from
the taxonomy with adequate parameter values (identifier, reference and bin-
ary flags as applicable). Two further restrictions apply to correctly labelled
dialogues:
• si = ir⇒ valid-reply /∈ Li
• si = ie⇒ valid-question /∈ Li
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Turn Spkr. Speech Action Label
1 ir How do you explain the rise in the
inflation rate for the last quarter,
Mr Chancellor?
(1) : valid-question N
2 ie Let me explain this. (2) : acceptance@(1)
The numbers are worse than we
expected, but this Government is
working hard to correct the situ-
ation.
(3) : invalid-reply@(1) I
3 ir But how do you explain the increase
in the inflation rate?
(3) : valid-question R
4 ie It was due to a combination of sea-
sonal factors and a sudden rise in
the price of commodities on the in-
ternational market.
(5) : valid-reply@(1) C
But we are working hard to correct
the situation.
(6) : invalid-reply@(1) C
5 ir That’s clear enough. (7) : acceptance@(5)
Could you please tell us the price of
a pint of milk in China?
(8) : invalid-question N
6 ie I suppose you don’t expect me to
answer that question.
(9) : rejection@(8)
ir: Interviewer, ie: Interviewee; N: New, R: Repeated, C: Complete, I: Incomplete.
(a) Political interview transcript annotated with action labels
Turn Spkr. Action Label
1 ir (1) : valid-question N
2 ie (2) : acceptance@(1)
(3) : invalid-reply@(1) I
3 ir (4) : valid-question R
4 ie (5) : valid-reply@(1) C
(6) : invalid-reply@(1) C
5 ir (7) : acceptance@(5)
(8) : invalid-question N
6 ie (9) : rejection@(8)
ir: Interviewer, ie: Interviewee;
N: New, R: Repeated, C: Complete, I: Incomplete.
(b) Political interview as a list of turns with action labels
D1 = 〈(ir, 〈(1) : valid-question N〉);
(ie, 〈(2) : acceptance@(1); (3) : invalid-reply@(1) I〉);
(ir, 〈(4) : valid-question R〉);
(ie, 〈(5) : valid-reply@(1) C; (6) : invalid-reply@(1) C〉);
(ir, 〈(7) : acceptance@(5); (8) : invalid-question N〉);
(ie, 〈(9) : rejection@(8)〉)〉
(c) Formalised political interview
Figure 3.7: Action labels in a (hand-crafted) political interview
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meaning that there can be no valid replies performed by interviewers, nor
valid questions put forward by the interviewee17. An example of the form-
alisation is shown in Figure 3.7(c).
3.5.3 The Dialogue Game
Based on the simplifying assumptions above and on the discussion on polit-
ical interviews in Chapter 2, political interviews can be characterised as
follows:
A political interview is a dialogue with two participants, the
interviewer and the interviewee, who make their contributions
in turns, with complete utterances and only when they hold the
floor – that is, there are no interruptions and no overlaps. The
interviewer’s role is to elicit information from the interviewee
by asking valid questions that can be optionally accompanied by
one or more statements setting up the context. The interviewee’s
role is to provide the information requested by the interviewer.
After a valid question is posed by the interviewer, the inter-
viewee is expected to accept it, either explicitly, or by providing
a valid reply. By accepting a question, either valid or invalid,
the interviewee is obliged to provide a valid reply. Once a ques-
tion has been answered, the interviewer is expected to accept it,
either explicitly or by moving on to the next question until the
interview ends.
In cases when a response is not a valid answer to the question,
the interviewer is expected to reject it, either explicitly by indic-
ating how the response fails to provide an answer or by repeating
17We are using the mathematical notation loosely here as the sequences of labels do not
contain unparameterised labels but instances of the form described in Section 3.5.1.
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the question. Conversely, if the interviewer asks an invalid ques-
tion, the interviewee must reject it, explicitly indicating why the
question is not valid or why an answer cannot be provided.
As can be seen from the description above, some of the obligations are
inherent to the role of each participant, while others depend on the dynamics
of the dialogue and on the actions that participants take. The rules of
a dialogue game for political interviews are informally expressed as
shown in Figure 3.8.
Following the observations by Heritage (1985) and Greatbatch (1988)
for news interviews, except for the repetition of questions, we treat the
omission of explicit acknowledgements as implicit acceptances. Heritage
observed that receipts and assessments are systematically avoided by parti-
cipants and, for instance, interviewers “display their alignment to prior talk
largely by designing next questions so as to tacitly presuppose the truth and
adequacy of prior reports or to undermine them.” (Heritage, 1985, p. 99).
This approach also conforms with the treatment of implicit acceptances as
proposed by Kreutel and Matheson (2003a).
Interviews often start with a question from the interviewer, so we assume
that at the outset of the dialogue there is an obligation on the interviewer
to ask a valid question. In the exceptional cases in which the exchange
starts with a statement by the interviewee, there is an obligation for the
interviewee to make a valid statement.
The rules of the dialogue game for political interviews are formally rep-
resented as GPI = (AllowPI , IntroducePI , DischargePI), defined as shown
in Figure 3.918.
18We use “∗” as a wildcard character for when the validity of the action is not relevant
to the application of the rule.
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Dialogue Game for Political Interviews (Informal)
1. The interviewer limits himself or herself to:
• making valid statements,
• asking valid questions,
• accepting a contribution from the interviewee, or
• rejecting a contribution the interviewee.
2. The interviewee limits himself or herself to:
• making valid statements,
• producing valid replies to questions,
• accepting a statement or question from the interviewer, or
• rejecting a contribution from the interviewer.
3. If the interviewer makes a valid statement, the interviewee must accept it.
4. If the interviewer asks a valid question, the interviewee must accept it.
5. By accepting a question, the interviewee commits him/herself to providing a
valid reply to that question.
6. If the interviewee makes a valid statement, the interviewer must accept it.
7. If the interviewee provides a valid reply to a question, the interviewer is
obliged to accept it.
8. By accepting a reply, the interviewer commits him/herself to asking a new
valid question.
9. If the interviewer makes an invalid statement, the interviewee must reject it.
10. If the interviewer asks an invalid question, the interviewee must reject it.
11. If the interviewer provides an invalid reply, the interviewee must reject it.
12. If the interviewee makes an invalid statement, the interviewer must reject it.
13. If the interviewee asks an invalid question, the interviewer must reject it.
14. If the interviewee provides an invalid reply, the interviewer must reject it.
15. Repeated (valid and invalid) questions are implicit rejections.
16. Statements (valid and invalid) are implicit acceptances of the contributions
in the last turn of the other party.
17. New (valid and invalid) questions are implicit acceptances of the contribu-
tions in the last turn of the other party.
18. Replies (valid and invalid) are implicit acceptances of the contributions in
the last turn of the other party.
Figure 3.8: An informal dialogue game for political interviews
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Dialogue Game for Political Interviews (Formal)
GPI = (AllowPI , IntroducePI , DischargePI)
where
AllowPI = {[ir : {valid-statement, valid-question, acceptance, rejection}],
(1)
[ie : {valid-statement, valid-reply, acceptance, rejection}]} (2)
IntroducePI = {[(ir, (s) : valid-statement); (ie, acceptance@(s))], (3)
[(ir, (q) : valid-question N); (ie, acceptance@(q))], (4)
[(ie, acceptance@(q)); (ie, valid-reply@(q) C)], (5)
[(ie, (s) : valid-statement); (ir, acceptance@(s))], (6)
[(ie, (r) : valid-reply@(q)); (ir, acceptance@(r))], (7)
[(ir, acceptance); (ir, valid-question N)], (8)
[(ir, (s) : invalid-statement); (ie, rejection@(s))], (9)
[(ir, (q) : invalid-question); (ie, rejection@(q))], (10)
[(ir, (r) : invalid-reply); (ie, rejection@(r))], (11)
[(ie, (s) : invalid-statement); (ir, rejection@(s))], (12)
[(ie, (q) : invalid-question); (ir, rejection@(q))], (13)
[(ie, (r) : invalid-reply); (ir, rejection@(r))]} (14)
DischargePI = {[∗-question R  rejection], (15)
[∗-statement  acceptance], (16)
[∗-question N  acceptance], (17)
[∗-reply  acceptance]} (18)
Figure 3.9: Formal representation of the dialogue game for political inter-
views
3.6 Summary
This chapter presented the conceptual framework for the study of non-
cooperation in dialogue.
We started by making clear the distinction between cooperation in dia-
logue at the level of the underlying activity (e.g. working together towards
exposing the truth on a certain matter) and cooperation at the conver-
sational level (e.g. asking sensible questions and responding to them ad-
equately). Focusing on the latter, called linguistic cooperation, we gave a
generic definition of non-cooperation of a speaker with respect to a conver-
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sational setting. By illustrating with a definition of non-cooperation specific
to political interviews we identified a number of shortcomings. This led to
simplifying assumptions that allowed us to revisit the definition in greater
detail by focusing on issues pertaining to core speech acts.
Discourse obligations resulting from the rules specifying global dialogue
games were introduced as a conceptual means for tracking the behaviours
of dialogue participants and detecting instances of non-cooperation. This
led to a revisited, more detailed definition of non-cooperation in dialogue.
Under this definition, non-cooperation is the extent to which each dialogue
participant has failed to meet their obligations. Failures are aggregated into
a single, normalised figure for each participant, which allows comparisons
between the participants in the same conversation and also across dialogues
and any of their fragments.
The concepts were formalised and illustrated with examples from the
political interview setting. The chapter closed with a detailed dialogue game
for political interviews which will be used as needed in the examples of the
rest of the thesis and in the evaluation of the approach.
Having laid the grounds for the systematic study of non-cooperative
behaviour, in the next chapter we present, discuss and evaluate a semi-
automatic method for assessing non-cooperation in dialogue. In Chapter 5,
the concepts introduced here are incorporated in a model of conversational




The previous chapter introduced the conceptual framework for studying
linguistic non-cooperation in naturally-occurring dialogue and, more spe-
cifically, in political interviews. This chapter presents and discusses a semi-
automatic empirical method for measuring non-cooperation within this frame-
work. Section 4.1 describes the overall approach and Sections 4.2 and 4.4
explain the method in detail in the context of political interviews. Two
corpus studies are described in Sections 4.3 and 4.5, reporting on results for
reliability and validity of the measure. Section 4.6 discusses the outcomes
in connection with the remainder of the thesis.
4.1 Aims and Overview of the Method
The first aim of the method described here is to obtain, semi-automatically,
the degree to which each participant in a dialogue behaved according to
the role he or she had in the conversation. This calls for a mechanism to
assess a participant’s contributions in terms of the expectations for their
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role in the conversational context specified by the dialogue game introduced
in Chapter 3. Ideally, this mechanism should be reliable, i.e. it should be
possible for anyone to apply the method to dialogues beyond those analysed
in this research. It should also be valid, i.e it should correlate to intuitive
notions of cooperation in dialogue in the sense that we give it in the thesis.
The second goal is to inform the study of non-cooperation by means
of simulation presented in Chapter 5. This requires that the method be
suitable for its incorporation, at least in part, into a model of conversational
agents that can exhibit and cope with non-cooperative linguistic behaviour.
We will come back to this aspect in Section 4.6.
In short, starting with a transcript of a dialogue and a short description
of its context, we arrive at a numeric value for each participant indicating
to what extent he or she adhered to the rules of the dialogue game. We call
this value the degree of cooperation of each dialogue participant with
respect to a dialogue game.
The measure is obtained in two steps. In the first step, the dialogue
transcript is manually annotated, identifying a set of features in the par-
ticipants’ contributions. In the second step, these features are automatic-
ally assessed for cooperation with respect to the dialogue game. Figure
4.1 shows an overview of this process. The icons on the upper-left corner
of the boxes for each step indicate whether they are automatic or involve
human intervention. The chess board icon inside the box Assessment of Co-
operation shows that the dialogue game plays a role in this step. We will
use this convention when describing the method in further detail.
Section 4.2 focuses on the annotation step applied to political interviews.
Annotations are done in two stages:




(Segments, Dialogue Act Functions, 
References and Content Features)
Assessment of 
Cooperation 





Figure 4.1: Two-step semi-automatic measure of cooperation (overview)
First Stage: each turn in the transcript is divided into segments and each
segment is assigned a dialogue act function and, when applicable,
the segment it responds to.
Second Stage: each segment identified in the first stage is annotated with
content features, i.e. qualitative judgements on its content with
respect to the context of to the dialogue and to the dialogue history.
The concepts above will be defined precisely in Section 4.2. The out-
come of the annotation step is a dialogue in which the contributions of the
participants are identified and categorised according to their function and to
the qualitative properties of their content. These annotations are then used
in the second step to determine the degree of cooperation of each dialogue
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participant.
Section 4.3 presents a corpus study on the reliability of the method.
The study involved applying the annotation scheme to six political inter-
views. Inter-annotator agreement was measured for each annotation stage,
including segmentation agreement using Krippendorff’s αU coefficient (Krip-
pendorff, 1995), which was adapted for segmentation of transcribed dialogue
(see Section 4.3.1 for details). Agreement was also measured on the assign-
ment of dialogue act functions, referent segments (first annotation stage)
and content features (second annotation stage) using multi-rater versions of
Cohen’s κ (Cohen, 1960; Davies and Fleiss, 1982), Scott’s pi (Scott, 1955;
Fleiss, 1971) and Krippendorff’s α (Krippendorff, 2004). After the first
stage, the data from individual annotators were aggregated automatically
to produce a single annotation for each dialogue. These were used as input
for the second annotation stage.
Section 4.4 describes the automatic assessment step applied to polit-
ical interviews. This involves analysing the annotated dialogues in order to
identify departures from the linguistic behaviour that is expected of each
participant according to the dialogue game. The assessment process starts
by mapping the annotations to action labels and computing the discourse
obligations introduced by these actions, as described in Chapter 3. Next,
these action labels and discourse obligations are used to detect cooper-
ative and non-cooperative features. These are instances in which an
action respectively met or failed to meet a discourse obligation. Finally,
the degree of cooperation is calculated for each speaker as the ratio of co-
operative features over the total number of features (cooperative and non-
cooperative). This gives a numerical value between 0 and 1, that is, between
total non-cooperation where none of the speaker’s actions met the ob-
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ligations prescribed by the dialogue game and total cooperation where
all of the speaker’s actions met their obligations. The concepts above are
defined and formalised in Section 4.4, where we also present and discuss the
algorithms and data structures involved in each of the computations. Figure
4.2 shows a more detailed schematic representation of the method with the
annotation stages and processes just introduced.
Dialogue 
Transcript
Annotation - First Stage
(Segments, Dialogue Act Functions 
and References)






Mapping of Annotations 
to Action Labels
Computation of Discourse 
Obligations
















Figure 4.2: Stages of the semi-automatic measure of cooperation
104 Chapter 4. Measuring Non-Cooperation in Dialogue
Section 4.5 presents a study on the validity of the method. The study in-
volved eliciting human judgement on the behaviour of dialogue participants
via an on-line survey. This was performed independently from the previous
study and on the same set of dialogue transcripts. Validity of the measure
was assessed by testing the correlation between these judgements and the
degree of cooperation obtained when applying the method to the aggreg-
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Figure 4.3: Overview of the evaluation approach
4.2 Annotating Political Interviews for the Assess-
ment of Cooperation
This section describes an annotation scheme for naturally-occurring political
interviews towards the automatic assessment of conversational cooperation.
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The assessment requires that participants’ contributions be classified ac-
cording to their effects and to the quality of their content. Typical examples
include distinguishing questions from responses and, further, questions that
request for information relevant to the topical context of the interview from
those that do not, or responses that provide a meaningful answer to a ques-
tion from those that fail to do so.
The distinctions pertaining to the content of what participants contrib-
ute to the conversation pose a challenge with respect to previous research
in dialogue annotation. Classical annotation schemes for dialogue moves
(Carletta et al., 1997; Allen and Core, 1997; Poesio et al., 1999) and also
those specifically concerned with non-cooperation (Davies, 1997; Cavicchio,
2010), were developed in the context of tightly constrained task-oriented
domains. Given the nature of such dialogues, either in human–human in-
teraction analysis or human–computer dialogue modelling, these proposals
assume dialogue participants work together towards the resolution of the
task at hand. As discussed in Chapter 3, political interviews share some
characteristic with task-oriented dialogues (e.g. the roles of the participants
are clearly defined). However, it is often the case that politicians and inter-
viewers have contradicting goals, which results in contributions not always
meeting the expectations for the conversational context or for the role of the
participant in the dialogue.
More recently, annotation schemes have been proposed for other types
of dialogue, including fictive expository dialogues (Stoyanchev and Piwek,
2010a), argumentation and persuasion (Georgila et al., 2011), and open-
context, multi-modal, multi-party interactions (Bunt, 2009; Bunt, 2011;
Bunt et al., 2012). Some of these schemes consider interactions in which
participants’ goals do not point in the same direction (e.g. the annota-
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tion scheme for argumentation and persuasion proposed by Georgila et al.),
but to our knowledge this is the first time a coding scheme is proposed for
naturally-occurring open-domain political interviews aimed at investigating
aspects of linguistic non-cooperation. Political interviews are in a way ex-
pository dialogues: the ultimate goal of an interview is to make information
publicly available. On the other hand, they differ with respect to the spe-
cific roles, both conversational and public, of the participants. There is not,
for instance, a clear divide between an expert and a naive participant with
respect to the information being elicited, and therefore an answer from the
politician can be challenged by the interviewee based on facts. Political
interviews are also instances of naturally-occurring dialogue, what differen-
tiates them further form fictive dialogue of the kind studied, for instance,
by Stoyanchev and Piwek (2010a).
We define our annotation scheme taking elements from the ISO standard
proposed by Bunt et al. (2009; 2010; 2012) and incorporating insights from
the analysis of equivocation in political communication proposed by Bull
and Mayer (1993) and developed further by Bull (1994; 2003).
4.2.1 A Discussion on Related Work
Previous research on dialogue annotation for non-cooperation is scarce. The
only instances of complete research we know of are those of Davies (1997;
2006) and Cavicchio (2010), both in the context of task-oriented dialogues,
and more specifically in the HCRC Map Task domain (Anderson et al., 1991;
Carletta et al., 1997)1. Davies (1994; 1997; 2006) proposes a direct approach
1At the moment of writing this thesis, two short papers were published by Asher et al.
(2012) and Afantenos et al. (2012) from the STAC project which focuses on analysis and
modelling strategic conversation with a strong emphasis on non-cooperation. The papers
report on ongoing data collection and preliminary annotation of negotiation dialogues
surrounding a board game, but mention is made of future work exploring data from
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to annotating cooperation for analysing its relation with effort and task
success. Her notion of cooperation is a re-interpretation of Grice’s (1975)
Cooperative Principle in terms of the risk/effort trade-off of a speaker’s
dialogue acts and their alignment with the hearer’s goals. Her annotation
approach shares some characteristics with ours, but cooperation is judged
directly by the annotators, as “positive codings (i.e. finding an instance
of the behaviour in an utterance), and negative codings (i.e. finding an
instance where we believe a particular behaviour should have been used)”
(Davies, 2006, p. 43). In addition, codings are weighed towards the rating
of cooperation according the their level of effort (low-effort behaviours have
lower positive weightings but higher negative weightings, while the converse
holds for high-effort behaviours). In her doctoral thesis, Cavicchio (2010)
applies Davies’ coding scheme to a multi-modal corpus of the Map Task
domain and studies the relation between (non-)cooperation and emotions.
Her focus is not however on how to assess cooperation in dialogue, but on to
what extent psychophysiological indicators of emotion (e.g. heartrate and
facial expressions) correlate with cooperative behaviour.
We considered a series of flat annotation schemes2 similar to Davies’
in previous investigations (Plu¨ss, 2010), but abandoned them in favour of
the multi-dimensional one presented here for several reasons. First, the
open-domain of naturally-occurring political interviews makes the annota-
tion task inherently more complicated and cognitively demanding than in
political debating dialogues. Their modelling approach seems to share the concept of
dialogue game with the one presented here, while their approach to dialogue management
uses a statistical planning method (reinforcement learning) for acquiring optimal dialogue
policies (Rieser and Lemon, 2011), diverging from what we present in Chapter 5.
2By flat annotation scheme we mean that one label is chosen for each annotation unit,
as shown in Figure 4.4 (Neutral Question, Loaded Question, Reply, Unsolicited Comment,
etc.), as opposed to a multi-dimensional coding scheme in which each unit receives several
content feature labels that depend hierarchically on the dialogue act annotations of the
first stage.
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controlled domains such as the Map Task. This difficulty was worsened
by a flat taxonomy which made annotating each contribution considerably
harder3. Although preliminary annotation schemes are not discussed here
in further detail, for illustration we point the reader to Figure 4.4 which
shows a decision tree intended at guiding the annotation using one of such
schemes.
The second reason is that schemes like Davies’ already include the norm-
ative notion of dialogue game we use later in the assessment of cooperation.
This reduces the flexibility of the coding scheme, as the assessment of cooper-
ation is part of the annotation process. By detaching these steps, the method
proposed here allows for assessment of cooperation of the same annotated
data using different dialogue games, e.g. to explore how the same behaviour
would be perceived by audiences with different cultural backgrounds.
The third reason for favouring the coding approach described below is
that it results in a classification of contributions that is closer to the struc-
ture of the dialogue game presented in Chapter 3 and also to the model of
conversational agents discussed in Chapter 5. This allows for the insights
obtained by empirical analysis to be easily incorporated in the model of
conversational agents.
Dividing the annotation in two stages and dealing with segmentation and
dialogue act function annotation separately from the qualitative analysis of
the content had several advantages. First, it made individual annotations
considerably easier and less time consuming by reducing the cognitive load
on the annotators. Second, it draws us closer to previous work on segment-
ation and dialogue act coding. By building on previous research for the first
3A flat annotation scheme was a first natural choice as these generally score better in
inter-annotator agreement than multi-dimentional ones, as pointed out by Artstein and
Poesio (2008, p. 33).
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Figure 4.4: Flat coding scheme from preliminary investigations
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stage, we could focus on the more specific and novel qualitative judgements
on the content of the contributions in the second stage.
For the first stage, we followed the recommendations put forward in the
ISO standard proposal by Bunt et al. (2009; 2010; 2012), simplifying the
terminology and some aspects of the scheme when needed, drawing from
work by Carletta et al. (1997), Allen and Core’s (1997) DAMSL, Traum
and Hinkelman’s (1992) Conversation Acts theory – following Poesio and
Traum (1997; 1998) and proposed as a standard by the Discourse Resource
Initiative (Initiative, 1997) 4 – and Stoyanchev and Piwek (2010a; 2010b).
For the second stage, we identified a set of dimensions on which the
content of a contribution are judged. These are based, in part, on Bull and
Mayer’s (1993) and Bull’s (1994; 2003) extensive work on the micro-analysis
of equivocation in political discourse.
4.2.2 First Annotation Stage: Segmenting Turns and Annot-
ating Dialogue Acts and Referent Segments
As mentioned above, in the first annotation stage the turns in dialogue
transcripts are divided into segments and each segment is assigned a dia-
logue act function and, when applicable, the segment it responds to.
Below we define these concepts and the annotation scheme. We also describe
the annotation procedure and provide examples5.
4It is worth noting that in DAMSL (Allen and Core, 1997), Conversation Acts theory
(Traum and Hinkelman, 1992) and the ISO standard proposed by Bunt et al. (2012) the
same utterance can be annotated with several dialogue act functions operating at different
levels (e.g. turn-taking, grounding, core speech acts). As discussed in Chapter 3, our focus
is on core speech acts, so we will annotate each segment with a single dialogue act function.
This however does not make our approach incompatible with the aforementioned as noted
in Section 4.6.
5Copyright of all interview fragments belong to the respective broadcasting company
and are reproduced here for the purpose of examination towards an academic degree.
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Definitions
Turn: a speaker’s continued contribution before the other dialogue parti-
cipant takes over. In the transcript, this is the fragment of text next
to a speaker label – i.e. IR (interviewer) or IE (interviewee).
Segment: the longest stretch (i.e. a continuous substring of the transcript)
of a turn, on the same topic (see further details regarding topicality be-
low), that can be labelled with a single dialogue act function. Stretches
of a turn can belong to only one segment – i.e. segments do not overlap
– and some stretches can remain unannotated.
Dialogue Act Function: the conversational action performed by a seg-
ment. Dialogue acts functions can be responsive or initiating6, de-
pending on whether they initiate an exchange pair or respond to an
initiation. Typical examples are questions (initiating) and their replies
(responsive).
Referent Segment: a segment in a previous turn of the other speaker to
which the current segment responds7. By definition, every segment
with a responsive dialogue act function must have an associated ref-
erent segment. Conversely, segments with an initiating dialogue act
function do not have a referent segment.
6The distinction between responsive and initiating dialogue act functions is analogous
to that between backward-looking and forward-looking functions in DAMSL (Allen
and Core, 1997), or to the distinction between dialogue acts with and without a functional
dependence link in the ISO standard proposed by Bunt et al. (2012).
7Referent segments are called functional dependence relations in the ISO standard
proposed by Bunt et al. (2012). The name stems from the observation that “the semantic
content of these types of dialogue act depend crucially on which previous dialogue act
they respond to” (Bunt et al., 2012, p. 432).
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Annotation Instructions
The instructions for segmenting and annotating a political interview in the
first stage are summarised as follows:
1. For each turn in the dialogue:
(a) Segment the turn by selecting the stretches of speech that have
a clear dialogue act function.
(b) Assign a dialogue act function to each segment, identifying whether
the dialogue act is initiating an exchange (i.e. requesting inform-
ation, giving information as context for an upcoming question,
etc.), or responding to a previous dialogue act (i.e. accepting a
question or an answer, answering a question, rejecting a premise,
providing additional information, etc.).
(c) For each responsive segment, select the segment that caused the
response.
Dialogue Act Taxonomy
As said, dialogue acts are the actions speakers perform in a conversation.
Chapter 3 described political interviews as a subtype of information-seeking
dialogues, usually structured as a sequence of question–answer pairs, in
which one of the participants asks the questions and the other provides
the answers. Questions are sometimes preceded by a few statements setting
up the context or with an observation on the previous answer. Similarly,
answers can be preceded or replaced by remarks on the previous question.
When identifying these actions, focus should be on the function they
play in the dialogue, rather than, for instance, on their syntactic form8. So,
8This is a generalisation of Bull’s (1994; 2003) functional criterion for identifying ques-
tions in political interviews.
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for example, a question needs not necessarily be in interrogative form to
function as a request for information. Similarly, a rhetorical question can
be conveying information rather than asking for a reply.
We consider two main classes of functions for dialogue acts: initiating
and responsive. Initiating dialogue acts are primarily meant to provoke a
response by the other speaker – as opposed to being themselves responses
to previous dialogue acts. Responsive dialogue acts are mainly reactions of
the speaker to a previous (initiating or responsive) action of the other party.
Initiating dialogue acts are further divided into information giving
and information requesting dialogue acts. For the annotation, we
refer to these as Init-Inform and Init-InfoReq, respectively:
– Init-Inform dialogue acts have as main function to make a piece
of information (e.g. a fact, an opinion) available to the hearer.
– Init-InfoReq dialogue acts are aimed at requesting a piece of in-
formation from the hearer.
Responsive dialogue acts are further divided into information giv-
ing, accepting and rejecting dialogue acts. For the annotation, we
refer to these as Resp-Inform, Resp-Accept, Resp-Reject, respectively:
– Resp-Inform dialogue acts have as main function to make a piece
of information (e.g. a fact, an opinion) available to the hearer in
response to a previous contribution.
– Resp-Accept dialogue acts are mainly aimed at indicating that
the speaker is satisfied with a previous contribution of the other
party (positive feedback).
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– Resp-Reject dialogue acts have as principal role indicating that
the speaker objects to the contribution of the other party (neg-
ative feedback).
Figure 4.5 shows the dialogue act taxonomy.
Dialogue Act
Initiating Responsive
Init-Inform Init-InfoReq Resp-Inform Resp-Accept Resp-Reject
Figure 4.5: Dialogue Act Taxonomy
Deciding What Constitutes a Segment
When choosing the stretches of a turn that constitute separate segments two
criteria are followed:
1. The stretch has to be of a length such that it can be assigned one of
the available dialogue act functions, and
2. its contents have to request for or convey a clearly identifiable, ideally
unique piece of information, or several pieces of information on the
same topic.
Example 4.1. Consider the following turn from the interview between
BBC presenter Jeremy Paxman and then Home Secretary Michael Howard
first introduced in Example 1.1:
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Interviewer Right, uh... can you help us with this then? You stated in
your statement that the Leader of the Opposition had said that
I (that is, you) personally told Mr Lewis that the governor of
Parkhurst should be suspended immediately, and that when Mr
Lewis objected as it was an operational matter, I threatened to
instruct him to do it. Derek Lewis says Howard had certainly
told me that the Governor of Parkhurst should be suspended,
and had threatened to overrule me. Are you saying Mr Lewis
is lying?
(Newsnight, BBC, 1997)
The turn contains two questions and three quotations from two different
sources. The first question is in fact an invitation to comment on an issue,
i.e. a politeness formula with a function that does not match any of the
options listed above. The quotations are setting up the context for the
request for information that comes at the end of the turn. This turn is thus
segmented as follows9:
Interviewer Right, uh... can you help us with this then? (1.1)[You stated
in your statement that the Leader of the Opposition had said
that I (that is, you) personally told Mr Lewis that the governor
of Parkhurst should be suspended immediately, and that when
Mr Lewis objected as it was an operational matter, I threatened
to instruct him to do it.] (1.2)[Derek Lewis says Howard had
certainly told me that the Governor of Parkhurst should be
suspended, and had threatened to overrule me.] (1.3)[Are you
saying Mr Lewis is lying?]
When segmenting requests for information we distinguish between long
single-barrelled questions and multi-barrelled questions. A single-barrelled
question asks for one piece of information or for several pieces of the same
9Note that the stretch “Right, uh... can you help us with this then?” is not assigned
to any segments.
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kind of information (e.g. a confirmation, an opinion or view on a certain
matter, the name of one or more people, etc.) and should belong in one
segment. Multi-barrelled questions, on the other hand, are sequences of
separate questions posed together which are assigned to separate segments.
Example 4.2. Consider the following fragment from an interview between
CBS Evening News anchor Dan Rather and then American vice-president
George H. Bush during the coverage of the 1988 presidential campaign:
Interviewee (Interrupting) I wanted those hostages. I wanted Mr Buckley
out of there-
Interviewer (Interrupting) But you made us hypocrites in the face of the
world. How could you sign on to such a policy? And the
question is what does that tell us about your record?
(CBS Evening News, CBS Corporation, 1988)
In the second turn, the interviewer starts with a response to the contribution
of the interviewee and continues with a two-barrelled question. Segmenta-
tion of this turn is as follows:
Interviewer (Interrupting) (2.1)[But you made us hypocrites in the face
of the world.] (2.2)[How could you sign on to such a policy?]
(2.3)[And the question is what does that tell us about your
record?]
Similarly, long responses are segmented identifying the stretches of speech
that can be assigned a unique dialogue act function. If the function is to
provide information, then pieces of information on different topics should
belong in separate segments.
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Example 4.3. Consider the following turn as a continuation from the
previous example:
Interviewee The same reason the President signed on to it. When a CIA
agent is being tortured to death, maybe you err on the side of a
human life. But everybody’s admitted mistakes. I’ve admitted
mistakes. And you want to dwell on them, and I want to talk
about the values we believe in and experience and the integrity
that goes with all of this, and what’s I’m going to do about
education, and you’re, there’s nothing new here. I thought this
was a news program. What is new?
(CBS Evening News, CBS Corporation, 1988)
According to the criterion above, this turn is segmented as:
Interviewee (3.1)[The same reason the President signed on to it. When a
CIA agent is being tortured to death, maybe you err on the
side of a human life.] (3.2)[But everybody’s admitted mis-
takes. I’ve admitted mistakes. And you want to dwell on them,]
(3.3)[and I want to talk about the values we believe in and ex-
perience and the integrity that goes with all of this, and what’s
I’m going to do about education], and you’re, (3.4)[there’s
nothing new here. I thought this was a news program. What
is new?]
The rest of the section shows how each of the segments in these examples
are annotated with dialogue act functions and referent segments.
Selecting a Dialogue Act Function
The first decision when selecting a dialogue act function is whether it is
initiating or responsive. Annotators should ask themselves the question:
• Can I identify a segment to which this one responds?
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If the answer is ’No’, then the segment is initiating. Otherwise, it is respons-
ive.
Exceptions. Follow-up questions and clarification requests are exceptions
to this rule. Although follow-up questions refer to previous contributions, as
they also have an initiating function we favour this aspect and regard them
as initiating dialogue acts. Clarification requests are left unannotated.
Selecting an Initiating Dialogue Act Function
Once they have decided that a segment is initiating, annotators should
ask themselves the following question:
• Is the segment only aimed at providing information or is it requesting
a contribution from the other party?
In the first case, the segment is annotated as Init-Inform. In the second case,
it is annotated as Init-InfoReq. Going back to Example 4.1, the segments
are annotated as follows:
Interviewer (1.1) You stated in your statement that the
Leader of the Opposition had said that
I (that is, you) personally told Mr Lewis
that the governor of Parkhurst should be
suspended immediately, and that when
Mr Lewis objected as it was an opera-
tional matter, I threatened to instruct
him to do it.
Init-Inform
(1.2) Derek Lewis says Howard had cer-
tainly told me that the Governor of
Parkhurst should be suspended, and had
threatened to overrule me.
Init-Inform
(1.3) Are you saying Mr Lewis is lying? Init-InfoReq
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Example 4.4. As a further example, consider the following two turns from
an interview between BBC presenter Caron Keating and UK Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher in relation with Kampuchea (now Cambodia):
Interviewer Although Pol Pot is actually on the border at the moment, it
said only in Thursday’s paper that he is actually there.
Interviewee Yes, indeed. And, of course,...
(Blue Peter, BBC, 1988)
Although the first turn is in the form of a statement, it is inviting a response
from the interviewee. In these cases, it is helpful to bear in mind the spe-
cific roles of interlocutors in an interview. Noting that this is said by the
interviewer is a good indicator that it is primarily about eliciting a response.
The annotation is thus as follows:
Interviewer (4.1) Although Pol Pot is actually on the
border at the moment, it said only in
Thursday’s paper that he is actually
there.
Init-InfoReq
Selecting a Responsive Dialogue Act Function
Once they have decided that a segment is responsive, annotators should
ask themselves the following question:
• Is the segment meant as providing feedback on or an assessment of a
previous contribution or is it aimed at making a new piece of inform-
ation available to the other party?
In the first case, the segment is annotated as Resp-Accept or Resp-Reject,
depending on whether the feedback or assessment is positive or negative. In
the second case, it is annotated as Resp-Inform.
If a segment is an explicit acceptance of the previous contribution it is
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annotated as Resp-Accept. For example, if after a wh-question (i.e. what,
when, where, which, who, how, etc.) the interviewee starts his response with
“Okay”, this could be considered an acceptance and not, say, a reply to a
yes/no-question. This, however, would depend on the rest of the response.
Other statements like “That is a very good question” are also acceptances.
After responses, expressions like “Thanks” or “Right” usually constitute ac-
ceptances. Also, more explicit cases like “Well, that answers my question”.
If a segment is an objection to a previous contribution it is annotated
as Resp-Reject. For example, if after an alternative or disjunctive question
(i.e. those in which two or more alternatives are presented for the hearer to
choose from), the interviewee starts his response with “No” this is considered
a rejection (and not, say, a reply to a yes/no-question). Statements like “I
will not answer that question” are also rejections. Although this depends
heavily on the rest of the contribution, after responses, an utterance like
“Excuse me” might constitute a rejection. Also, more explicit cases like
“You are not answering the question”.
Exceptions. A special case are responses like “I do not have an answer
for that question” or “We will only know in due time”. As they express
the inability of the speaker to provide an answer, they are considered in-
formative responses, as opposed to rejections, and should be annotated as
Resp-Inform.
Selecting a Referent Segment
In cases in which the current segment refers to more than one previous
segment (e.g. acceptances and rejections of long contributions), annotators
should choose the last segment of the set (i.e. the most recent one).
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Going back to Examples 4.2 and 4.3, the segments are annotated as fol-
lows (we use the notation “@(<segment-number>)” to indicate referent
segments and shorten the speaker labels as Ir and Ie for interviewer and
interviewee, respectively):
Ir (2.1) But you made us hypocrites in the face
of the world.
Init-Inform
(2.2) How could you sign on to such a policy? Init-InfoReq
(2.3) what does that tell us about your record? Init-InfoReq
Ie (3.1) The same reason the President signed on
to it. When a CIA agent is being tor-
tured to death, maybe you err on the
side of a human life.
Resp-Inform @(2.2)
(3.2) But everybody’s admitted mistakes. I’ve
admitted mistakes. But you want to
dwell on them,
Resp-Inform @(2.3)
(3.3) I want to talk about the values we be-
lieve in and experience and the integrity
that goes with all of this, and what’s I’m
going to do about education
Resp-Inform @(2.3)
(3.4) there’s nothing new here. I thought this
was a news program. What is new?
Resp-Reject @(2.3)
4.2.3 Second Annotation Stage: Selecting Content Features
In the second annotation stage, segmented dialogues are annotated with
content features. Below we define this concept and give a taxonomy. We
also describe the annotation procedure and provide several examples.
Definitions
Content Features: a set of qualitative binary judgements on the content
of a segment.
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Content Dimensions: the different aspects on which the content of a
segment is judged. Dimensions are determined by the dialogue act
function assigned to the segment in the previous annotation stage.
Annotation Instructions
In this annotation stage, an annotator receives a dialogue in which the turns
have been segmented and annotated with dialogue act functions from the
taxonomy described above and, when applicable, with referent segments.
The segmented dialogue is accompanied by a brief description of the context
in which the interview took place and the main topic(s) discussed.
The instruction for annotating the content features in these dialogues
are summarised as follows:
1. Read the context of the interview.
2. For each turn:
(a) Judge the content of each annotated segment in the dimensions
given for the associated dialogue act function following the
guidelines. In doing so, identify objective quotations, neutral
and relevant questions, complete answers, controversial state-
ments, misquotations, ill-formed or loaded questions, incomplete
answers, irrelevant comments, etc.
3. Once the interview is annotated, review each segment and check that
the judgement on the content features has not changed while annot-
ating further turns. If it has changed, adjust the values accordingly.
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Content Feature Taxonomy
According to the definition above, the content features of a segment are
a set of binary qualitative judgments on its content with respect to the
context of the interview and to what the participants have contributed so
far. The number of judgements corresponds to a set of dimensions (e.g.
topicality, relevance, accuracy) associated with each dialogue act function
in the taxonomy presented in the previous section.
In the rest of this section, we describe the dimensions for each dialogue
act function, except for Resp-Accept and Resp-Reject that have no associ-
ated content features. The content feature taxonomy is shown in Figure 4.6
as an extension of the dialogue act taxonomy presented in Figure 4.5.
Dialogue Act
Initiating Responsive














Figure 4.6: Content Feature Taxonomy
Content Features for Init-Inform Segments
For segments annotated with an Init-Inform dialogue act function we
consider the following dimensions:
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On-Topic | Off-Topic: whether or not the information provided in the
segment is related to the subject matter of the interview.
Objective | Subjective: whether the information provided is unbiased,
impartial and evidence-based or conveys the opinion or point of view
of the speaker.
Accurate | Inaccurate: whether the information provided is correct or
presents imprecisions, errors or false statements.
New | Repeated: whether the information provided is novel or has been
provided earlier in the dialogue by the same speaker.
Content Features for Init-InfoReq Segments
For segments annotated with an Init-InfoReq dialogue act function we
consider the following dimensions:
On-Topic | Off-Topic: whether or not the information requested in the
segment is related to the subject matter of the interview.
Neutral | Loaded: whether the request for information is straight-forward
and non-leading or contains controversial assumptions, bias, criticisms
or accusations.
Reasonable | Unreasonable: whether the information requested is avail-
able to the hearer (bearing in mind his public role, common sense, etc.)
or it is not expected that he or she would be able to provide it.
New | Repeated: whether the information requested is novel or has been
requested earlier in the dialogue by the same speaker.
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Content Features for Resp-Inform Segments
For segments annotated with an Resp-Inform dialogue act function we
consider the following dimensions:
Relevant | Irrelevant: whether or not the information provided in the
current segment was requested in the segment to which it responds.
Objective | Subjective: whether the information provided is unbiased,
impartial and evidence-based or conveys the opinion or point of view
of the speaker.
Accurate | Inaccurate: whether the information provided is correct or
presents imprecisions, errors or false statements.
New | Repeated: whether or the information provided is novel or has
been provided earlier in the dialogue by the same speaker.
Complete | Incomplete: whether the information given in this segment
satisfies the information requested in the segment to which it responds
or there are still pieces of the information requested that have not been
provided.
A Discussion on the Choice of Dimensions
The dimensions above were selected with the aim of obtaining a qualitative
profile of each contribution a participant makes in an interview. As far as
possible, we wanted these judgements to be independent from the normative
constraints of the dialogue game for political interviews presented in Chapter
3 and from the roles of the dialogue participants. This follows a principle
of modularity in view of the incorporation of the method in the model of
conversational agents discussed in Chapter 5. Also, as mentioned earlier, it
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allows for data annotated with this scheme to be analysed by considering
variations of the dialogue game, for instance, to investigate how cooperation
is perceived by in different cultural backgrounds.
In their analysis of equivocation in political interviews, Bull and Mayer
(Bull and Mayer, 1993) categorise the ways in which politicians fail to answer
questions, proposing a hierarchy of 11 categories and 32 subcategories10.
Although we were not aiming for such a fine-grained granularity in our
study, their insights informed our choice of dimensions, while keeping in
sight the requirement for independence of the coding scheme with respect
to a particular dialogue game.
Selecting Content Features
When judging the content of a segment annotators must consider, to the
best of their knowledge, several elements of the context of the conversation
(e.g. topical, political, historical), as well as common sense, world know-
ledge, etc. They must also take into account previous contributions of both
participants, and in some cases contributions made later on in the dialogue.
Every time annotators make a judgement, they should ask themselves the
following question:
• Do I have any evidence to make this choice?
If the answer is ‘Yes’, then they can go ahead with their choice. Oth-
erwise, they must be charitable. This means that, for instance, if is not
possible to determine whether the information provided in a segment is ac-
curate or not, the first option is chosen. Similarly, if whether a question is
reasonable or not cannot be decided, then it is is considered reasonable.
10This work was developed further by Bull (Bull, 1994; Bull, 2003) to include questions,
replies and non-replies in political interviews.
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The rest of the section, provides a few examples and indicate how their
content features are annotated.
Selecting Init-Inform Content Features
Consider the following interview context:
“BBC presenter Jeremy Paxman questions former UK Home Secretary
Michael Howard with respect to a meeting in 1995 between Howard and
the head of the Prison Service, Derek Lewis, about the dismissal of the
governor of Parkhurst Prison, John Marriott, due to repeated security
failures. The case was given considerable attention in the media, as
a result of accusations by Lewis that Howard had instructed him, thus
exceeding the powers of his office.”
This is the context of Example 4.1 given in the previous section. The
first two segments of the example were annotated as follows:
Interviewer (1.1) You stated in your statement that the
Leader of the Opposition had said that
I (that is, you) personally told Mr Lewis
that the governor of Parkhurst should be
suspended immediately, and that when
Mr Lewis objected as it was an opera-
tional matter, I threatened to instruct
him to do it.
Init-Inform
(1.2) Derek Lewis says Howard had cer-
tainly told me that the Governor of
Parkhurst should be suspended, and had
threatened to overrule me.
Init-Inform
As we pointed out earlier, the speaker is presenting two literal quotations
setting the context for an upcoming question. There is no evidence that
the quotations are false or erroneous and they have not been mentioned
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before (this is the beginning of the interview fragment). Therefore, for both





If, later on, the interviewee noted, for instance, that the quotations are
inaccurate and we have reasons to trust his argument, then the third judge-
ment would be reviewed.
Example 4.5. Now, consider the following segment, a few turns later in
the same interview:
Interviewer (5.1) Mr Lewis says, If I did not change my
mind and suspend Marriot he would
have to consider overruling me.
Init-Inform
This is another quote with essentially the same information conveyed by





The context for the fragments presented in Examples 4.2 and 4.3 is the
following:
“On 25 January 1988, CBS Evening News anchor Dan Rather inter-
views vice-president George H. W. Bush, as part of the coverage of
the 1988 presidential election. Before the interview, a video on the
Iran–Contra affair was shown to the audience.”
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Recall the following annotated segment from Example 4.2:
Interviewer (2.1) But you made us hypocrites in the face
of the world.
Init-Inform
The segment conveys a subjective opinion. Assuming that the rest of the
dialogue indicates that this is relevant to the subject matter of the interview
and that it has not been mentioned before, the following content features





Note that accuracy of the statement could not be checked in this case,
so we apply the charitability criterion and judge it as accurate.
Selecting Init-InfoReq Content Features
Example 4.6. Back to the Example 4.1, consider the following question
posed a few turns after the quotations in segments (1.1) and (1.2):
Interviewer (6.1) Did you threaten to overrule him? Init-InfoReq
This question is requesting information related to the topic of the inter-
view. It is also neutral (yet sensitive) and reasonable, as it is in the power
of the interviewee to provide a reply. Assuming that this is the first time
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Example 4.7. Now, consider the interview context below:
“BBC presenter Jeremy Paxman interviews Conservative MP George
Galloway shortly after his parliamentary victory over Labour’s Oona
King in the UK 2005 General Election.”
The following annotated segment initiates the dialogue:
Interviewer (7.1) Mr Galloway, are you proud of having
got rid of one of the very few black wo-
men in Parliament?
Init-InfoReq
(Election Night, BBC, 2005)
This question is clearly conveying controversial assumptions and is even
accusatory. The topic, however, is related to the context of the interview





It must be noted that, although the question is loaded, it is considered
reasonable, as it would be possible for the interviewee to provide a satisfact-
ory answer.
Example 4.8. For an instance of unreasonable information request, con-
sider the following context:
“In February 2012, BBC Sunday Politics presenter Andrew Neil inter-
views UK Cabinet Minister Eric Pickles on the Coalition Government’s
plans for reforms to the National Health Service.”
In the annotated exchange below, as the interviewee notes, it is not in
his power to answer the question:
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Ir (8.1) Do you deny that three cabinet minis-
ters urged this Conservative Home blog
to call for the bill to be junked or emas-
culated?
Init-InfoReq
Ie (8.2) Er, I have no knowledge of the internal
workings of, of Conservative Home”
Resp-Reject @(8.1)
(Sunday Politics, BBC, 2012)





Selecting Resp-Inform Content Features
Information-giving responsive segments are judged in a way similar to
initiating ones. However, in this case the relevance of the topic is judged
with respect to the segment to which they respond and not only with respect
to the topical context of the interview. The aim is to judge, for instance,
whether the information provided by the segment is relevant to the request
that motivated it.
Example 4.9. Going back to the interview in Example 4.1, consider the
following fragment further into the conversation:
Ir (9.1) Did you threaten to overrule him? Init-InfoReq
Ie (9.2) I did not overrule Derek Lewis. Resp-Inform @(9.1)
Although the distinction is subtle, the information given in the response
is not relevant to the question and the content features below are selected
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A second difference between the content features of responsive and ini-
tiating information giving segments relates to the amount of information
provided. Questions usually ask for clearly identifiable pieces of informa-
tion. Yes/No-questions, for instance, can be answered with an affirmative
or negative statement (e.g. “Yes” or “No”), but many times an elaboration
is expected. Wh-questions ask for one or more objects, individuals, places,
and so forth to be identified. Open questions request for positions or opin-
ions on a certain issue. In each case, if annotators are able to determine the
amount of information that has been asked for in the segment to which a
Resp-Inform refers in the annotation, they should be able to decide whether
it satisfies the request or not. If it does, then the Complete content fea-
ture is selected. Otherwise, Incomplete is the correct choice. On occasion,
the information can be spread across several segments, none of which on its
own contains the totality of the information requested. In these cases, the
Incomplete content feature is selected for all the segments but the last one
in the sequence, for which the Complete content is chosen.
Example 4.10. Consider the following context:
“In February 2011, Channel 4 News presenter Krishnan Guru-Murthy
interviews George Osborne, as he attends a G20 meeting of finance
ministers in Paris, on the state of the outcomes of the meeting and the
state of the British economy.”
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In the fragment below, segments (10.3) to (10.5) have all responsive in-
formation giving functions and they are annotated as responding to segment
(1.2):
Ir (10.1) So, George Osborne, there you are in
Paris with the finest economic minds of
the G20.
Init-Inform
(10.2) Have you solved the problem of rising
food prices?
Init-InfoReq
Ie (10.3) Well, we did talk about the problem of
rising food prices and we came up with
some of the solutions.
Resp-Inform @(10.2)
(10.4) Obviously, you can’t solve a problem like
that overnight, but by giving more in-
formation out there about the real cost
of things, by trying to promote freer
trade, by making sure that some of the
poorest producers in the world, in Africa
and Asia, get help, financial help to im-
prove their agriculture, what we are try-
ing to do is create more food supply in
the world,
Resp-Inform @(10.2)
(10.5) and that has a real impact on the famil-
ies in Britain, because, like many other
families around the world, we’ve seen
food prices go up.
Resp-Inform @(10.2)
(Channel 4 News, UK Channel 4, 2011)
Let us see how we annotate each segment bearing in mind the instruc-
tions above. Although segment (10.3) is relevant to question (10.2), it does
not provide all the information requested. For this reason, segment (10.3)
is annotated with the following content features:






The answer seems to be complete by segment (10.4), where the inter-
viewer admits they have not found a solution, but are working towards it.






Segment (10.5), although on a topic related to the context of the inter-
view, is not relevant to the question. The information it conveys has not
been requested in segment (10.2). Therefore, the following content features






This concludes the description of the annotation approach towards as-
sessment of cooperation. In the next section, we describe a corpus study for
evaluating inter-annotator agreement in both annotation stages and discuss
the results.
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4.3 Evaluation of the Method (Part 1): a corpus
annotation study
This section describes an evaluation of the two-stage annotation scheme
described above. The method was applied to a corpus of six interview frag-
ments. For the first annotation stage, four annotators received transcripts
of the fragments and were asked to segment the turns in each dialogue and
to annotate each segment with dialogue act functions and, when applicable,
with referent segments. Annotations were automatically aggregated to pro-
duce a single segmented and partially annotated version of each dialogue.
These were used in the second stage of the study in which seven annotators
were asked to select content features. We analysed inter-annotator agree-
ment on the data resulting from each stage to assess the reliability of the
scheme. Figure 4.7 shows a diagram of the study.
Dialogue 
Transcripts
Annotation - First Stage
(Segments, Dialogue Act Functions 
and References) Segmented 
Dialogues
Gold Standard - First Stage




Annotation - Second Stage





Figure 4.7: Overview of the evaluation approach (Part 1)
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4.3.1 Materials
A summary of the materials involved in the annotation study follows. Fur-
ther detail is given in Appendix A and online at http://mcs.open.ac.uk/
nlg/non-cooperation/.
A Corpus of Political Interviews
The study involved the annotation of six interview fragments with a total of
88 turns (3556 words)11. The number of turns and words in each fragment is
shown in Table 4.1. For further detail and an example of the transcripts, see
Appendix A. The entire corpus and annotation data is available at http:
//mcs.open.ac.uk/nlg/non-cooperation/.
Table 4.1: Political interview fragments in the corpus annotation study
Interview Turns Words
1. Brodie and Blair 16 734
2. Green and Miliband 9 526
3. O’Reilly and Hartman 19 360
4. Paxman and Osborne 16 272
5. Pym and Osborne 10 595
6. Shaw and Thatcher 18 1069
Total 88 3556
The fragments were selected from a larger set of 15 interviews collec-
ted from publicly available sources (BBC News, CNN, Youtube, etc.; see
Appendix A for details). When available, official transcripts from the ori-
ginal sources were used, with minor modifications to reduce the number of
functionally empty or split turns (e.g. due to interruptions or overlapped
speech). Otherwise, the interviews were transcribed from video or audio
clips taken from the sources.
11Copyright of all video, audio and transcripts belongs to the respective broadcasting
company. Transcripts are reproduced here for the purpose of examination towards an
academic degree.
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We selected this particular set with the aim of including behaviours at
different levels of cooperation on either role. At the same time, we avoided
extreme cases in which the exchange broke down or turned into a dialogue of
an entirely different type (e.g. confrontation or debate). A second criterion
was to ensure coverage of the annotation scheme, with special attention to
the dialogue act taxonomy so that all the dimensions in the content feature
taxonomy could be tested in the second annotation stage. The third criterion
was manageability. In order to reduce the effects of sustained cognitive effort
on the quality of annotations, we designed each stage to be completed in
one hour. This meant that some of the fragments had to be considerably
shortened (e.g. by only including the first few consecutive turns), while
keeping their size large enough so that annotators had sufficient context and
dialogue history on which to make their judgements12. Finally, we limited
the interviews in time of broadcast and country of origin. Interviews 3 and
6 were taken from American media (although the politician in Interview
6 is British). The other four fragments involve British interviewers and
politicians. All the interviews took place within a span of 14 years, the
most dated being from June 1997 (Interview 6) and the most recent from
June 2011. These constraints are based on the observation that, as was
discussed in Chapter 3, the social conventions underlying a dialogue game
change over time and depend highly on cultural background. Considering
interviews from a significantly wider time span and from further cultural
backgrounds would have interfered with the outcome of the survey study
used in the validation of the method.
12The fragment of Interview 6 was taken from the end of the interview instead of from
the beginning. Care was taken to ensure that the contributions in the fragment did not
refer to omitted earlier turns.
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Annotation Guidelines
A set of annotation guidelines was prepared for each annotation stage with
the definitions and examples presented above. These documents are avaliable
online at http://mcs.open.ac.uk/nlg/non-cooperation/. Annotators
were given a brief introduction to the instructions and examples before start-
ing their annotations. They read the document in detail and had a chance
to clarify any doubts. After these preliminaries, they worked independently
on the data.
Annotation Tool
Annotations were carried out using a special-purpose tool, deployed to each
annotator containing the annotation data. Among other features, the tool
guides annotators through the dialogues in a fixed order and can be con-
figured to operate according to each annotation stage13.
The main window (Figure 4.8) shows the context of the interview and
the transcribed turns with their respective annotations. Clicking on the
annotation of a turn opens a window that allows the user to edit the segments
and annotations of that turn (Figure 4.9).
The tool also allows collecting information about the background of the
annotators (Figure 4.10) and about their familiarity with each dialogue
(Figure 4.11 shows an example). The annotation tool user guide with
a detailed description of further features and instructions is available at
http://mcs.open.ac.uk/nlg/non-cooperation/.
13The tool was built based on the CODA D2MTool developed by Svetlana Stoyanchev
for the CODA Project (Stoyanchev and Piwek, 2010b).
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Figure 4.8: Annotation tool: main window
4.3.2 First Annotation Stage: Segmenting Turns and Annot-
ating Dialogue Acts and Referent Segments
In the first stage, annotators received the interview transcripts without
any annotations other than the division of turns as spoken by each speaker.
Section A.1.1 in the Appendix contains the transcript of Interview 1. The en-
tire corpus is available at http://mcs.open.ac.uk/nlg/non-cooperation/.
Annotators
Four annotators were involved in the first stage: the author, one of his
supervisors and two native English-speaking researchers with previous ex-
perience in dialogue annotation and some familiarity with the topic of this
thesis. Before annotating each dialogue, annotators were asked to provide
information about their familiarity with the interview, its context and the
dialogue participants. A summary of their answers is shown in Table 4.2.
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Figure 4.9: Annotation tool: turn annotator window
Figure 4.10: Annotator profile
Figure 4.11: Annotator familiarity with respect to an interview
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Table 4.2: Familiarity of the annotators with the interviews, their contexts
and the dialogue participants (first annotation stage)
Interview Context Dialogue Interviewer IntervieweeY N NS Y N NS Y N NS Y N NS
1. Brodie and Blair 4 0 0 2 1 1 2 2 0 4 0 0
2. Green and Miliband 2 2 0 1 2 1 2 2 0 4 0 0
3. O’Reilly and Hartman 1 2 1 1 3 0 2 2 0 1 3 0
4. Paxman and Osborne 2 2 0 2 2 0 4 0 0 4 0 0
5. Pym and Osborne 4 0 0 2 2 0 2 2 0 4 0 0
6. Shaw and Thatcher 4 0 0 1 3 0 2 2 0 4 0 0
Legend. Y: ‘yes’, N: ‘no’, NS: ‘not sure’.
The figures represent the number of annotators that chose each option.
Results
Inter-annotator agreement was measured on segmentation and on the
assignment of dialogue act functions and referent segments. For segmenta-
tion, we used Krippendorff’s αU , a coefficient for assessing the reliability of
unitising continuous data (Krippendorff, 1995). Agreement on the assign-
ment of dialogue act functions and referent segments was measured using
Krippendorff’s α (Krippendorff, 2004) and multi-rater versions of Cohen’s
κ (Cohen, 1960; Davies and Fleiss, 1982) and Scott’s pi (Scott, 1955; Fleiss,
1971).
Krippendorff’s α is a family of reliability coefficients (Krippendorff,
2003, Chapter 11) defined in terms of the ratio between the disagreement
observed among the coders and the disagreement expected by chance:
α = 1− Do
De
whereDo andDe are, respectively, the observed and expected disagreements.
A value of α = 1 results when Do = 0, that is, when there is perfect
agreement among the annotators. A value of α = 0 results when Do =
De, meaning that annotators agreed as expected by chance, thus rendering
the annotated data unreliable. Negative values of α mean that annotators
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disagreed more than is predicted by chance what usually indicates systematic
discrepancies in their interpretation of the annotation criteria.
Observed and expected disagreements are calculated based on differ-
ences between annotation categories. These differences are given by a dis-
tance function d that can be defined according to the nature of the coding
scheme, provided that the distance between identical categories is always
zero (daa = 0), that distances are symmetric (dab = dba) and that the trian-
gular inequality holds (dab+dbc ≥ dac). This spawns a whole family of rather
versatile coefficients, with properties that make them suitable for assessing
the reliability of our annotation scheme. Krippendorff’s α supports, for
instance, multiple coders, incomplete data (missing annotations), different
kinds of annotations categories (nominal, ordinal, interval, ratio), weighed
distance metrics, small samples and unitisation (Krippendorff, 2004).
In addition to Krippendorff’s α, we report reliability of the annotation
of dialogue act functions using multi-rater versions of Cohen’s κ (Cohen,
1960; Davies and Fleiss, 1982) and Scott’s pi (Scott, 1955; Fleiss, 1971) –
called K by Siegel and Castellan (1988) . This is because these measures
are often found in the literature when discussing the results of dialogue




where Ao and Ae are, respectively, the observed – or average – agreement
and the agreement expected by chance. The observed agreement Ao is the
same for both coefficients and equal to the ratio between the number of
instances in which any two annotators agreed in the classification of an item
and the total number of pairs of annotations of each item. The latter is
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the number of possible pairs of annotators, times the number of items. The
former is the number of possible pairs of annotators that classified an item
























where i is the size of the set of items I, c is the number of annotators, K is
the set of labels and nik is the number of annotators that classified item i
with label k.
The expected agreement Ae is the mean of the probability of any two
coders agreeing on assigning a label to any items, summed over all labels. As





, where c is the number
of annotators. If P(k|c) and P(k|d) denote, respectively, the probability of
coder c and d assigning label k to an item, then the probability of both coders


























where K is the set of labels and c is the size of the set of coders C.
The coefficients differ in the way the probabilities P(k|c) and P(k|d) are
calculated. In the absence of a probability distribution for the labels in the
annotation scheme, the probabilities are estimated based on the annotation
data. For Scott’s pi – or Siegel and Castellan’s K –, it is assumed that the
14The formula is based on Artstein and Poesio (2008, p. 560). The mean is over twice





, as the summation is over all pairs of different coders
twice.
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probability of a coder choosing a given label by chance is the same for all
coders and equal to the proportion of items assigned to label k over the total
number of assignments. That is, P(k|c) = P(k|d) = Pˆ(k) = nk/ic, where nk
is the number of items classified under label k, i is the number of items
and c is the number of coders. In Cohen’s κ, on the other hand, a different
probability distribution is estimated for each coder based on their individual
annotations. That is, P(k|c) = Pˆ (k|c) = nck/i, where nck is the number of
items classified under label k by coder c and i is the total number of items15.
From the definitions of Ao and Ae it follows that κ and pi can only be
used when all items have been annotated by all coders16. In this case, it can
be shown that the observed disagreement in Krippendorff’s α is equal to the
complement of observed agreement, Do = 1− Ao, with binary difference
as the distance function d:
dab =
 0 if a = b1 if a 6= b
Moreover, with this distance function, expected disagreement in Krippen-
dorff’s α is closely equivalent to the complement of expected agreement for
pi (or K) so these two coefficients take similar values as the number of items
or annotators grow larger (Artstein and Poesio, 2008, p. 567). When pos-
sible, however, we report agreement values for the three coefficients, as κ
and pi/K are often found in related work and α can be applied consistently
across the corpus and for the entire coding scheme.
15For further details and a discussion on the properties of these coefficients, we refer the
reader to Artstein and Poesio’s article (Artstein and Poesio, 2008, pp. 559–562).
16Note that Ao is defined as an average over the number of items and pairs of coders
which is only accurate if all annotators annotated every item. For coded data with missing
annotations, we measure agreement using only Kripendorff’s α.
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Figure 4.12: Values of κ-like coefficients and strength of agreement according
to Landis and Koch (1977) adapted from Artstein and Poesio (2008, p. 576).
There is no consensus regarding how high a value of any of the coeffi-
cients renders annotated data reliable for further use. Artstein and Poesio
(2008, pp. 576–577) discuss this and state that no clear threshold has been
established in the field of computational linguistics since reliability studies
were first introduced to the community by Carletta et al. (1997). The au-
thors refer to medical literature where values for κ-like coefficients above 0.4
are considered adequate and point to similar conventions in the field of lan-
guage studies (see Figure 4.12). They warn, however, that in computational
linguistics, higher thresholds are usually adopted. They quote Carletta et
al. (1997) who follow Krippendorff (1980, p. 147) in that only annotated
data with values of α above 0.8 should be considered reliable, with values
between 0.67 and 0.8 allowing for “tentative conclusions”. In their conclu-
sions, Artstein and Poesio (2008) settle for 0.8 as a good value if a threshold
is required. They are uncertain, however, that this single value could be used
as a cutoff point for all purposes and, in agreement with Di Eugenio and
Glass (2004) and others recommend that researchers “report in detail on the
methodology that was followed in collecting the reliability data (number of
coders, whether they coded independently, whether they relied exclusively
on an annotation manual), whether agreement was statistically significant,
and provide a confusion matrix or agreement table so that readers can find
out whether overall figures of agreement hide disagreements on less common
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Table 4.3: Number of segments identified by each annotator
Interview Annot.1 Annot.2 Annot.3 Annot.4 Total
1. Brodie and Blair 21 24 20 21 86
2. Green and Miliband 16 25 13 15 69
3. O’Reilly and Hartman 29 30 27 30 116
4. Paxman and Osborne 20 17 15 13 65
5. Pym and Osborne 13 20 11 16 60
6. Shaw and Thatcher 25 28 20 37 110
Total 124 144 106 132 506
categories.” (Artstein and Poesio, 2008, p. 591). This is what we present
in the rest of this section. All annotation data is available from the author
in text and digital format.
Inter-Annotator Agreement for Segmentation. Table 4.3 summar-
ises the number of segments identified by the annotators in each dialogue.
Krippendorff (1995; 2004) calls unitising the process of identifying the
units of annotation in continuous data. This is similar to what we call
segmentation, except that in our case the data is continuous only within a
turn. Furthermore, Krippendorff’s units exhaustively cover the continuum
of data, while segments refer only to functionally “interesting” sections of
speech, with uninteresting sections left unmarked. Nevertheless, Krippen-
dorff’s definition allows for certain units to be discarded in posterior an-
notations. Discarded units are analogous to gaps between segments in our
approach, except that two or more consecutive discarded units retain their
respective boundaries, while in our annotations they are regarded as a single
gap.
Disagreement is computed by pairing the units identified by each an-
notator with those identified by all other annotators, and measuring how
much paired units that overlap differ from each other. Artstein and Poesio
concisely describe the metric used for measuring this difference as follows
(Artstein and Poesio, 2008, p. 582):
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“If a unit identified by one coder overlaps a unit identified by
the other coder, the amount of disagreement is the square of the
lengths of the non-overlapping segments [. . . ]; if a unit identified
by one coder does not overlap any unit of interest identified by
the other coder, the amount of disagreement is the square of the
length of the whole unit.”
Krippendorff (1995) provides a geometric interpretation of the metric
and of observed and expected disagreement. We implemented these as pro-
posed by the author, measuring starting positions and lengths of segments
in number of words, with a modification to consider dialogue data that is
divided in turns, rather than as a single continuum. This change is of relev-
ance, for instance, when computing expected disagreement as this requires
considering all possible units and gaps that could overlap with a given unit.
In a single continuum of data the boundaries of such units and gaps can
appear anywhere, while in our data they are limited within a single turn.
Thus, for each dialogue in the corpus, observed and expected disagreement





Similarly, overall agreement for the entire corpus can be obtained by adding
the respective disagreements of each dialogue. The results are presented in
Table 4.4.
In general, agreement for segmentation is high (“substantial”, in terms of
the scale in Figure 4.12). Consistent with intuition, disagreement is greater
in dialogues with longer turns.
Artstein and Poesio (2008) argue that αU is not applicable to all tasks
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Table 4.4: Inter-annotator agreement for segmentation (Krippendorff’s αU )
Interview αU Do De
1. Brodie and Blair 0.802 3.217 16.251
2. Green and Miliband 0.618 3.276 8.565
3. O’Reilly and Hartman 0.773 4.138 18.219
4. Paxman and Osborne 0.92 0.993 12.468
5. Pym and Osborne 0.672 4.0 12.184
6. Shaw and Thatcher 0.653 7.951 22.890
Overall 0.74 23.574 90.577
in computational linguistics. Among the reasons for this they mention the
method’s assumption that units identified by a single coder do not overlap.
They note, however, that when this assumption holds and when parts of
the data can be left unannotated, testing the reliability of segmentation can
be beneficial (Artstein and Poesio, 2008, p. 583). They also note that,
as far as they know, this had not been tested in computational linguistics
at the time of publication of their article17. Our annotation scheme meets
these assumptions. This made testing agreement attractive, especially as we
introduced some uncertainty by including topicality among the criteria for
choosing segment boundaries.
Inter-Annotator Agreement for Dialogue Act Functions. Table 4.5
summarises the number of occurrences of each dialogue act function over the
506 segments identified in total by the four coders (frequencies are given in
parentheses).
These frequencies are consistent with the assumptions in Chapter 3. In
general, political interviews are predominantly made up of questions and
17The authors refer to several studies on the reliability of segmentation using Siegel
and Castellan’s K and the presence or absence of boundaries as possible classifications
of the space between words, as reported for instance by Carletta et al. (1997). They
note, however, that using such coefficients for analysing segmentation can lead to values
of agreement that are artificially low (Artstein and Poesio, 2008, pp. 580–582). This is
because the boundary/not boundary distinction makes no consideration for cases in which
two annotators agreed in most of a segment but disagreed on the exact boundaries.
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Table 4.5: Number of occurrences and frequency of dialogue act functions
in the annotated corpus
Interview Init-Inform Init-InfoReq Resp-Inform Resp-Accept Resp-Reject Total
1. Brodie and Blair 8 (0.093) 33 (0.384) 43 (0.500) 1 (0.012) 1 (0.012) 86
2. Green and Miliband 24 (0.348) 22 (0.319) 19 (0.275) 1 (0.014) 3 (0.043) 69
3. O’Reilly and Hartman 27 (0.233) 9 (0.078) 28 (0.241) 14 (0.121) 38 (0.328) 116
4. Paxman and Osborne 12 (0.185) 16 (0.246) 16 (0.246) 8 (0.123) 13 (0.200) 65
5. Pym and Osborne 6 (0.100) 32 (0.333) 32 (0.533) 1 (0.017) 1 (0.017) 60
6. Shaw and Thatcher 15 (0.136) 47 (0.291) 47 (0.427) 9 (0.082) 7 (0.064) 110
Total 92 (0.182) 132 (0.261) 185 (0.366) 34 (0.067) 63 (0.125) 506
replies, with almost two thirds of the dialogue acts falling in either of these
categories. Replies are slightly longer than questions extending over several
segments, and about one fifth of the contributions are initiating statements
– e.g. preambles to questions or comments by either speaker that are not
reactions to previous questions or replies. Explicit rejections are twice as
frequent as explicit acceptances, supporting the assumption that acceptances
are usually left implicit. These frequencies vary dramatically for some of
the dialogues. A rather extreme example is Dialogue 3, in which initiating
statements are three times more abundant than questions, the number of
explicit acceptances doubles the average for the corpus, and almost a third
of the segments are explicit rejections.
For computing the values of the agreement coefficients presented in the
remainder of the section, we based our implementation on a Python script
developed by Tom Lippincott18. A later version of this script has recently
been included in the Natural Language Toolkit (NLTK) suite of libraries for
natural language processing in Python (Bird et al., 2009)19.
As noted above, annotators segmented the turns and selected dialogue
18The original Python script was taken from The Alpha resources page, a companion
page to the article by Artstein and Poesio (2008): http://cswww.essex.ac.uk/Research/
nle/arrau/alpha.html (accessed: December 2012). The modified version of the script is
available from the author of this thesis.
19The NLTK version of Lippincott’s script is available at http://nltk.org/_modules/
nltk/metrics/agreement.html (accessed: December 2012).
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Table 4.6: Inter-annotator agreement for dialogue act functions
Label α Do De
Init-Inform 0.409 0.040 0.068
Init-InfoReq 0.893 0.009 0.089
Resp-Inform 0.645 0.038 0.107
Resp-Accept 0.606 0.011 0.029
Resp-Reject 0.635 0.018 0.050
Overall 0.657 0.059 0.171
Table 4.7: Pairwise confusion matrix of dialogue act function annotations
Init-Inform Init-InfoReq Resp-Inform Resp-Accept Resp-Reject
Init-Inform 40 9 40 5 10
Init-InfoReq 145 1 3 2
Resp-Inform 68 6 13
Resp-Accept 15 4
Resp-Reject 36
act functions for these segments independently and in the same annotation
step. This means that the units for annotation identified by one coder can
differ from those identified by another coder. Figure 4.13(a) illustrates this:
the three annotators coincided in identifying the initial segment, but differed
in the remainder of the turn. These differences make it possible to analyse
the reliability of the original annotation data only in terms of Krippendorff’s
α, which supports missing annotations for some of the items. The value of
this coefficient for each label (i.e. regarding the rest of the categories as
’Other’) and for entire dialogue act taxonomy is given in Table 4.6.
Agreement ranges from “moderate” to “perfect” (see the scale in Fig-
ure 4.12), with overall agreement being “substantial”. Table 4.7 shows a
condensed pairwise confusion matrix20.
Recall that in total the four annotators identified 506 segments. Of these,
138 were identified by at most one annotator and are not part of the con-
20The figures in each cell represent the number of instances in which two coders assigned
the labels in the cell’s row and column to the same segment. This considers each pair of
annotators only once for each segment (thus the upper triangular shape of the matrix).
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fusion matrix. The remaining 368 segments were annotated by two or more
coders. This resulted in 397 pairs of annotations of the same element by two
different coders (i.e. the sum of all the elements in the matrix), 304 of which
are on the diagonal of the matrix – meaning that both annotators in the pair
coincided in their classification of the segment. The highest number of mis-
matches (40) happened between initiating and responsive information-giving
dialogue acts (Init-Inform and Resp-Inform, respectively). The function
of both dialogue acts is that of providing information, with the difference
that the latter is doing so in response to a previous act while the former
is initiating an exchange or providing context for an upcoming question.
These results could be improved by further clarification in the guidelines,
for instance, emphasising that attention should first focus on whether an
act is responsive or initiating and an explicit mention on how to deal with
information-giving dialogue acts that are given in response to a question but
that do not constitute a relevant answer. The next highest number of mis-
matches happened between Resp-Reject and Resp-Inform or Init-Inform.
This might call for further clarification in the guidelines as to what should
be regarded as an explicit rejection.
As stated, overall agreement was acceptably high. It is unclear, however,
how these results compare to related work in the annotation of dialogue
acts, given the differences in the identification of segment boundaries by
individual coders we discussed above. Although Krippendorff’s α deals with
incomplete annotations, in this case the missing annotations are not caused
by coders omitting the classification of some items, but rather by these
items being different across annotators. Carletta et al. (1997, p. 26) note
that only data where segmentation is robust should be analysed further.
Their solution is to measure reliability of dialogue act classification only in
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segments whose boundaries were identified by all coders. This is along the
lines of what we do below, but the same arguments that support the use
of Krippendorff’s αU for analysing segmentation agreement as opposed to
Siegel and Castellan’s K apply here. Eliminating segments just because not
all annotators agreed exactly on their boundaries is too harsh and reduces
the dataset considerably.
A straightforward way of avoiding these problems is to carry out the
segmentation and the classification of dialogue act functions in two separ-
ate annotation stages. Time constraints prevented us from repeating the
annotation exercise, but this modification to the scheme is recommended
for future studies. The reason why we did not do it in the first place is
that segments are defined based on their function, which is precisely what
dialogue act functions encode. This made it natural to combine both an-
notation tasks in one step. However, nothing would prevent us from adding
an intermediate stage in which the annotation of dialogue act functions from
the first stage are discarded, segmentation from all annotators is aggregated
into a single set as explained in the next section, and segmented dialogues
are given to a (potentially new) set of annotators who will then select the
dialogue act functions and referent segments.
In order to apply the other two coefficients to the annotated dialogues,
we considered two derived sets of annotations in which all segments received
four judgements. In the first set we followed a criterion called strict seg-
ment matching: a segment and its annotation are retained in the derived
set if all coders selected that segment in their annotation. This is illustrated
(for three coders) by the initial segment in Figure 4.13(a), resulting in the
subset of annotations in Figure 4.13(b).
Of the 506 segments identified in total by the four annotators, 156 be-
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(c) Lenient segment matching
Figure 4.13: A turn coded by three annotators and the approach for meas-
uring reliability of dialogue act functions: (a) original annotated segments;
(b) subset of segments matching exactly across all annotators; (c) lenient
matching considering subsegments.
long in this subset – that is, 39 distinct segments, each one with four an-
notations. Table 4.8 shows the frequencies as before but for the annotations
in this subset. With respect to the original set of annotations, the most
salient differences in the frequencies are in questions and replies (labels Init-
InfoReq and Resp-Inform, respectively). While replies went down from over
a third of the items to just above 15%, questions doubled in frequency to
over half the total number of segments. This is explained by noting that
question turns tend to be shorter than reply turns, thus making annotat-
ors agree more often in the identification of these segments. On the other
hand, longer reply turns increase the chances that annotators select differ-
ent boundaries for the segments within, which are thus excluded from this
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Table 4.8: Number of occurrences and frequency of dialogue act functions
in strictly matching annotated segments
Interview Init-Inform Init-InfoReq Resp-Inform Resp-Accept Resp-Reject Total
1. Brodie and Blair 0 (0.00) 28 (0.875) 4 (0.125) 0 (0.000) 0 (0.000) 32
2. Green and Miliband 1 (0.063) 12 (0.75) 3 (0.188) 0 (0.000) 0 (0.000) 16
3. O’Reilly and Hartman 10 (0.227) 8 (0.182) 1 (0.023) 9 (0.205) 16 (0.364) 44
4. Paxman and Osborne 4 (0.500) 4 (0.500) 0 (0.000) 0 (0.000) 0 (0.000) 8
5. Pym and Osborne 5 (0.179) 4 (0.143) 12 (0.429) 1 (0.036) 6 (0.214) 28
6. Shaw and Thatcher 1 (0.036) 23 (0.821) 4 (0.143) 0 (0.000) 0 (0.000) 28
Total 21 (0.135) 79 (0.506) 24 (0.154) 10 (0.064) 22 (0.141) 156
Table 4.9: Inter-annotator agreement for dialogue act functions in the set
of strictly matching annotated segments
Label α (Do, De) Ao κ (Ae) pi|K (Ae)
Init-Inform 0.471 (0.124, 0.234) 0.876 0.470 (0.766) 0.468 (0.767)
Init-InfoReq 0.924 (0.038, 0.503) 0.962 0.923 (0.500) 0.923 (0.500)
Resp-Inform 0.674 (0.085, 0.262) 0.915 0.673 (0.739) 0.672 (0.740)
Resp-Accept 0.575 (0.051, 0.121) 0.949 0.573 (0.880) 0.573 (0.880)
Resp-Reject 0.790 (0.051, 0.244) 0.949 0.788 (0.758) 0.788 (0.758)
Overall 0.743 (0.175, 0.682) 0.825 0.742 (0.321) 0.741 (0.322)
subset. Table 4.9 presents the values for Krippendorff’s α, observed and ex-
pected disagreement, observed (or average) agreement Ao, and multi-rater
versions of Cohen’s κ and Scott’s pi (or Siegel and Castellan’s K) with their
respective expected agreements Ae – recall that observed agreement is the
same for both coefficients and as given under Ao.
The table shows that the three coefficients take values that are very close
to each other for all labels. With the exception of Resp-Accept, all the val-
ues for Krippendorff’s α are slightly higher here than in the original set
of segments. Agreement ranges from “moderate” to “perfect”, with overall
agreement being “substantial”. The overall score of K = 0.741 is lower than
those reported for similar dialogue act taxonomies. Carletta et al. (1997)
reported an overall agreement of K = 0.83 for the MapTask coding scheme.
A one-dimensional version of the DAMSL scheme for the Switchboard do-
main by Jurafsky et al. (1997) resulted in overall agreement of K = 0.8.
Stoyanchev and Piwek (2010b) obtained overall agreement of K = 0.82 for
4.3. Evaluation of the Method (Part 1): a corpus annotation study 155
Table 4.10: Pairwise confusion matrix of dialogue act function annotations
for strictly matching segments
Init-Inform Init-InfoReq Resp-Inform Resp-Accept Resp-Reject
Init-Inform 17 6 15 3 5
Init-InfoReq 114 0 3 0
Resp-Inform 26 2 3
Resp-Accept 9 4
Resp-Reject 27
their coding scheme for expository dialogues. Bunt (2009) reported on near-
perfect agreement (K = 0.98 in average for most categories) on a study of
the LIRICS taxonomy – a predecessor of the ISO standard for dialogue act
annotation proposed later by Bunt et al. (2010; 2012). Although our values
are lower, especially for initiating information-giving acts and for explicit
acceptances, they are encouragingly high considering that we had a single
run of annotations, that there was no training for non-expert annotators
and that the dialogues were open-domain.
Table 4.10 shows the condensed pairwise confusion matrix for this set of
annotations. There are six pairs of judgements for each of the 39 segments
what amounts to 234 pairs of judgements. Of these, 193 lie on the diagonal
of the matrix, meaning that two annotators coincided in the choice of label
for a segment. The remaining 41 pairs are mismatches. The majority of
these (15) happened between the labels Init-Inform and Resp-Inform. In
fact, 29 of the 41 mismatches involved Init-Inform which explains the low
agreement score for this label (K = 0.468).
To compute κ and pi/K on a larger portion of the annotated corpus, we
considered a second derived set of segments by applying a criterion called
lenient segment matching: for each annotator, an opening or closing
boundary is introduced in the derived set of segments if at least one of
the coders included that boundary in their annotations, provided that the
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resulting segment is equal to or contained by the segments identified by
all other annotators21. The intention behind this criterion is to allow for
portions of a turn that have been annotated by all coders but that were
partitioned in different ways during segmentation to be included in the ana-
lysis of agreement for dialogue act labels using κ and pi/K. Figure 4.13(a)
illustrates this. All the annotators agreed on the first segment of the turn,
but thereafter annotator A identified one large segment, while annotators
B and C identified three (agreeing on the boundaries of the first of these
segments, while disagreeing on those of the other two). Thus, according to
the criterion, larger segments are partitioned as illustrated in Figure 4.13(c)
and agreement is assessed by comparing the respective annotation labels.
Applying the lenient criterion to the annotated dataset resulted in 696
judgements, that is 174 segments or subsegments, each one with four judge-
ments. Table 4.11 shows the frequencies of the labels for each dialogue and
for the entire corpus. These frequencies are similar to those in the original
set of annotations. There are more segments classified as Init-Inform (148,
from 92 in the original set) and as Resp-Inform (307, from 185 in the ori-
ginal set). This is because initiating statements and responses to questions
are generally longer than questions, acceptances and rejections which can
lead to higher disagreement in the exact boundaries of the segments. This
is the same reason why most of these segments were filtered out by the
strict segmentation criterion (only 21 segments labelled as Init-Inform and
24 labelled as Resp-Inform were part of the resulting set).
Table 4.12 shows the values of the three agreement coefficients for this set
21The containment condition is required to make sure that all the segments in the
resulting set are annotated by all coders. When there is a gap because one of the annotators
left a portion of a turn unsegmented, then that portion is omitted from the derived set
according to the criterion, as the definition of κ and pi/K require that items are annotated
by all coders.
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Table 4.11: Number of occurrences and frequency of dialogue act functions
in leniently matching annotated segments
Interview Init-Inform Init-InfoReq Resp-Inform Resp-Accept Resp-Reject Total
1. Brodie and Blair 34 (0.293) 14 (0.121) 65 (0.56) 1 (0.009) 2 (0.017) 116
2. Green and Miliband 23 (0.25) 9 (0.098) 55 (0.598) 1 (0.011) 4 (0.043) 92
3. O’Reilly and Hartman 9 (0.063) 34 (0.236) 51 (0.354) 12 (0.083) 38 (0.264) 144
4. Paxman and Osborne 28 (0.28) 35 (0.35) 28 (0.28) 1 (0.01) 8 (0.08) 100
5. Pym and Osborne 21 (0.328) 12 (0.188) 16 (0.25) 1 (0.016) 14 (0.219) 64
6. Shaw and Thatcher 33 (0.183) 30 (0.167) 92 (0.511) 14 (0.078) 11 (0.061) 180
Total 148 (0.213) 134 (0.193) 307 (0.441) 30 (0.043) 77 (0.111) 696
Table 4.12: Inter-annotator agreement for dialogue act functions in the set
of leniently matching annotated segments
Label α (Do, De) Ao κ (Ae) pi|K (Ae)
Init-Inform 0.317 (0.213, 0.311) 0.787 0.333 (0.681) 0.316 (0.689)
Init-InfoReq 0.863 (0.046, 0.335) 0.954 0.863 (0.665) 0.863 (0.665)
Resp-Inform 0.494 (0.250, 0.494) 0.750 0.498 (0.502) 0.493 (0.507)
Resp-Accept 0.258 (0.061, 0.083) 0.939 0.258 (0.917) 0.257 (0.918)
Resp-Reject 0.480 (0.102, 0.197) 0.898 0.482 (0.802) 0.479 (0.803)
Overall 0.527 (0.336, 0.710) 0.664 0.530 (0.284) 0.526 (0.291)
of segments. Except for Init-InfoReq, agreement values for all the labels are
significantly lower than those we obtained for the original set of annotations
and for the strict matching.
In Table 4.13 we give the condensed pairwise confusion matrix for this
set of judgements. The six pairs of judgements for each of the 174 seg-
ments yield a total of 1044 pairs, 693 of which are matching pairs. The
remaining 351 pairs are mismatches. It emerges that confusion is high
between Init-Inform and Resp-Inform, as before, but also between Resp-
Inform and Resp-Accept or Resp-Reject. The confusion between initiating
and responsive information-giving acts is worsened here by the length of
Table 4.13: Pairwise confusion matrix of dialogue act function annotations
for leniently matching segments
Init-Inform Init-InfoReq Resp-Inform Resp-Accept Resp-Reject
Init-Inform 90 34 153 7 28
Init-InfoReq 198 1 5 8
Resp-Inform 330 44 63
Resp-Accept 13 8
Resp-Reject 62
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the segments which, as said, results in higher disagreement on the segment-
ation and thus in more subsegments with mismatching judgements. The
high number of mismatches between replies and explicit acceptances and re-
jections results from annotators that identified longer segments considering
acceptances and rejections implicit – and therefore part of an information-
giving act – while annotators favouring shorter segments would classify the
first one as an explicit acceptance or rejection followed by one or more re-
sponsive information-giving acts.
Inter-Annotator Agreement for Referent Segments. In Section 4.2.2
and in Appendix A, we used sequential numbering for identifying previous
segments in the selection of referents for responsive dialogue acts. However,
as segmentation differs from coder to coder, sequential numbering is only
consistent within the annotations of a single coder. For illustration, consider
the fragments annotated by different coders shown in Figure 4.14. While
coder A identified one segment in Turn 1, coder B identified three. This
means that the numberings of subsequent segments are different and, for
instance, although both annotators chose the question in Turn 2 as referent
of the last segment in Turn 3, the actual values are not the same. For com-
paring the choice of referents across annotators, we identify segments using
the index of the turn they belong in (t) and the starting (s) and ending (e)
boundaries (in number of characters from the beginning of the turn), using
colons as separators: (t : s : e). In the example, the segment numbered as
(2) by coder A and as (4) by coder B is identified as (2 : 0 : 28). This guar-
antees that we can compare referent segment chosen by different annotators
independently of how many segments they identified earlier in the dialogue.
Still, comparing referent segments is not a trivial task. The binary dif-
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Turn Spkr. Annotated Speech
0 ir (0)[Init-InfoReq Is Osama Bin Laden your prime suspect?]
1 ie (1)[Resp-Inform@(0) He is the prime suspect. We are still assembling the
evidence and we have said we will do so in a careful and measured way. But
we’ve known for some time of his activities and those of his associates, that
have been designed to spread terror around the world that are I believe fun-
damentally contrary to the basic teachings of Islam. And in respect of this
particular incident there’s no doubt at all, as both ourselves and President
have said, he is the prime suspect.]
2 ir (2)[Init-InfoReq Him alone or anybody else?]
3 ie (3)[Resp-Inform@(2) Well, when we assemble the evidence finally, we will
present it to people.] (4)[Resp-Inform@(2) But as we have said he is the
prime suspect.]
(a) Fragment annotated by coder A
Turn Spkr. Annotated Speech
0 ir (0)[Init-InfoReq Is Osama Bin Laden your prime suspect?]
1 ie (1)[Resp-Inform@(0) He is the prime suspect.] (2)[Init-Inform We are still
assembling the evidence and we have said we will do so in a careful and meas-
ured way. But we’ve known for some time of his activities and those of his
associates, that have been designed to spread terror around the world that are
I believe fundamentally contrary to the basic teachings of Islam.] (3)[Resp-
Inform@(0) And in respect of this particular incident there’s no doubt at all,
as both ourselves and President have said, he is the prime suspect.]
2 ir (4)[Init-InfoReq Him alone or anybody else?]
3 ie (5)[Init-Inform Well, when we assemble the evidence finally, we will present it
to people.] (6)[Resp-Inform@(4) But as we have said he is the prime suspect.]
(b) Fragment annotated by coder B
Figure 4.14: Example of a fragment annotated by two coders in which seg-
mentation differs
ference distance function used above for dialogue act functions can be too
strict. It requires exact matches between segment boundaries, so two refer-
ent segments overlapping almost perfectly except for a word, for instance,
would constitute a mismatch22. Therefore, in addition to the binary differ-
ence distance function, we report here the results for an alternative, more
relaxed binary metric which we called overlapping. The overlapping dis-
tance function between two referent segments in the same dialogue is 0 if
segments overlap and 1 otherwise23.
22These problems would be solved, at least in part, by separating segmentation and
dialogue act function and referent segments annotation in two stages as suggested above.
In that way, targets could be regarded as labels and binary difference could be used safely.
However, the problem of estimating expected agreement more accurately by considering
the restrictions in the options available to annotators at each point in a dialogue would
remain.
23We tried a third metric that considered the proportion of overlap between the segments
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Table 4.14: Inter-annotator agreement for referent segment annotations
Segments αe (Do, De) αo (Do, De) Ao κ (Ae) pi|K (Ae)
Original 0.732 (0.038, 0.141) 0.699 (0.007, 0.024) – – –
Strict 0.459 (0.519, 0.959) 0.780 (0.074, 0.337) 0.481 0.452 (0.068) 0.444 (0.068)
Lenient 0.646 (0.337, 0.952) 0.788 (0.074, 0.210) 0.663 0.646 (0.049) 0.644 (0.053)
Table 4.14 summarises agreement values for α with the exact (αe) and
overlap (αo) binary metrics, κ and pi/K for the original set of segments and
also, as before, for strict and lenient matching sets of segments. Of the
506 segments identified in total by the four coders, 282 were annotated as
responsive and assigned referent segments (recall Table 4.5). Only 36 of these
judgements were on segments identified by all coders, that is 9 segments with
four annotations each. When we consider leniently matching subsegments,
the number of items with four referent segment associations rises to 45, for
a total of 180 judgements. Expected disagreement (agreement) is almost
maximal (minimal) for these sets when using the binary difference metric
thus agreement nears average agreement.
The alternative metric is more flexible than the binary difference dis-
tance function, but still suffers from the problem of overestimating chance
disagreement by considering coders could choose among more referent seg-
ments than are actually possible according to the annotation guidelines.
When computing expected agreement or disagreement, the limitations in
the choices of segments (past segments by the other speaker) would have to
be considered as they decrease agreement and disagreement that could hap-
pen by chance. The latter would require the definition of a metric involving
the length of the turns and the boundaries of the target segments, making
it 0 for segments that belong to the turns of the same speaker or that come
with respect to their combined length taking values between 0 and 1, but results were
inconclusive.
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later in the dialogue24.
4.3.3 Aggregating Annotations for the Second Stage
We obtained a single segmented dataset annotated with dialogue act func-
tions and referent segments, aggregating the annotations from the first stage
by implementing the method described below:
1. The segment boundaries and their annotations identified by all coders
are collected as shown in the example of Figure 4.15(a).
2. Opening and closing segment boundaries are filtered according to an
agreement threshold, T , between 1 and the total number of coders that
can be set when running the algorithm. Only boundaries identified by
at least T annotators are kept in the resulting annotation25.
3. For each one of these boundaries, the annotation labels chosen by the
highest number of annotators are kept:
• If two or more labels meet the criteria above for one of the bound-
aries in the segment, the ambiguity is resolved by looking at the
other boundary.
• If there is ambiguity in or between the two boundaries of a seg-
ment, one label is chosen based on their frequencies. The criterion
chosen at runtime can either favour coverage, choosing the label
24R. Artstein (personal communication, 3 October 2012) expressed concerns about the
adequacy of any metric that used the distance between referents as a measure of agree-
ment. He suggested that a distance function capturing semantic content similarities might
capture better the similarities and differences between coders’ choices.
25There were a few cases – 3 to 6 occurrences in the entire corpus, depending on the
runtime parameter settings – in which one of the boundaries of a resulting segment is
missing. We resolved this by taking the longest stretch of unsegmented speech before or
after the unmatched end or start boundary.
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with the least frequency, or conservative choosing the most fre-
quent one. Frequencies are taken from the distribution of labels
in the entire annotation as shown in the Table 4.5.
4. For each remaining segment annotated as a responsive dialogue act,
the referent segment chosen by the highest number of coders is chosen.
• If one or more are candidates, the most recent one is chosen.
• If the chosen referent segment does not exist in the referred turn
(because the boundary did not pass the filter in 2.), the segment
which contains the start boundary is chosen instead.
5. The resulting annotation – see the example in Figure 4.15(b) – is
written to an XML file and used as input to the second stage.
We generated all 4 variations for the different runtime parameters and
decided to take T = 2 as the agreement threshold for deciding on what
segment boundaries stay and the conservative criterion for when there was
not a majority in the annotation of dialogue acts, taking the label with
the highest frequency. The value of T = 3 for the threshold produced
too few segments for the judgments we wanted to obtain in the second
stage, so we went with the lower value. A fragment of the resulting dataset
is given in Appendix A, Section A.1.2 – the entire dataset is available at
http://mcs.open.ac.uk/nlg/non-cooperation/. Table 4.15 shows the
number of occurrences and the frequency of each dialogue act function.
4.3.4 Second Annotation Stage: Selecting Content Features
In the second stage, annotators received the interview transcripts – segmen-
ted and annotated with dialogue act functions and referent segments – that
resulted from the aggregation method described above. Section A.1.2 in
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Legend. Partial annotations are marked directly on the speech transcript. Segments are bound-
aries are indicated using square brackets and numbered sequentially. Inside the brackets dialogue
act functions are shown according to the following key:
A Annotator 1, B Annotator 2, C Annotator 3, D Annotator 4
1 Init-Inform, 2 Init-InfoReq, 3 Resp-Inform, 4 Resp-Accept, 5 Resp-Reject
Referent segments are indicated after the dialogue act function using the “@” symbol and the
number of the segment they point to.
Turn Spkr. Annotated Speech
0 ir (0)[A2B2C2D2 Is Osama Bin Laden your prime suspect? A2B2C2D2]
1 ie (1)[A3@(0)B3@(0)C3@(0)D3@(0) He is the prime suspect. A3] (2)[A1
We are still assembling the evidence and we have said we will do so in a
careful and measured way. But we’ve known for some time of his activities
and those of his associates, that have been designed to spread terror around
the world that are I believe fundamentally contrary to the basic teachings of
Islam. A1] (3)[A3@(0) And in respect of this particular incident there’s
no doubt at all, as both ourselves and President have said, he is the prime
suspect. A3B3R3D3]
2 ir (4)[A2B2C2D2 Him alone or anybody else? A2B2C2D2]
3 ie (5)[A1B3@(4)C3@(4)D3@(4) Well, when we assemble the evidence finally,
we will present it to people. A1B3] (6)[A3@(4)B3@(4) But as we have said
he is the prime suspect. A3B3C3D3]
(a) Collected labels
Turn Spkr. Annotated Speech
0 ir (0)[2 Is Osama Bin Laden your prime suspect?]
1 ie (1)[3@(0) He is the prime suspect. We are still assembling the evidence and
we have said we will do so in a careful and measured way. But we’ve known for
some time of his activities and those of his associates, that have been designed
to spread terror around the world that are I believe fundamentally contrary to
the basic teachings of Islam. And in respect of this particular incident there’s
no doubt at all, as both ourselves and President have said, he is the prime
suspect.]
2 ir (2)[2 Him alone or anybody else?]
3 ie (3)[3@(2) Well, when we assemble the evidence finally, we will present it to
people.] (4)[3@(2) But as we have said he is the prime suspect.]
(b) Result of the aggregation
Figure 4.15: Example of a fragment with annotations aggregated for use
as input in the second stage: (a) collecting annotations from all coders
into single labels and (b) result of the filtering according to the agreement
threshold and coverage criteria.
Appendix A contains the input data corresponding to Interview 1. The
data for the entire corpus is available at http://mcs.open.ac.uk/nlg/
non-cooperation/.
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Table 4.15: Number of occurrences and frequency of dialogue act functions
in the annotated corpus resulting from aggregating annotations of the first
stage
Interview Init-Inform Init-InfoReq Resp-Inform Resp-Accept Resp-Reject Total
1. Brodie and Blair 1 (0.045) 8 (0.364) 13 (0.591) 0 (0.000) 0 (0.000) 22
2. Green and Miliband 6 (0.333) 6 (0.333) 6 (0.333) 0 (0.000) 0 (0.000) 18
3. O’Reilly and Hartman 7 (0.226) 2 (0.065) 8 (0.258) 4 (0.129) 10 (0.322) 31
4. Paxman and Osborne 1 (0.063) 5 (0.313) 6 (0.375) 2 (0.125) 2 (0.125) 16
5. Pym and Osborne 1 (0.063) 5 (0.313) 10 (0.625) 0 (0.000) 0 (0.000) 16
6. Shaw and Thatcher 4 (0.174) 8 (0.348) 10 (0.435) 0 (0.000) 1 (0.043) 23
Total 20 (0.159) 34 (0.270) 53 (0.421) 6 (0.048) 13 (0.103) 126
Table 4.16: Familiarity of the annotators with the interviews, their contexts
and the dialogue participants (second annotation stage)
Interview Context Dialogue Interviewer IntervieweeY N NS Y N NS Y N NS Y N NS
1. Brodie and Blair 7 0 0 3 3 1 4 3 0 7 0 0
2. Green and Miliband 3 4 0 2 4 1 2 5 0 7 0 0
3. O’Reilly and Hartman 3 3 1 3 4 0 3 3 1 3 4 0
4. Paxman and Osborne 4 3 0 3 4 0 7 0 0 6 1 0
5. Pym and Osborne 6 1 0 4 3 0 4 3 0 6 1 0
6. Shaw and Thatcher 5 1 1 1 5 1 3 4 0 7 0 0
Legend. Y: ‘yes’, N: ‘no’, NS: ‘not sure’.
The figures represent the number of annotators that chose each option.
Annotators
Seven annotators were involved in the annotation of content features: the
four coders that took part in the first stage, plus another of the author’s
supervisors and two native English speakers with no background in linguist-
ics or experience in dialogue analysis. As before, annotators were asked to
provide information about their familiarity with the interview, its context
and the dialogue participants. A summary of their answers appears in Table
4.16.
Results
Recall from Section 4.2.3 that segments annotated with Init-Inform, Init-
InfoReq and Resp-Inform dialogue act functions receive binary judgements
on their content referred to as content features. Contrary to the annotation
of dialogue act functions, in the second stage, coders identified the content
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features in the same set of segments. This allowed obtaining inter-annotator
agreement values for the three coefficients discussed earlier in this section:
Krippendorff’s α and the multi-rater versions of Cohen’s κ and Scott’s pi (or
Siegel and Castellan’s K).
Inter-Annotator Agreement for Content Features. Table 4.17 sum-
marises the number of occurrences and the frequency of each content fea-
ture. Of the 126 segments in the corpus, 19 are acceptances or rejections
and have no associated content features (cf. Table 4.15). The remaining 107
segments are divided into 20 statements (Init-Inform), 34 questions (Init-
InfoReq) and 53 replies (Resp-Inform). The content features in each of
these segments were annotated by seven coders, resulting in 140, 238 and
371 judgements, respectively. Table 4.17 shows how these choices are dis-
tributed between the two options available for each aspect on which content
is judged. For example, of 140 annotations for the 20 Init-Inform segments:
regarding topicality, 132 found the contents to be on-topic and 8 found them
to be off-topic with respect to the subject matter of the interview; regarding
objectivity, 56 annotations found the contents objective while 84 found them
subjective; regarding accuracy, 127 judged the contents accurate and 13 re-
garded them as inaccurate; and regarding novelty, 129 judgements found
that the contents were new while 11 found that the same contents had been
expressed earlier in the dialogue. Similar descriptions applies to the annota-
tions for Init-InfoReq and Resp-Inform segments. It is worth noting that
the distribution of choices for some of the features was particularly skewed
towards one of the options (e.g. On-Topic|Off-Topic for Init-Inform and
Init-InfoReq, Accurate|Inaccurate for Resp-Inform). We discuss below
the effects of this on the inter-annotator agreement results for such features.
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Table 4.17: Number of occurrences and frequency of content features in the
annotated corpus
Init-Inform Init-InfoReq Resp-Inform
Total: 140 Total: 238 Total: 371
On-Topic Off-Topic On-Topic Off-Topic Relevant Irrelevant
132 (0.943) 8 (0.057) 235 (0.987) 3 (0.013) 275 (0.741) 96 (0.259)
Objective Subjective Neutral Loaded Objective Subjective
56 (0.4) 84 (0.6) 68 (0.286) 170 (0.714) 208 (0.561) 163 (0.439)
Accurate Inaccurate Reasonable Unreasonable Accurate Inaccurate
127 (0.907) 13 (0.093) 225 (0.945) 13 (0.055) 365 (0.984) 6 (0.016)
New Repeated New Repeated New Repeated
129 (0.921) 11 (0.079) 211 (0.887) 27 (0.113) 288 (0.776) 83 (0.224)
Complete Incomplete
182 (0.491) 189 (0.509)
Table 4.18 shows the values of agreement for Krippendorff’s α, observed
and expected disagreement, observed (or average) agreement Ao, and multi-
rater versions of Cohen’s κ and Scott’s pi (or Siegel and Castellan’s K) with
their respective expected agreements Ae – recall that observed agreement
is the same for both coefficients and as given under Ao. We report on
agreement for the content features individually, aggregated for each dialogue
act function and overall for the entire corpus.
As Table 4.18 shows, agreement varies considerably across features, from
“poor” (Accurate|Inaccurate for Resp-Inform) to “perfect” (New|Re-
peated for Init-InfoReq), using the terminology of Figure 4.12. Overall
agreement is “moderate” (α = 0.454). Agreement per dialogue act function
is also “moderate” for questions (α = 0.563) and replies (α = 0.438), but
falls slightly below the 0.40 threshold and is “fair” for initiating statements
(α = 0.398).
Looking at the individual features, agreement is consistently high for
New|Repeated for the three dialogue act functions, with values of α be-
tween 0.641 (“substantial”) and 0.806 (“perfect”). Agreement is “moderate”
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Table 4.18: Inter-annotator agreement for content features
Content Feature α (Do, De) Ao κ (Ae) pi|K (Ae)
Init-Inform 0.398 (0.137, 0.227) 0.863 0.402 (0.772) 0.393 (0.775)
On-Topic | Off-Topic 0.079 (0.100, 0.109) 0.900 0.083 (0.891) 0.072 (0.892)
Objective | Subjective 0.370 (0.305, 0.483) 0.695 0.377 (0.510) 0.365 (0.520)
Accurate | Inaccurate 0.467 (0.090, 0.170) 0.910 0.467 (0.830) 0.463 (0.832)
New | Repeated 0.641 (0.052, 0.146) 0.948 0.640 (0.855) 0.638 (0.855)
Init-InfoReq 0.563 (0.081, 0.185) 0.919 0.564 (0.814) 0.560 (0.816)
On-Topic | Off-Topic 0.104 (0.022, 0.025) 0.978 0.105 (0.975) 0.100 (0.975)
Neutral | Loaded 0.481 (0.213, 0.410) 0.787 0.486 (0.586) 0.478 (0.592)
Reasonable | Unreasonable 0.514 (0.050, 0.104) 0.950 0.512 (0.897) 0.512 (0.897)
New | Repeated 0.806 (0.039, 0.202) 0.961 0.805 (0.799) 0.805 (0.799)
Resp-Inform 0.438 (0.198, 0.352) 0.802 0.443 (0.645) 0.436 (0.649)
Relevant | Irrelevant 0.407 (0.228, 0.385) 0.772 0.411 (0.613) 0.405 (0.616)
Objective | Subjective 0.316 (0.338, 0.494) 0.662 0.333 (0.493) 0.314 (0.507)
Accurate | Inaccurate −0.014 (0.032, 0.032) 0.968 −0.014 (0.968) −0.016 (0.968)
New | Repeated 0.763 (0.083, 0.348) 0.917 0.762 (0.652) 0.762 (0.653)
Complete | Incomplete 0.383 (0.309, 0.501) 0.691 0.385 (0.498) 0.382 (0.500)
Overall 0.454 (0.143, 0.262) 0.857 0.458 (0.736) 0.452 (0.739)
for the features Accurate|Inaccurate for Init-Inform, Neutral|Loaded
and Reasonable|Unreasonable for Init-InfoReq, and Relevant|Irrele-
vant for Resp-Inform, with values of α between 0.407 and 0.514. Agreement
is “fair” for Objective|Subjective for Init-Inform (α = 0.370) and Resp-
Inform (α = 0.316) and for Complete|Incomplete for Resp-Inform (α =
0.383). These results are consistent with the feedback we received from
the annotators that relevance, objectivity and completeness were generally
hard to assess with the available context and that the assessment depended
strongly on specific knowledge which could vary among coders.
The lowest agreement values were for Accurate|Inaccurate for Resp-
Inform (α = −0.014), and for On-Topic|Off-Topic for Init-Inform (α =
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0.079) and Init-InfoReq (α = 0.104). Normally, such low agreement would
render the categories unreliable. However, these results can be explained by
the skewed distributions of judgements towards one of the available options,
as pointed out above. In fact, a closer inspection of the agreement values
for these three cases shows that average agreement (Ao) was almost per-
fect: 96.8%, 90% and 97.8%, respectively. The low scores on the agreement
coefficients are due to the small number of judgements in one of the options
which brought expected disagreement down to, respectively, 0.032, 0.109
and 0.025. This turned the high observed agreement on the most frequent
choices insignificant with respect to the slightest disagreement on the rarer
alternatives. This means that the data is inconclusive regarding the reliab-
ility of judgements on accuracy of replies and topical adequacy of initiating
statements and questions.
We checked for outliers by excluding the annotations of each coder and
comparing the agreement values above with those of the resulting reduced
datasets. Agreement decreased after excluding the annotations of each coder
except for annotator 7. Table 4.19 shows the values of agreement for the
dataset resulting when excluding the annotations of this coder. As before,
agreement values are inconclusive regarding accuracy of replies and top-
ical adequacy of initiating statements and of questions. However, for all
other content features, agreement is above the 0.40 threshold and ranges
from “moderate” (Objective|Subjective and Accurate|Inaccurate for
Init-Inform, Neutral|Loaded for Init-InfoReq, and Relevant|Irrelevant,
Objective|Subjective and Complete|Incomplete for Resp-Inform), to
“substantial” (New | Repeated for Init-Inform and Resp-Inform, Reas-
onable|Unreasonable for Init-InfoReq), to “perfect” (New | Repeated
for Init-InfoReq).
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Table 4.19: Inter-annotator agreement for content features (excluding an-
notations of coder 7)
Content Features α (Do, De) Ao κ (Ae) pi|K (Ae)
Init-Inform 0.440 (0.131, 0.234) 0.869 0.440 (0.767) 0.436 (0.768)
On-Topic | Off-Topic 0.097 (0.113, 0.125) 0.887 0.101 (0.874) 0.089 (0.876)
Objective | Subjective 0.474 (0.263, 0.501) 0.737 0.474 (0.500) 0.470 (0.503)
Accurate | Inaccurate 0.437 (0.087, 0.154) 0.913 0.438 (0.846) 0.433 (0.847)
New | Repeated 0.611 (0.060, 0.154) 0.940 0.610 (0.846) 0.607 (0.847)
Init-InfoReq 0.616 (0.069, 0.180) 0.931 0.616 (0.820) 0.613 (0.822)
On-Topic | Off-Topic 0.125 (0.025, 0.029) 0.975 0.126 (0.971) 0.120 (0.971)
Neutral | Loaded 0.537 (0.175, 0.377) 0.825 0.541 (0.620) 0.535 (0.625)
Reasonable | Unreasonable 0.637 (0.037, 0.103) 0.963 0.635 (0.898) 0.635 (0.898)
New | Repeated 0.812 (0.039, 0.209) 0.961 0.811 (0.792) 0.811 (0.792)
Resp-Inform 0.494 (0.176, 0.349) 0.824 0.495 (0.650) 0.493 (0.652)
Relevant | Irrelevant 0.431 (0.230, 0.404) 0.770 0.434 (0.593) 0.429 (0.597)
Objective | Subjective 0.432 (0.264, 0.465) 0.736 0.435 (0.533) 0.430 (0.537)
Accurate | Inaccurate −0.010 (0.025, 0.025) 0.975 −0.010 (0.975) −0.013 (0.975)
New | Repeated 0.765 (0.082, 0.348) 0.918 0.765 (0.653) 0.764 (0.653)
Complete | Incomplete 0.440 (0.281, 0.501) 0.719 0.441 (0.498) 0.439 (0.500)
Overall 0.505 (0.129, 0.261) 0.871 0.506 (0.738) 0.503 (0.740)
4.4 Assessing Cooperation in Annotated Dialogue
This section describes the algorithm for automatically assessing conversa-
tional cooperation in annotated dialogue. The method is applied to the
annotated corpus of political interviews discussed in the previous section.
4.4.1 Mapping Annotations to Action Labels
As a first step, the dialogue act functions and content features in the an-
notations are mapped to the action labels introduced in Chapter 3 for
defining dialogue games. The mapping is carried out automatically, based
on rules that are tailored to a specific dialogue game and coding scheme pair.
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This approach allows for a separation between the prescriptive nature of the
dialogue game and the descriptive character of the coding scheme. Such in-
dependence facilitates, for instance, changing the rules of the dialogue game
so that it better relates to the social norms, conventions and expectations of
different cultural backgrounds, while keeping the coding scheme unchanged
and using the same annotated data.
Table 4.20 shows how the dialogue act functions and content features of
the coding scheme for political interviews are mapped to the action labels
of the political interview dialogue game presented in Chapter 3. As argued
in Section 3.5, the validity of contributions with respect to a dialogue game
depend on the role of each speaker in the conversation. For this reason, the
rules for mapping annotations to action labels are given separately for the
interviewer in Table 4.20(a) and for the interviewee in Table 4.20(b).
For the interviewer, an initiating statement is mapped as a valid state-
ment if it is on-topic with respect to the subject matter of the interview and
if the information conveyed is objective, accurate and has not been expressed
before. This means that segments uttered by the interviewer and annotated
as Init-Inform dialogue acts with the content features On-Topic, Object-
ive, Accurate and New are assigned the valid-statement action label.
This is specified by the first rule of Table 4.20(a). The second rule states
that if any of the content features are different from the respective choices,
above the Init-Inform segment is assigned an invalid-statement action la-
bel. Similarly, questions are valid if they are on-topic, neutral and reasonable
(i.e. if it is in the power of the interviewee to provide an answer)26. If any
of these conditions are unmet, the question is invalid. These two cases are
specified by the third and fourth rules in Table 4.20(a). Any replies from the
26Note that it is not a requirement that questions are new as the repetition of a question
works as the implicit rejection of a reply. We discuss this further later in the chapter.
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Table 4.20: Mapping annotations to action labels in political interviews
Annotation Scheme Dialogue Game























Annotation Scheme Dialogue Game
Dialogue Act Content Features Action Label





















aIf the interview starts with a question by the interviewer.
bIn the first turn of an interview that starts with a statement by the interviewee.
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interviewer are regarded as invalid27 so, regardless of the associated content
features, segments by the interviewer annotated as Resp-Inform are assigned
an invalid-reply action label. The last two rules in Table 4.20(a) refer to
acceptances and rejections. As Resp-Accept and Resp-Reject dialogue act
functions have no associated content features, they are mapped directly to
the corresponding action label – respectively, acceptance and rejection.
For the interviewee, initiating statements convey uninvited information
and are generally considered invalid, regardless of their associated content
features. This means that, as specified by the first rule in Table 4.20(b),
segments spoken by the interviewee and annotated as Init-Inform dialogue
acts are assigned an invalid-statement action label. An exception to
this rule is when interviews start with a statement by the interviewee (e.g.
Interview 2 in the corpus). In such special cases, the mapping is the same as
for initiating statements spoken by the interviewer. This is specified by the
second and third rules in Table 4.20(b). Any questions by the interviewee are
considered invalid (see Footnote 27 above) which is specified by the fourth
rule in the table. Replies are valid if they are relevant with respect to the
question they respond to and if the information conveyed is accurate and has
not been presented earlier in the conversation. Thus, segments spoken by the
interviewee annotated as Resp-Inform dialogue acts with content features
Relevant, Accurate and New are assigned a valid-reply action label.
When any of these conditions are unmet, replies are invalid. These mappings
are specified by the fifth and sixth rules in Table 4.20(b). It is worth noting
that the objectivity of the information provided by the interviewee is not
required for the validity of a reply. This is because interviewees are often
27Recall from Chapter 3 that according to the dialogue game interviewees are not allowed
to ask questions (except for clarification questions which are not part of the current study).
Therefore, interviewers should respond to any such questions by rejecting them instead of
providing a reply. See turns 13 and 14 in Figure 4.16(a) for an example.
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asked to provide their points of view and personal opinions on certain issues
and this involve subjective information. Complete|Incomplete content
features are also not part of the mapping for Resp-Inform dialogue acts
because a complete answer to a question can take up several segments.
This aspect is dealt with at the turn-level when measuring cooperation.
As before, acceptances and rejections are mapped directly from annotations
to the corresponding action labels.
Figure 4.16 presents an example of the mapping using an excerpt of
Interview 6 from the annotated corpus. For each invalid action label, the
offending content features are given as reasons for the invalidity. Also, it is
shown how all referent segments and the content features New|Repeated
for Init-InfoReq segments and Complete|Incomplete for Resp-Inform seg-
ments are kept for processing in later steps of the method. Below, these
will be represented by their initial in bold face after the label name (e.g.
valid-question N), consistently with the structure for action labels presen-
ted in Section 3.4.1.
4.4.2 Measuring Cooperation in Dialogue
As stated in Chapter 3, linguistic cooperation of a dialogue participant with
respect to a conversational setting equates to the participant following the
rules of the dialogue game for that conversational setting. From this per-
spective, each turn in a dialogue is associated with an amount of cooperation
and an amount of non-cooperation, given by the number of dialogue rules,
respectively, conformed with and violated in the turn. The instances in
which rules are conformed with are called cooperative features and those
in which rules are broken are called non-cooperative features. Recall the
following fragment from Chapter 3 (page 79):
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Turn Spkr. Annotated Speech
6 ir (6)[Init-InfoReq 〈On-Topic, Loaded, Reasonable, New〉 Following the
Falklands War, did hubris from having won that war make you believe that
you could persuade the Chinese that Britain should continue administering
Hong Kong with an umbrella of Chinese sovereignty?]
7 ie (7)[Resp-Inform@(6) 〈Relevant, Objective, Accurate, New, Complete〉
No, there was no hubris in Falklands, only a fantastic relief that our people
were once again free and we were not going to have an aggressor taking over
British land and British people. And we don’t like aggression anywhere in the
world, that is why we believe in strong defense.]
8 ir (8)[Init-InfoReq 〈On-Topic, Neutral, Reasonable, New〉 Well, Sir Percy
Craddock, Britain’s Ambassador to China said that you had to be persuaded,
that you had to be told, that there was no way Britain was going to remain
an administrative force of Hong Kong with the Chinese being the mere sover-
eigns.]
9 ie (9)[Resp-Inform@(8) 〈Relevant, Objective, Accurate, New, Complete〉
Well, that Deng Xiaoping told me. I’ll tell you what he told me. I have written
it. I said that we have done so well for Hong Kong, for Hong Kong people,
that can we not have another lease say for another 50 years? He reacted very
quickly. He said no. I said can we not have another lease? I said we have done
so well on a territory which I know will eventually return to you. Wouldn’t you
really let us have, it would be an act of sovereignty to give us a management
contract?]
10 ir (10)[Init-Inform 〈On-Topic, Subjective, Accurate, New〉 They were out-
raged.]
(11)[Init-InfoReq 〈On-Topic, Neutral, Reasonable, New〉 Is that when
Mr. Deng told you that if the Chinese wanted to they could walk right in here
and take Hong Kong?]
11 ie (12)[Resp-Inform@(11) 〈Relevant, Objective, Accurate, New,
Complete〉 Oh yes he said he could. But I know that I didn’t need
to be told. That is why I had to ask him.]
(13)[Resp-Inform@(11) 〈Relevant, Subjective, Accurate, New,
Complete〉 But, he said to me, which really rather shook me: I would rather
recover Hong Kong poverty stricken than let the British have another period
of administration over Hong Kong. Now, that shows you the communist mind,
not concerned about the prosperity, about the well being of the people.]
12 ir (14)[Init-InfoReq 〈On-Topic, Neutral, Reasonable, New〉 You don’t trust
him, do you?]
13 ie (15)[Resp-Inform@(14) 〈Relevant, Objective, Accurate, New,
Complete〉 I don’t trust a communist,]
(16)[Init-InfoReq 〈On-Topic, Loaded, Unreasonable, New〉 do you?]
14 ir (17)[Resp-Reject@(16) 〈〉 I can’t answer that, I am the reporter asking ques-
tions.]
(a) Excerpt from an interview segmented and annotated
Turn Spkr. Action Labels
6 ir (6) : invalid-question New {Reason: Loaded}
7 ie (7) : valid-reply@(6) Complete
8 ir (8) : valid-question New
9 ie (9) : valid-reply@(8) Complete
10 ir (10) : invalid-statement {Reason: Subjective}
(11) : valid-question New
11 ie (12) : valid-reply@(11) Complete
(13) : valid-reply@(11) Complete
12 ir (14) : valid-question New
13 ie (15) : valid-reply@(14) Complete
(16) : invalid-question New {Reason: Init-InfoReq by ie}
14 ir (17) : rejection@(16)
(b) The same excerpt with annotations mapped onto action labels
Figure 4.16: Example of the mapping between annotations and action labels
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Participants can break the rules of the game in two ways: (a)
by performing a conversational action that is not allowed for their
role and (b) by failing to perform an action they were obliged
to perform. Instances of (a) are violations of static obligations,
which we call static non-cooperative features. Instances of
(b) are violations of dynamic obligations, which we call dynamic
non-cooperative features. An analogous distinction is made
for cooperative features, called, respectively, static cooperat-
ive features and dynamic cooperative features. The de-
gree of cooperation of each dialogue participant is thus the
ratio between the number of cooperative features – static and
dynamic – and the total number of features of that participant.
In general, this value can be obtained for the entire conversation
and for any continuous fragments.
In the rest of the section, we revisit the formalisation of these concepts
and describe a method to compute the dynamic obligations of participants in
each turn of a dialogue. We also explain how to compute static and dynamic
cooperative and non-cooperative features and the degree of non-cooperation.
Throughout, we illustrate the method using the political interview conver-
sational setting and examples from the annotated corpus.
Computing Dynamic Obligations
Formally, for a dialogueD = 〈t1; . . . ; tn〉, where each ti is a turn, we represent
dynamic obligations as two sequences POD = 〈POD,0;POD,1; . . . ;POD,n〉
and DOD = 〈DOD,1; . . . ;DOD,n〉, where each element is a list 〈o1, . . . , ok〉
of the obligations pending after and discharged in turn ti, respectively.
POD,0 is also a list with the obligations pending before the dialogue starts.
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As in Chapter 3, each obligation is a pair oi = (si, li), where si is a speaker
and li is an action label.
Obligations are updated in each turn of the dialogue. This means that,
for each turn ti, POD,i and DOD,i are computed based on POD,(i−1) by
discharging existing obligations and introducing new pending ones28:
• A pending obligation o = (s, l) ∈ POD,i−1 is discharged in turn
ti = (si, Li) if s = si and lj  l for some label lj ∈ Li. The resulting
list of pending obligations POD,i is POD,i−1 − 〈o〉. The obligation
is added to the list of discharged obligations for the turn so DOD,i
becomes DOD,i ◦ 〈o〉. To discharge several obligations in the same
turn, we generalise this definition in the obvious way.
• An obligation o is introduced in turn ti = (si, Li) if there is a rule
[(s, l); o] in the game such that s = si and lj  l, for some label lj ∈
Li (meaning that obligations are introduced by implicitly performed
actions). After the update, the list of pending obligations is 〈o〉◦POD,i.
The list of discharged obligations remains unchanged. To introduce
several obligations in the same turn, we generalise this definition in
the obvious way.
Those obligations in POD,(i−1) that are not discharged in turn ti are
carried over to POD,(i).
Figure 4.18 shows Interview 1 from the annotated corpus with the action
labels mapped from the annotations of one of the coders and the dynamic
obligations updated after each turn. Let us see how these are computed
28In the definition below, recall that the implicit performance relation  is reflexive,
so for any label l it is l  l. Also, in the rest of the presentation, we assume that
list structures support operations for indexing (denoted as l[i]), concatenation (l1 ◦ l2),
subtraction (l1 − l2) and those inherited from sets, such as element membership (x ∈ l)
and cardinality (|l|).
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over a few turns. Figure 4.17 reproduces the dialogue game for political
interviews presented at the end of Chapter 3 .
As the interview – here D1 – starts with the interviewer holding the floor,
we assume that at the outset of the dialogue there is a pending obligation on
the interviewer to ask a valid question: POD1,0 = 〈(ir, valid-question N)〉.
In the first turn, (ir, 〈(0) : valid-question N〉), the interviewer asks a
new valid question. This action discharges the only obligation in POD1,0,
which is added to DOD1,1, the list of discharged obligations. By Rule (4), it
introduces a new obligation for the interviewee to accept the question, so at
the end of the turn it is POD1,1 = 〈(ie, acceptance@(0))〉29 and DOD1,1 =
〈(ir, valid-question N)〉.
In the second turn, (ie, 〈(1) : valid-reply@(0) C〉), the interviewee
provides a valid reply. This implicitly accepts the question due to Rule
18, discharging the only obligation in POD1,1, which is added to DOD1,2,
and introducing the obligation (ie, valid-reply@(0) C) by Rule (5), which
commits the interviewee to providing a valid and complete reply. This ob-
ligation is discharged immediately by the same action and added to the
list of discharged obligations. By application of Rule (7), a new pending
obligation is introduced for the interviewer to accept the reply. At the
end of the turn, it is POD1,2 = 〈(ir, acceptance@(1))〉 and DOD1,2 =
〈(ie, acceptance@(0)); (ie, valid-reply@(0) C)〉.
The interviewer asks a new valid question in the third turn, which impli-
citly accepts the interviewee’s reply according to Rule 17 and introduces an
obligation on the interviewer to ask a new valid question due to Rule 8, which
29Observe that the application of rules involves a mechanism that resembles unification
in logic programming. Constants such as the label name valid-question and the binary
flag N in Rule 4 are unified with identical constants in the action label that appears in the
dialogue. On the other hand, all occurrences of variables such as q in Rule 4 are unified
with the value – 0 in this case – in the action label that appears in the dialogue.
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Dialogue Game for Political Interviews (Formal)
GPI = (AllowPI , IntroducePI , DischargePI)
where
AllowPI = {[ir : {valid-statement, valid-question, acceptance, rejection}],
(1)
[ie : {valid-statement, valid-reply, acceptance, rejection}]} (2)
IntroducePI = {[(ir, (s) : valid-statement); (ie, acceptance@(s))], (3)
[(ir, (q) : valid-question N); (ie, acceptance@(q))], (4)
[(ie, acceptance@(q)); (ie, valid-reply@(q) C)], (5)
[(ie, (s) : valid-statement); (ir, acceptance@(s))], (6)
[(ie, (r) : valid-reply@(q)); (ir, acceptance@(r))], (7)
[(ir, acceptance); (ir, valid-question N)], (8)
[(ir, (s) : invalid-statement); (ie, rejection@(s))], (9)
[(ir, (q) : invalid-question); (ie, rejection@(q))], (10)
[(ir, (r) : invalid-reply); (ie, rejection@(r))], (11)
[(ie, (s) : invalid-statement); (ir, rejection@(s))], (12)
[(ie, (q) : invalid-question); (ir, rejection@(q))], (13)
[(ie, (r) : invalid-reply); (ir, rejection@(r))]} (14)
DischargePI = {[∗-question R  rejection], (15)
[∗-statement  acceptance], (16)
[∗-question N  acceptance], (17)
[∗-reply  acceptance]} (18)
Figure 4.17: Dialogue game for political interviews (repeated)
it also discharges, plus one obligation on the interviewee to accept the ques-
tion, according to Rule 4. The list of pending obligations at the end of the
turn is then POD1,3 = 〈(ie, acceptance@(2))〉. The obligations discharged
in the turn are DOD1,3 = 〈(ir, acceptance@(1)); (ir, valid-question N)〉
Turn 4 shows an instance in which the question is implicitly accepted,
which introduces an obligation on the interviewee to provide a complete
valid reply. This is done by providing a valid incomplete reply, which is
followed by an invalid reply, (ie, 〈(3) : valid-reply@(2) I; (4) : invalid-
reply@(2) I〉). These actions introduce obligations on the interviewer to
accept the valid – yet incomplete – reply and to reject the invalid reply. They
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Turn Spkr. Action Labels Pending Obligations Discharged Obligations
0 ir: valid-question N
1 ir (0):valid-question N ie: acceptance@(0) ir: valid-question N
2 ie (1):valid-reply@(0) C ir: acceptance@(1) ie: acceptance@(0),
ie: valid-reply@(0) C
3 ir (2):valid-question N ie: acceptance@(2) ir: acceptance@(1),
ir: valid-question N
4 ie (3):valid-reply@(2) I ir: acceptance@(3), ir: rejection@(4), ie: acceptance@(2)
(4):invalid-reply@(2) I ie: valid-reply@(2) C




6 ie (6):valid-reply@(5) C ir: acceptance@(6), ir: rejection@(7), ie: acceptance@(5),
(7):invalid-reply@(5) C ir: rejection@(8), ir: rejection@(4), ie: valid-reply@(5) C
(8):invalid-reply@(5) C ie: valid-reply@(2) C
7 ir (9):valid-question N ie: acceptance@(9), ir: rejection@(7),




8 ie (10):invalid-reply@(9) I ir: rejection@(10), ie: valid-reply@(9) C,
ir: rejection@(7), ir: rejection@(8),
ir: rejection@(4), ie: valid-reply@(2) C
ie: acceptance@(9)
9 ir (11):valid-question R ie: valid-reply@(9) C, ir: rejection@(7),
ir: rejection@(8), ir: rejection@(4),
ie: valid-reply@(2) C
ir: rejection@(10)
10 ie (12):invalid-reply@(11) I ir: rejection@(12), ie: valid-reply@(9) C,
ir: rejection@(7), ir: rejection@(8),
ir: rejection@(4), ie: valid-reply@(2) C
—
11 ir (13):valid-question N ie: acceptance@(13), ir: rejection@(12),
ie: valid-reply@(9) C, ir: rejection@(7),
ir: rejection@(8), ir: rejection@(4),
ie: valid-reply@(2) C
ir: valid-question N
12 ie (14):valid-reply@(13) C ir: acceptance@(14), ir: rejection@(15), ie: acceptance@(13),
(15):invalid-reply@(13) C ir: rejection@(12), ie: valid-reply@(9) C,
ir: rejection@(7), ir: rejection@(8),
ir: rejection@(4), ie: valid-reply@(2) C
ie: valid-reply@(13) C
13 ir (16):valid-statement ie: acceptance@(16), ie: acceptance@(17), ir: acceptance@(14),
(17):valid-question N ir: rejection@(15), ir: rejection@(12),
ie: valid-reply@(9) C, ir: rejection@(7),
ir: rejection@(8), ir: rejection@(4),
ie: valid-reply@(2) C
ir: valid-question N
14 ie (18):valid-reply@(17) I ir: acceptance@(18), ir: acceptance@(19), ie: acceptance@(16),
(19):valid-reply@(17) C ir: rejection@(15), ir: rejection@(12),
ie: valid-reply@(9) C, ir: rejection@(7),




15 ir (20):valid-question N ie: acceptance@(20), ir: rejection@(15),
ir: rejection@(12), ie: valid-reply@(9) C,
ir: rejection@(7), ir: rejection@(8),




16 ie (21):valid-reply@(20) I ie: valid-reply@(20) C, ir: rejection@(15),
ir: rejection@(12), ie: valid-reply@(9) C,
ir: rejection@(7), ir: rejection@(8),
ir: rejection@(4), ie: valid-reply@(2) C
ie: acceptance@(20)
Content features: (N)ew|(R)epeated, (C)omplete|(I)ncomplete.
Figure 4.18: Action labels and dynamic obligations for Interview 1
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do not discharge the obligation on the interviewer to provide a complete
valid reply, so the obligations pending at the end of the turn are POD1,4 =
〈(ir, acceptance@(3)); (ir, rejection@(3)); (ie, valid-reply@(2)) C〉 and
the obligations discharged in the turn are DOD1,4 = 〈(ie, acceptance@(2))〉.
Moving forward to Turns 7 through 9, it can be observed how the repe-
tition of a question works as a rejection. The new valid question in Turn 7
introduces the obligation (ie, acceptance@(9)), for the interviewee to accept
the question. The acceptance is implicitly performed in Turn 8 by means of
an invalid reply which introduces an obligation on the interviewee to provide
a complete valid reply, (ie, valid-reply@(9) C). The invalid reply intro-
duces an obligation on the interviewer to reject it, (ir, rejection@(10)).
The repeated question in Turn 9 implicitly performs this rejection dischar-
ging the obligation and inviting a complete valid reply from the interviewee.
Turn 12 illustrates the treatment of complete valid replies that extend
over several actions. The interviewee provides an incomplete valid reply,
followed by a valid reply that completes the answer. This discharges the
obligation introduced implicitly by the first action and introduces a new
obligation of acceptance on the interviewer.
Algorithm 1 describes the procedure for automatically computing the
sequences POD = 〈POD,1; . . . ;POD,n〉 and DOD = 〈DOD,1; . . . ;DOD,n〉 of
pending and discharged dynamic obligations for a dialogue D and starting
obligations POD,0, given dialogue game G. The implementation of this al-
gorithm is actually more complicated as it requires that responsive implicitly
performed actions, such as acceptances and rejections, be matched to the
actions they refer to. The criterion we followed considers any actions that
need be accepted or rejected by the current speaker and for which the cor-
responding obligations were introduced in the turn immediately preceding
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the current one. The implicit action performed with respect to such actions
is then determined by the rules in the set Discharge of the dialogue game30.
Algorithm 1 Computing dynamic obligations for dialogue D, initial
pending obligations POD[0] and dialogue game G.
for i in {1. . . length(D)} do [for each turn in the dialogue...]
(speaker, labels)← D[i] [take actions in current turn]
pending-obligations← POD[i− 1] [take previous pending obligations]
[introduce new obligations]
for label in labels do [for each action in the turn...]
for rule in G(2) do [for each rule in the set Introduce...]
[(rule-speaker, rule-label); obligation]← rule
if (speaker = rule-speaker) ∧ (label  rule-label) then




[discharge obligations met in turn]
discharged-obligations← 〈〉
for label in labels do [for each action in the turn...]
for obligation in pending-obligations do
(obligation-speaker, obligation-label)← obligation
if (speaker = obligation-speaker) ∧ (label  obligation-label) then
pending-obligations← pending-obligations− 〈obligation〉




POD[i]← pending-obligations [set obligations pending after turn]
DOD[i]← discharged-obligations [set obligations discharged in turn]
end for
Computing Cooperative and Non-Cooperative Features
As introduced in the previous chapter, cooperative and non-cooperative fea-
tures are instances of, respectively, observed and neglected static and dy-
30Explicitly discharged obligations are straightforward to deal with by following the
unification-like binding of variables and constants discussed earlier and bearing in mind
that the performance relation, , is reflexive.
182 Chapter 4. Measuring Non-Cooperation in Dialogue
namic obligations:
Static cooperative features: actions performed by the speaker that
are allowed for by his or her role in the dialogue.
Static non-cooperative features: actions performed by the speaker
that are disallowed for by his or her role in the dialogue.
Dynamic cooperative features: obligations on the speaker that
were discharged in the current turn.
Dynamic non-cooperative features: obligations on the speaker
that were not discharged in the current turn.
Formally, for a dialogue D = 〈t1; . . . ; tn〉 features will be grouped in two
sequences, SFD = 〈sf1; . . . ; sfn〉 and DFD = 〈df1; . . . ; dfn〉, of static and
dynamic features, respectively. The elements in both sequences are triples
(si, Ci, NCi) where si is the speaker in turn ti, Ci is the list of cooperative
features and NCi is the list of non-cooperative features (static for sfi and
dynamic for dfi). In the rest of the section we show how compute these
features. Figure 4.19 reproduces the example in Figure 4.18 with two new
columns showing the static and dynamic features. For each turn, cooperat-
ive features appear decorated with a ‘X’ sign and non-cooperative features
appear with a ‘×’ sign.
Computing Static Features. In each turn, we check whether the actions
performed by the speaker are allowed for his or her role as specified in the
dialogue game. If an action is in the the speaker’s set of allowed actions,
then it constitutes a static cooperative feature, otherwise it becomes a static
non-cooperative feature. Formally, this means that in turn ti = (si, Li), for
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Turn Spkr. Action Labels Pending Obligations Static Features Dynamic Features
0 ir: valid-question N
1 ir (0):valid-question N ie: acceptance@(0) Xvalid-question N Xvalid-question N
2 ie (1):valid-reply@(0) C ir: acceptance@(1) Xvalid-reply@(0) C Xacceptance@(0)
Xvalid-reply@(0) C
3 ir (2):valid-question N ie: acceptance@(2) Xvalid-question N Xacceptance@(1)
Xvalid-question N
4 ie (3):valid-reply@(2) I ir: acceptance@(3) Xvalid-reply@(2) I Xacceptance@(2)
(4):invalid-reply@(2) I ir: rejection@(4)
ie: valid-reply@(2) C
×invalid-reply@(2) I ×valid-reply@(2) C






6 ie (6):valid-reply@(5) C ir: acceptance@(6) Xvalid-reply@(5) C Xacceptance@(5)
(7):invalid-reply@(5) C ir: rejection@(7) ×invalid-reply@(5) C Xvalid-reply@(5) C
(8):invalid-reply@(5) C ir: rejection@(8)
ir: rejection@(4)
ie: valid-reply@(2) C
×invalid-reply@(5) C ×valid-reply@(2) C


































×invalid-reply@(11) I ×valid-reply@(9) C
×valid-reply@(2) C












12 ie (14):valid-reply@(13) C ir: acceptance@(14) Xvalid-reply@(13) C Xacceptance@(13)







×invalid-reply@(13) C Xvalid-reply@(13) C
×valid-reply@(9) C
×valid-reply@(2) C
13 ir (16):valid-statement ie: acceptance@(16) Xvalid-statement Xacceptance@(14)














14 ie (18):valid-reply@(17) I ir: acceptance@(18) Xvalid-reply@(17) I Xacceptance@(16)








































Figure 4.19: Static and dynamic cooperative (X) and non-cooperative (×)
features for Interview 1
184 Chapter 4. Measuring Non-Cooperation in Dialogue
each l ∈ Li we check whether l ∈ L, with [si : L] a dialogue game rule in
G(1) = Allow. If this is the case, then l is added to Ci in sfi = (si, Ci, NCi).
Otherwise, l is added to NCi.
In the example of Figure 4.19, t1 = (ir, 〈(0) : valid-question N〉) is
the first turn. Rule (1) of GPI (see Figure 4.17) is [ir : {valid-statement,
valid-question, acceptance, rejection}], so this action is a static cooper-
ative feature, and sf1 = (ir, 〈valid-question N〉, 〈〉) are the static features
for this turn. The second turn is t2 = (ie, 〈(1) : valid-reply@(0) C〉). Rule
(2) of the dialogue game, [ie : {valid-statement, valid-reply, acceptance,
rejection}], so sf2 = (ie, 〈valid-reply@(0) C〉, 〈〉) are the static fea-
tures for this turn. The third turn is analogous to Turn 1 and so are
its static features. The fourth turn, however, is t4 = (ie, 〈(3) : valid-
reply@(2) I; (4) : invalid-reply@(2) I〉). The first action is among those
specified for the interviewee’s role, but the second one is not and constitutes
a static non-cooperative feature. The static features for the fourth turn are
thus sf4 = (ie, 〈valid-reply@(2) I〉, 〈invalid-reply@(2) I〉). Following
this method for the rest of the turns produces the sequence of static features
for the entire dialogue:
SFD1 = 〈 (ir, 〈valid-question N〉, 〈〉) ; (1)
(ie, 〈valid-reply@(0) C〉, 〈〉) ; (2)
(ir, 〈valid-question N〉, 〈〉) ; (3)
(ie, 〈valid-reply@(2) I〉, 〈invalid-reply@(2) I〉) ; (4)
(ir, 〈valid-question N〉, 〈〉) ; (5)
(ie, 〈valid-question N〉, 〈invalid-reply@(5) C; invalid-reply@(5) C〉) ; (6)
(ir, 〈valid-question N〉, 〈〉) ; (7)
(ie, 〈〉, 〈invalid-reply@(9) I〉) ; (8)
(ir, 〈valid-question R〉, 〈〉) ; (9)
(ie, 〈〉, 〈invalid-reply@(11) I〉) ; (10)
(ir, 〈valid-question N〉, 〈〉) ; (11)
(ie, 〈valid-reply@(13) C〉, 〈invalid-reply@(13) C〉) ; (12)
(ir, 〈valid-statement; valid-question N〉, 〈〉) ; (13)
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(ie, 〈valid-reply@(17) I; valid-reply@(17) C〉, 〈〉) ; (14)
(ir, 〈valid-question N〉, 〈〉) ; (15)
(ie, 〈valid-reply@(20) I〉, 〈〉)〉 (16)
Algorithm 2 shows the procedure for computing static features in a dialogue
D given a dialogue game G.
Computing Dynamic Features. In each turn, we look at the speaker’s
obligations pending after and discharged in that turn. If an obligation on
the speaker has been discharged within the turn, then it constitutes a dy-
namic cooperative feature, otherwise it becomes a dynamic non-cooperative
feature. Formally, this means that for turn ti = (si, Li), an obligation
Algorithm 2 Computing static features for dialogue D and game G.
for i in {1. . . length(D)} do [for each turn in the dialogue...]
(speaker, labels)← D[i] [take current turn]
[collect actions allowed for the speaker]
allowed-actions← {}
for rule in G(1) do [for each rule in the set Allow...]
[rule-speaker : rule-labels]← rule
if speaker = rule-speaker then
allowed-actions← allowed-actions ∪ rule-labels
end if
end for
[compute static features for current turn]
cooperative← 〈〉
non-cooperative← 〈〉
for label in labels do [for each action in the turn...]
if label.name ∈ allowed-actions then
cooperative← cooperative ◦ 〈label〉
else
non-cooperative← non-cooperative ◦ 〈label〉
end if
end for
[set static features for current turn]
SFD[i]← (speaker, cooperative, non-cooperative)
end for
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o = (so, lo) ∈ DOD,i discharged in the current turn for which so = si is the
current speaker is a dynamic cooperative feature. The action label lo is thus
added to the list Ci of dynamic cooperative features in dfi = (si, Ci, NCi).
On the other hand, a pending obligation o = (so, lo) ∈ POD,i, not discharged
in the current turn for which so = si is the turn speaker is a dynamic non-
cooperative feature. The action label lo is thus added to NCi of dynamic
non-cooperative features in dfi = (si, Ci, NCi).
After the first turn of the example, the list of pending obligations is
POD1,1 = 〈(ie, acceptance@(0))〉. The list of obligations discharged in the
turn is DOD1,1 = 〈(ir, valid-question N)〉. As the speaker is the inter-
viewer, s1 = ir, the dynamic features are df1 = (ir, 〈valid-question N〉, 〈〉)
for Turn 1.
Turns 2 and 3 also have only cooperative dynamic features. On the
other hand, after the forth turn, the list of pending obligations is POD1,4 =
〈(ir, acceptance@(3)); (ir, rejection@(3)); (ie, valid-reply@(2)) C〉 and
the obligations discharged in the turn are DOD1,4 = 〈(ie, acceptance@(2))〉.
As the speaker is the interviewee, s4 = ie, the dynamic features for Turn 4
are df4 = (ie, 〈〉, 〈valid-reply@(2) C〉).
Following this method for the rest of the turns produces the sequence of
dynamic features for dialogue D1:
DFD1 = 〈(ir, 〈valid-question N〉, 〈〉); (1)
(ie, 〈acceptance@(0); valid-reply@(0) C〉, 〈〉); (2)
(ir, 〈acceptance@(1); valid-question N〉, 〈〉); (3)
(ie, 〈acceptance@(2)〉, 〈valid-reply@(2) C〉); (4)
(ir, 〈acceptance@(3); valid-question N〉, 〈rejection@(4)〉); (5)
(ie, 〈acceptance@(5); valid-reply@(5) C〉, 〈valid-reply@(2) C〉); (6)
(ir, 〈acceptance@(6); valid-question N〉,
〈rejection@(7); rejection@(8); rejection@(4)〉); (7)
(ie, 〈acceptance@(9)〉, 〈valid-reply@(9) C; valid-reply@(2) C〉); (8)
(ir, 〈rejection@(10)〉, 〈rejection@(7); rejection@(8); rejection@(4)〉); (9)
(ie, 〈〉, 〈valid-reply@(9) C; valid-reply@(2) C〉); (10)
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(ir, 〈valid-question N〉,
〈rejection@(12); rejection@(7); rejection@(8); rejection@(4)〉); (11)
(ie, 〈acceptance@(13); valid-reply@(13) C〉,
〈valid-reply@(9) C; valid-reply@(2) C〉); (12)
(ir, 〈acceptance@(14); valid-question N〉,
〈rejection@(15); rejection@(12); rejection@(7);
rejection@(8); rejection@(4)〉); (13)
(ie, 〈acceptance@(16); acceptance@(17); valid-reply@(17) C〉,
〈valid-reply@(9) C; valid-reply@(2) C〉); (14)




〈acceptance@(20); valid-reply@(9) C; valid-reply@(2) C〉)〉 (16)
Algorithm 3 shows a procedure for computing dynamic features in dia-
logue D, given pending dynamic obligations POD and discharged dynamic
obligations DOD.
Computing the Degree of Non-Cooperation
Once we have computed the static and dynamic features for each turn, we
can regard the proportion of these that are cooperative as an indicator of
the extent to which each participant acted within the rules of the game.
This is the degree of cooperation of a dialogue participant with respect





where cfD,s is the number of cooperative features – both static and dynamic
– of participant s and ncfD,s is the analogous for non-cooperative features.












Note that, although these definitions are here expressed for the complete
dialogue, the same applies to any contiguous subsequences of turns.
The degree of non-cooperation of a dialogue participant s in dialogue
D is:
dncD,s = 1− dcD,s = ncfD,s
cfD,s + ncfD,s
Table 4.21 summarises the values involved in computing the degree of
non-cooperation for both participants in Interview 1. A printout of the
output produced by the Java program implementing the method described
above run on the annotation data for Interview 1 is given in Appendix B.
Before moving on to describing how we evaluated the validity of the
method, it is worth pointing out one possible shortcoming. As presented
above, dynamic non-cooperative features, that is unmet obligations on the
current speaker, are never forgotten. This means that they are counted
towards the degree of non-cooperation in every turn of the speaker from the
turn in which they are first introduced until they are discharged, or until
the dialogue ends. Although this is technically reasonable as the rules of the
game are actually violated every time a speaker fails to meet an obligation,
human observers are more likely to sanction early misbehaviours increasingly
less harsh later on in the dialogue. For the validity analysis, in which we
31Recall that the elements in the sequences of both static and dynamic features SFD =
〈sf1; . . . ; sfn〉 and DFD = 〈df1; . . . ; dfn〉 are triples (si, Ci, NCi), where si is the speaker
in turn ti, and Ci and NCi are the associated sequences of, respectively, cooperative and
non-cooperative features.
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Algorithm 3 Computing dynamic features for dialogue D, given pending
dynamic obligations POD and discharged dynamic obligations DOD.
for i in {1. . . length(D)} do [for each turn in the dialogue...]
(speaker, label)← D[i] [take speaker of current turn]
[compute dynamic features for current turn]
cooperative← 〈〉
non-cooperative← 〈〉
[collect obligations on speaker met in current turn]
met-obligations← DOD[i]
for obligation in met-obligations do
(obligation-speaker, obligation-label)← obligation
cooperative← cooperative ◦ 〈obligation-label)〉
end for
[collect obligations on speaker pending after current turn]
unmet-obligations← POD[i]
for obligation in unmet-obligations do
(obligation-speaker, obligation-label)← obligation
if obligation-speaker = speaker then
non-cooperative← non-cooperative ◦ 〈obligation-label〉
end if
end for
[set dynamic features for current turn]
DFD[i]← (speaker, cooperative, non-cooperative)
end for
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contrast the results from the method to human assessment of the speakers’
behaviour, we introduced a runtime parameter that causes the method to
forget dynamic non-cooperative features after a certain number of turns
have passed since they were first introduced. We called this parameter the
dialogue history threshold.
4.5 Evaluation of the Method (Part 2): a survey
study
This section describes a survey study designed for evaluating the valid-
ity of the method described above. The goal of the study is to analyse
how the degree of cooperation resulting from the application of the method
to a corpus of interviews correlates to human judgement on the behaviour
of the dialogue participants in transcripts of the same dataset (see Figure
4.3). Human observers were asked to base their judgements on the intu-
itions they have regarding how participants ought to behave in a political
interview. Judgements on each dialogue participant were then aggregated
and the result checked for correlation with the respective degree of cooper-
ation resulting from the annotated corpus by application of the algorithms
described in the previous section.
4.5.1 Degree of Cooperation of the Dialogues in the Corpus
We start by reporting the results of applying the method for automatically
computing the degree of cooperation on the annotated corpus. As noted at
the end of Section 4.3.4, we only considered the annotations of six of the
seven annotators as this set showed increased reliability results. Table 4.22
summarises the results, shown as a bar chart in Figure 4.20.
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Table 4.22: Degree of cooperation for the interviews in the annotated corpus
Interview Mean Annot.1 Annot.2 Annot.3 Annot.4 Annot.5 Annot.6
1. Brodie and Blair
Interviewer 0.529 0.412 0.523 0.500 0.571 0.468 0.703
Interviewee 0.515 0.525 0.500 0.500 0.526 0.415 0.625
2. Green and Miliband
Interviewer 0.498 0.440 0.480 0.440 0.520 0.560 0.545
Interviewee 0.310 0.270 0.297 0.270 0.314 0.412 0.294
3. O’Reilly and Hartman
Interviewer 0.309 0.313 0.292 0.292 0.292 0.333 0.333
Interviewee 0.671 0.700 0.667 0.667 0.600 0.759 0.633
4. Paxman and Osborne
Interviewer 0.233 0.407 0.195 0.195 0.167 0.167 0.265
Interviewee 0.239 0.276 0.207 0.276 0.138 0.138 0.4
5. Pym and Osborne
Interviewer 0.336 0.538 0.448 0.093 0.167 0.419 0.353
Interviewee 0.304 0.400 0.345 0.114 0.182 0.385 0.400
6. Shaw and Thatcher
Interviewer 0.407 0.478 0.525 0.245 0.300 0.465 0.429
Interviewee 0.320 0.377 0.339 0.271 0.254 0.306 0.370






































Figure 4.20: Degree of cooperation for the interviews in the annotated corpus
(mean with error bars)
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4.5.2 Eliciting Human Judgement on Cooperation
We obtained judgements on the behaviour of participants in the political
interviews in the corpus by means of an online survey constructed using
SurveyMonkey32. Observers were shown transcripts of the dialogues and
asked to rate the behaviour of the participants with respect to their intu-
itions on how a political interview should normally go. Further details of
the study are given below.
Materials
We used the six interviews in the corpus described above in Section 4.3.1.
Judges were shown the same context and transcript as the annotators. The
entire survey is available in Appendix C.
Participants
Volunteers were invited to take part in the study via email to the mailing lists
of four research special interest group, a forum of postgraduate students in
computing and via a series of posts on the social networking site Facebook33.
Participants were not required to judge all the interviews in the survey.
After responding to the mandatory questions about their cultural back-
ground and experience on dialogue analysis on the first page, they were
given the option to skip pages or exit the survey. A total of 98 volun-
teers entered the questionnaire. Of these, 30 judged all 6 interviews and 24
provided judgements for at least one of them. The remaining 44 were dis-
carded. Figure 4.21 summarises the English proficiency, cultural background
32http://www.surveymonkey.com
33The contents of the email and the Facebook post are reproduced at the end of Ap-
pendix C.
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and dialogue analysis expertise for the 54 remaining volunteers34:
English proficiency: 23 (45.6%) native English speakers, 25 (46.3%) non-
native fluent English speakers and 6 (11.1%) non-native with some
knowledge of English.
Cultural background: 17 (31.5%) British or American, 11 (20.4%) non-
British and non-American who have lived in the UK/US for more
than five years, 5 (9.3%) non-British and non-American who have
lived in the UK/US for less than five years, 4 (7.4%) non-British and
non-Ammerican but Commonwealth and 17 (31.5%) from other back-
grounds.
Dialogue analysis expertise: 4 (7.4%) experts, 21 (38.9%) with some ex-
perience in research, 16 (29.6%) with some informal experience and 13
(24.1%) with no experience whatsoever.
Design and Implementation
We designed the study as a survey with 16 questions grouped in 8 pages. The
first page has the three mandatory background questions presented above.
Pages 2 to 7 are one for each of the six interview fragments with the context,
the dialogue transcripts and two questions: one asking for an assessment of
the behaviour of the participants in the interview and one about the judge’s
familiarity with the dialogue and its context (see Figure 4.22). As stated
above, replying to this questions was optional and volunteers could skip
through any of them. Bearing this in mind and to increase coverage, the
order of these pages was randomised. The last page has one optional question
34Age range and sex of the participants are missing here as they were not part of the
information collected in the survey.
194 Chapter 4. Measuring Non-Cooperation in Dialogue
Figure 4.21: English proficiency, cultural background and dialogue analysis
expertise of survey volunteers
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asking volunteers whether they read carefully the interviews they judged and
a text box for comments. Figure 4.22 shows the questions that were asked
after the volunteers had read each of the interview transcripts, asking them
to rate the performance of the participants based on their intuitions on how
interviewers and politicians ought to behave. They were given five options,
which ranged from Incorrect to Correct.
Figure 4.22: Questions put to human observers for eliciting their judgement
on the behaviour of the participants in a political interview
To implement the study we used SurveyMonkey35. We chose this tool
as it provided a quick and easy way of laying out the materials, with little
preparation of the data and minimal development. It also facilitated de-
ployment, as the survey was accessible from any computer with internet
access, as well as the collection, filtering and some analysis of the responses.
Appendix C shows the exact wording and layout of the questions.
Results
The number of judgements received by the speakers in each interview are as
follows:
35http://www.surveymonkey.com
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1. Brodie (46) and Blair (44)
2. Green (35) and Miliband (36)
3. O’Reilly (39) and Hartman (39)
4. Paxman (42) and Osborne (40)
5. Pym (36) and Osborne (35)
6. Shaw (36) and Thatcher (36)
Figures 4.24 and 4.25 show the distribution of these judgements (left) with
charts summarising the responses to the familiarity questions (right) for each
survey. The aggregated judgements are shown on Table 4.23 and as a bar
chart with error bars in Figure 4.26.
Of the 54 respondents, 31 replied to the question on the last page asking
whether they had read the interviews they judged in detail: 25 (80.6%)
answered positively and 6 (19.4%) negatively. There were 7 comments left
in the text box, which are reproduced in Figure 4.23.
4.5.3 Correlation Analysis Between Survey Results and the
Degree of Cooperation
We studied the relation between human judgement resulting from the
survey and the degree of cooperation obtained from the method described
above by means of a correlation analysis36. The outcomes of the method
applied to the annotations produced by the coders were aggregated for the
speakers in each interview fragment (cf. Table 4.22 and Figure 4.20). These
values were plotted against the corresponding survey results also aggregated
across judges for the speakers in each interviews (cf. Table 4.23 and Figure
4.26). This results in the 12 points presented as a scatter plot in Figure 4.27
showing error bars, the regression line and the value of Pearson’s correlation
coefficient r = 0.471. This value of Pearson’s r is interpreted a moderate-
to-strong positive correlation. However, its statistical significance is weak
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Figure 4.23: Feedback comments left by volunteers at the end of the survey
for that number of cases (p = 0.123).
For further insight, we carried out a similar analysis separating inter-
viewers from interviewees. The rationale for this step is that some of the
rules of the dialogue game are role-specific, making the method strictly dif-
ferent for each participant in an interview. A similar argument applies to
the way human observers are expected to judge the behaviour of interview-
ers and politicians. The two sets of six points are shown in Figure 4.28,
with separate regression lines and values for Pearson’s r. The results show
that correlation is significantly better for interviewers (r = 0.753) than for
36The analysis of correlation and the plots were done using the R software environment
for statistical computing and graphics (R Development Core Team, 2011).
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(a) Interview 1: Brodie and Blair
(b) Interview 2: Green and Miliband
(c) Interview 3: O’Reilly and Hartman
Figure 4.24: Human judgements on participant behaviour and familiarity of
volunteers with the interview
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(a) Interview 4: Paxman and Osborne
(b) Interview 5: Pym and Osborne
(c) Interview 6: Shaw and Thatcher
Figure 4.25: Human judgements on participant behaviour and familiarity of
volunteers with the interview (continued)
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Table 4.23: Human judgement on participant behaviour for the interviews
in the corpus
Interview Mean
1. Brodie and Blair
Interviewer 4.239
Interviewee 3.818
2. Green and Miliband
Interviewer 4.229
Interviewee 2.639




4. Paxman and Osborne
Interviewer 2.548
Interviewee 3.350
5. Pym and Osborne
Interviewer 4.194
Interviewee 3.371
6. Shaw and Thatcher
Interviewer 4.194
Interviewee 3.694
































Figure 4.26: Human judgement on participant behaviour for the interviews
in the corpus (mean with error bars)


































l Pearson's r = 0.471
Figure 4.27: Survey results and the degree of cooperation for the political





































Interviewer (Pearson's r = 0.7526 )
Interviewee (Pearson's r =  0.271 )
Figure 4.28: Survey results and the degree of cooperation for interviewers
and interviewees (means with error bars, regression line and Pearson’s r
correlation coefficient)
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interviewees (r = 0.271). Statistical significance is also stronger for inter-
viewers with respect to the combined set (p = 0.084) indicating a trend
towards positive correlation between the results of our method and human
judgement. For the interviewees the correlation is not statistically significant
(p = 0.603). With a sample of this size, correlation analysis is fairly sensit-
ive to outliers, which could explain such a high p-value for the interviewees.
Take, for instance, the behaviour of the interviewee in Interview 3 (O’Reilly
and Hartman), which scored fairly high via the method (0.671/1.000) but
just above average on the survey (3.359/5.000). This corresponds to the
point furthest up from the regression line for interviewees in Figure 4.28.
Coincidentally, Interview 3 has been described by one of the annotators as
“more like a debate than a political interview” which could explain the un-
expected value given by the method. The values of Pearson’s r and p are
shown for each role and for the combined set are on Table 4.24.
Table 4.24: Pearson’s correlation coefficient between survey results and the







One criticism of the degree of cooperation computed as described earlier in
the chapter is that it can penalise participants too harshly for obligations
introduced early in the dialogue and never met. As these stay in the set of
pending obligations, they are considered dynamic non-cooperative features
and contribute to the amount of non-cooperation each time the participant
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releases the floor without discharging them. This might be unrealistic from
the point of view of human judgement, especially for obligations like the
rejection of invalid contributions. For this reason, we introduced a runtime
parameter called dialogue history threshold (DHT) which controls the
number of turns after which unmet obligations cease to be considered non-
cooperative features.
We ran the method on the same annotated data for 5 values of the DHT
parameter. The aggregated results for the participants in each interview
are presented in Table 4.25 and shown as bar charts with error bars in
Figures 4.29 and 4.30. As expected, the degree of cooperation increases with
lower values of the DHT as a larger number of non-cooperative features are
ignored.
Table 4.25: Degree of cooperation for the interviews in the annotated cor-
pus for different values of the dialogue history threshold (DHT) runtime
parameter (means)
Interview No DHT DHT=5 DHT=4 DHT=3 DHT=2 DHT=1
1. Brodie and Blair
Interviewer 0.529 0.678 0.681 0.794 0.798 0.986
Interviewee 0.515 0.602 0.640 0.644 0.691 0.695
2. Green and Miliband
Interviewer 0.498 0.537 0.557 0.614 0.64 0.801
Interviewee 0.310 0.341 0.364 0.382 0.44 0.481
3. O’Reilly and Hartman
Interviewer 0.309 0.412 0.449 0.464 0.530 0.593
Interviewee 0.671 0.694 0.694 0.741 0.741 0.850
4. Paxman and Osborne
Interviewer 0.233 0.325 0.360 0.394 0.468 0.530
Interviewee 0.239 0.330 0.349 0.403 0.448 0.512
5. Pym and Osborne
Interviewer 0.336 0.426 0.431 0.534 0.544 0.800
Interviewee 0.304 0.344 0.371 0.389 0.439 0.468
6. Shaw and Thatcher
Interviewer 0.407 0.533 0.568 0.594 0.638 0.740
Interviewee 0.320 0.485 0.525 0.572 0.629 0.713
Figures 4.31 and 4.32 show the scatter plots for the values of the DHT
parameter from 5 to 1, both inclusive. The plots on the left are for the
combined sets of judgements and on the right they are segregated per speaker
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Figure 4.29: Degree of cooperation for the interviews in the annotated cor-
pus for different values of the dialogue history threshold (DHT) runtime
parameter (mean with error bars)
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Figure 4.30: Degree of cooperation for the interviews in the annotated cor-
pus for different values of the dialogue history threshold (DHT) runtime
parameter (mean with error bars; continued)
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role, as presented earlier for the results without dialogue history threshold37.
The analysis of correlation improved considerably with the introduction of
the parameter. For the combined set of observations, the three lower values
of the threshold give statistically significant results (p = 0.028, 0.044 and
0.012, for DHT = 3, 2 and 1, respectively) with strong positive correlation
(Pearson’s r = 0.631, 0.589 and 0.697, respectively). The other two values
for the parameter, 4 and 5, also indicate a trend towards strong positive
correlation (r = 0.560 and 0.542, respectively, with p = 0.058 and 0.069).
These values are shown in Table 4.26 on the first row.
The analysis of correlation for each conversational role reveals issues
similar to the results before the introduction of the DHT parameter. Cor-
relation is substantially stronger – and statistically more significant – for
interviewers than it is for interviewees. This seems to indicate that the is-
sues with the latter set that we discussed above persist after introducing the
parameter. In fact, as can be seen in Table 4.26, correlation for interviewers
decreases with the introduction of the threshold and only improves for DHT
= 1. On the other hand, correlation for interviewees increases significantly
with all the values of the parameter, peaking for DHT = 2. Overall, the best
results seem to be given by a dialogue history threshold of 1. This means
that only obligations introduced in the same turn that are not discharged
contribute to the degree of cooperation as perceived by the human observ-
ers. Such obligations emerge, for instance, when interviewers implicitly or
explicitly accept a question and then do not provide a valid reply, or when
interviewers fail to ask a valid question.
37To aid the comparison, we repeat here the results shown above in Figures 4.27 and
4.28






































































Interviewer (Pearson's r = 0.7526 )






































































Interviewer (Pearson's r = 0.705 )
Interviewee (Pearson's r =  0.499 )







































































Interviewer (Pearson's r = 0.6602 )
Interviewee (Pearson's r =  0.55 )
(c) DHT = 4
Figure 4.31: Correlation between survey results and the degree of cooper-
ation for different values of the dialogue history threshold (DHT) runtime
parameter






































































Interviewer (Pearson's r = 0.7469 )
Interviewee (Pearson's r =  0.551 )






































































Interviewer (Pearson's r = 0.677 )
Interviewee (Pearson's r =  0.594 )








































































Interviewer (Pearson's r = 0.8384 )
Interviewee (Pearson's r =  0.516 )
(c) DHT = 1
Figure 4.32: Correlation between survey results and the degree of cooper-
ation for different values of the dialogue history threshold (DHT) runtime
parameter (continued)
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Table 4.26: Pearson’s correlation coefficient between survey results and the
degree of cooperation for different values of the dialogue history threshold
(DHT) runtime parameter
No DHT DHT = 5 DHT = 4 DHT = 3 DHT = 2 DHT = 1
r p r p r p r p r p r p
Dialogue 0.471 0.123 0.560 0.058 0.542 0.069 0.631 0.028 0.589 0.044 0.697 0.012
Interviewer 0.753 0.084 0.705 0.118 0.660 0.154 0.747 0.088 0.677 0.141 0.838 0.037
Interviewee 0.271 0.603 0.499 0.314 0.550 0.259 0.551 0.257 0.594 0.214 0.516 0.295
4.6 Discussion
The method presented above is, to date and to the extent of our knowledge,
the most elaborate attempt at annotating and analysing naturally occurring
dialogue in the light of linguistic cooperation. Also novel is the application
of such an approach to a corpus of real political interviews, especially in that
both speakers received the same amount of attention and that the method
was subject to an extensive evaluation.
The results of the evaluation for reliability are encouraging and indicate
that the method is suitable for the systematic analysis of non-cooperation.
They also expose some of its weaknesses, such as the difficulties for applying
some of the criteria in the manual annotation, a degree of vagueness in the
definition of a few of the concepts and the inherent subjectivity of many
of the judgements involved in properly characterising non-cooperation. A
revision of the guidelines as discussed in Section 4.3 would contribute in this
direction.
The evaluation of validity produced fairly good results, especially consid-
ering how little information was given to observers in the survey as to what
was meant by linguistic cooperation and the total absence of a reference to
the specific dialogue game adopted as part of the semi-automatic measure.
It is worth pointing out that the method, in its current form, was able to
predict accurately in the six interviews of the corpus the participants that
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behaved better with respect to their interlocutors. Beyond the correlation
of the precise scores, the ability to determine this binary judgement without
mistakes in all cases is of great interest and an indication of the adequacy
of the approach.
It is unfortunate that the size of the sample in the corpus prevented from
obtaining statistically significant results for each speaker role, particularly
the interviewee. Strictly speaking, as the rules that are used to assess how
cooperative participants are depend on their specific roles, the method is in
fact distinct for each role. A larger sample, including more interview frag-
ments would help in setting this right. Given the relative ease in collecting
human judgements, the inclusion of new fragments should start with one or
more surveys similar to the one described above. This would allow to decide
what subset of interviews offers the best coverage of the range of possible
behaviours – something that was somewhat missing in our study. Only once
this set has been chosen, it would commence the annotation of the tran-
scripts, a procedure considerably more expensive in terms of the resources
it involves.
One key element of the method is the dialogue game described in Chapter
3. As it specifies the rules against which the behaviour of the participants in
a dialogue is assessed, the accuracy of the measure of cooperation depends
closely on the dialogue game. A revision of these rules to draw from the
intuitions human observers use when assessing linguistic cooperation could
result in a more accurate measure and an increase in the correlation between
the results of the measure and human judgement. Another possibility – or
perhaps a complement – would be to extract the rules automatically from a
corpus annotated with the scheme described in this chapter. We will come
back to this in Chapter 6.
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4.7 Summary
In this chapter we described a semi-automatic empirical method for measur-
ing linguistic non-cooperation in naturally occurring dialogue. The method,
instantiated for the analysis of political interviews, was applied to a cor-
pus of six interview fragments. The evaluation of the method consisted of
two parts: a detailed inter-annotator agreement analysis on the annotated
corpus for assessing reliability and a correlation analysis study between the
results of the method and human judgement elicited by means of an online
survey.
The method builds on the concepts introduced in the previous chapter
and bridges the gap between those concepts and phenomena that are present
in naturally-occurring dialogue. By analysing inter-annotator agreement, we
evaluated the reliably of this connection. By analysing the correlation of the
results of the method with human judgement, we assessed the validity of the
link between the conceptual framework (e.g. dialogue game rules, discourse
obligations and the proposition that linguistic cooperation can be regarded
as the extent to which dialogue participants behave withing the rules of
the game) and the way human observers perceive linguistic cooperation in
dialogue by means of the empirical measure.
In the next chapter we propose and discuss an architecture for conversa-
tional agents that incorporates the notions introduced in Chapter 3 and the
automatic aspects of the method discussed above to interpret, reason and
act in conversation.




This chapter describes a modelling approach for constructing conversational
agents that can exhibit and deal with diverse degrees of linguistic coopera-
tion as defined and analysed in previous chapters. Among other elements,
the model includes: a description of the dialogue game as defined in Chapter
3, a specification of the conversational domain in which semantic relations
such as the validity of questions and replies are specified; a mechanism for
assessing participant behaviour along the lines of the method described in
Chapter 4 and an agenda of private goals.
Section 5.1 describes the elements above in detail and how they relate to
each other and to the analysis in the previous chapter. Section 5.2 shows how
the model combines these elements into agents that can interact producing
dialogues that resemble the example first presented in Figure 3.6 in Chapter
3 and reproduced here in Figure 5.1, but that can range in the level of
cooperation displayed by the agents depending on very simple parameter
settings. We compare our model to related approaches in Section 5.3 and
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refer to a proof-of-concept, prototype implementation that informed the
development of many of our ideas in Section 5.4.
Let me try to explain this.
The numbers are worse than we expected, but this 
Government is working hard to correct the situation. Interviewee
How do you explain the rise in the inflation rate for the 
last quarter, Mr Chancellor?
Interviewer
But how do you explain the increase in the inflation rate?
Interviewer
It was due to a combination of seasonal factors and a 
sudden rise in the price of commodities on the 
international market. 
But we are working hard to correct the situation. Interviewee
I suppose you don't expect me to answer that question.
Interviewee
That's clear enough.
Could you please tell us the price of a pint of milk in 
China?Interviewer
Figure 5.1: A (hand-crafted) political interview example (D1)
5.1 Non-Cooperative Conversational Agents
Conversational agents must deal with several informational and interactional
aspects throughout a dialogue. For instance, they need knowledge about
what conversational actions are available to them, about what goals they
want to achieve in the conversation and about what constraints are imposed
upon them by the type of dialogue in which they are engaged. They also need
to keep track of the dialogue dynamics, that is the dialogue history, the goals
they have achieved and those yet to be pursued and any pending discourse
obligations on either side. For the model we propose in this chapter, we
group these elements in separate modules as follows:
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1. A taxonomy of dialogue acts specifying the conversational actions
that participants perform and understand in the dialogue, and a tax-
onomy of action labels, as described in previous chapters.
2. An information state to keep track of the dialogue history, dynamic
obligations and private goals.
3. Mechanisms for understanding and generating natural language
utterances.
4. A specification of the agent’s role. This is the management of aspects
specific to each agent, such as the identity of the role they play in the
dialogue, the agenda of private goals and so forth.
5. A conversational domain defining valid and invalid contributions,
relative relevance, e.g. of answers to questions, etc.
6. A dialogue game with the rules specifying the actions allowed to the
participants’ roles and the dynamics of discourse obligations.
7. A deliberation mechanism to decide on their next contribution.
8. A control algorithm that binds these elements together and interacts
with the other agent by writing and reading utterances to and from
shared channels.
These elements are shown in Figure 5.2. The modules with dashed borders
allow modelling different types of dialogue, roles and conversational domains.
They are instantiated according to specific aspects of the type of dialogue
being modelled as shown in Figure 5.3.
In the rest of the section, we formalise these elements and illustrate with
examples from the political interview dialogue setting. Before, let us make
a few modelling assumptions with the aim of scoping the discussion:


































Interviewer    Interviewee
Attorney       Witness
...
Teacher           Pupil       
Figure 5.3: Domain-specific elements in a conversational agent
• Agents are autonomous and do not physically share any of the modules
above. However, we assume that they agree on the dialogue act and
action label taxonomies, on the structure of the information state, on
the conversational domain and on the dialogue game. In fact, all these
modules are assumed to be identical in both agents, with the exception
of the agent’s role, the control algorithm and the information state.
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• Language understanding and generation are assumed to be flawless.
This means that the agents always agree on what is being communic-
ated in either direction, relieving us from having to deal with manage-
ment of grounding, evidence of understanding, and so forth.
• We consider differences in the contents of the information state, in
particular for the agenda of private goals. Each agent keeps a specific-
ation of its private goals and of the management of the agenda, but
not that of the other party.
• The deliberation mechanisms can also differ, implementing distinct
criteria for selecting an agent’s next contributions and to reflect which
party holds the floor at the start of the conversation.
We will discuss the possibilities for future work that result from relaxing
the assumptions above in Chapter 6.
5.1.1 Dialogue Act and Action Label Taxonomies
Dialogue acts are the basic conversational actions that agents can perform
and understand. For generality, we model dialogue acts as having function
and content. Formally, we represent dialogue acts as F (c), where F is the
function and c the content. The performance of a dialogue act is called a
dialogue move and is represented as a pair m = (s, F (c)) where s is the
speaker performing the dialogue act F (c).
As an example, for political interviews we consider the following dialogue
acts:
• Question(p): an information request. The content is some represent-
ation of the propositional content of an utterance.
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• Statement(p): an assertion providing information. The content is also
some representation of the propositional content of an utterance.
• Accept(m): the acceptance of a previous contribution. The content is
a dialogue move.
• Reject(m): the rejection of a previous contribution. The content is
also a dialogue move.
We leave the representation for the propositional content of an utterance
unspecified. They can range from simply the surface realisations produced
by the speaker to deep semantic representations (Traum, 2003). For the
example we use unique identifiers, understood as pointers to the surface ut-
terances (cf. Section 5.1.3). Hence, a question is represented asQuestion(q1)
and an acceptance of a move in which this question is asked by speaker s is
represented as Accept((s,Question(q1))).
Action labels were introduced and formalised in Chapter 3 (page 75)
for representing the actions of dialogue participants in terms that were com-
patible with the specification of the rules of the dialogue game. The tax-
onomy of action labels for political interview agents was described in Section
3.5.1 and used in Chapter 4 for the automatic assessment of cooperation in
annotated dialogue:
(〈ID〉) : 〈action name〉[@(〈referent ID〉)] [〈repeated & complete flags〉]
where the action name is in the set TPI = {valid-statement, invalid-
statement, valid-question, invalid-question, valid-reply, invalid-
reply, acceptance, rejection}. Recall that only responsive actions –
that is replies, acceptances and rejections – include a referent identifier,
to indicate the action they respond to. Also, valid and invalid questions
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have New/Repeated associated flags to indicate whether the question had
been asked earlier in the dialogue. Valid and invalid replies have Com-
plete/Incomplete associated flag, indicating whether the entirety of the
information requested in a question is provided by the reply, including any
preceding partial replies.
5.1.2 Information State
Agents use a structure called information state (Cooper and Larsson,
1999; Traum and Larsson, 2003) to keep track of the dynamic state of the
dialogue at all times. The information state includes the history of dialogue
moves performed by both participants, the state of the agent’s agenda of
private goals, the dynamic obligations of both parties, and possibly other
elements specific to the type of dialogue the agents are having. We repres-
ent this structure as a typed record (Cooper, 1998). The type of a record
is defined by an unordered list of named fields, each one with an associ-
ated type. These types can be another record type, a basic type or a type
constructed on the basis of other types. Types can be constructed as the
product of two or more types or by using type constructors, such as seq and
set for sequences and sets, respectively. The fields in instances of a type
record are accessed with the dot notation.
Our basic types are Utterance, for the speakers’ utterances; Act, for the
dialogue acts in the taxonomy; Speaker, for the speakers in the conversation;
and Label, for the action labels introduced in Chapter 3. The type for
dialogue moves is defined asMove = Speaker×Act. The type for obligations
is Obligation = Speaker × Label. The type for information states is then




DialogueHistory : seq Move
PrivateAgenda : set Act
Obligations : seq Obligation
(. . .)

These are typed records with at least three fields:
• The dialogue history (DialogueHistory), represented as a sequence
of moves, at any time in the dialogue holds the sequence of moves
performed so far by either speaker.
• The agenda of private goals (PrivateAgenda), represented as a set
of acts that the agent aims at performing during the conversation1.
• The agents’ dynamic obligations (Obligations), represented as a se-
quence of obligations as discussed in Chapter 4.
We assume that together with the specification of the information state
structure the module includes a constant – or 0-ary function – providing the
empty information state:
initialise-state : InfoState
In the political interview setting, the information state has two extra ele-
ments: the question being currently discussed (CurrentQuestion), and a
1This is a simplification: as part of their private agendas, agents only consider acts
that they themselves can perform – therefore these are dialogue acts instead of dialogue
moves. A more realistic model would also allow for acts performed by others as part of
an agent’s private goals or, more generally, for states of the world represented as partially
specified information states. A planning mechanism using the dialogue game and the
conversational domain to reason about the agent’s own actions that would lead the other
party to performing the desired goals or to the desired state of the world would be required
in such cases (Fikes and Nilsson, 1972; Zinn et al., 2002; Steedman and Petrick, 2007).
For instance, if an interviewer wants a question to be answered by the interviewee, he or
she would have to ask it in the first place.
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set of proposed questions or answers (joint projects) that have not yet been
accepted or rejected (Proposals), paired with their respective acceptance
or rejection obligations according to the dialogue game. The type for pro-
posals is Proposal = Obligation ×Move. The dialogue state for agents in
political interviews is as follows:
InfoState =

DialogueHistory : seq Move
PrivateAgenda : set Act
Obligations : seq Obligation
Proposals : set Proposal
CurrentQuestion : Act










Of these fields, only the contents of the private agenda are unique to each
agent. The contents of the rest of the information state, although not pub-
licly accessible to the other party, will be identical in both agents following
the assumption that natural language generation and understanding are
flawless and that the agents agree on the specifications of the dialogue game
and the conversational domain.
5.1.3 Natural Language Understanding and Generation
Agents use the natural language understanding and generation mod-
ules to turn utterances into dialogue moves and vice-versa. The modules
2The value None used to initialise current questions is a special element of all types
that denotes the null value. In this case, it means that no question is currently under
discussion.
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provide two functions, respectively:
interpret : Utterance→Move
generate : Move→ Utterance
For the general model, the internal details of these functions are left unspe-
cified. In practice, they could be implemented using many of the approaches
to natural language understanding and generation described in the literat-
ure and in current research (Allen, 1995; DeVault et al., 2011; Reiter and
Dale, 2000; DeVault et al., 2008).
As mentioned above, in the example we assume that generation and un-
derstanding are flawless. This means that interpret(generate(m)) = m, for
any dialogue move m. In other words, a dialogue move realised with the
natural language generator in one of the agents is interpreted as such by
the natural language understanding module in the other agent. Further-
more, we will use canned messages to present the resulting dialogues and
assume that these functions convert between strings and dialogue moves us-
ing unique identifiers for each string. Table 5.1 shows the conversion of the
utterances from the example in Figure 5.1, plus a few more we will use later
in the chapter. In this case, the functions interpret and generate simply
implement this mapping without any further processing.
5.1.4 Role
The Role module deals with elements specific to each agent throughout
the dialogue. These include the agent’s identity, the management of private
goals, the initial contents of the private agenda, and possibly further aspects
depending on the conversational setting or knowledge about the world that
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Table 5.1: Mapping between speaker utterances and dialogue moves.
Speaker Utterance Dialogue Move
Interviewer “How do you explain the rise in the
inflation rate for the last quarter,
Mr Chancellor?”
(ir, Question(q1))
Interviewee “Let me try to explain this.” (ie, Accept((ir, Question(q1))))
Interviewee “The numbers are worse than we
expected, but this Government is
working hard to correct the situ-
ation.”
(ie, Statement(s1))
Interviewer “That’s not answering the ques-
tion.”
(ir, Reject((ie, Statement(s1))))
Interviewee “It was due to a combination of sea-
sonal factors and a sudden rise in
the price of commodities on the in-
ternational market.”
(ie, Statement(s2))
Interviewee “But we are working hard to correct
the situation.”
(ie, Statement(s3))
Interviewer “That’s clear enough.” (ir, Accept((ie, Statement(s2))))
Interviewer “Could you please tell us the price
of a pint of milk in China?”
(ir, Question(q2))
Interviewee “I suppose you don’t expect me to
answer that question.”
(ie, Reject((ir, Question(q2))))
Interviewer “Can you comment on the position
of your office regarding the inflation
rate? ”
(ir, Question(q3))
Interviewee “Right.” (ie, Accept((ir, Question(q3))))
Interviewer “Thank you.” (ir, Accept((ie, Statement(s1))))
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is known to only one of the agents. The module provides four functions:
identity : Speaker
initialise-agenda : set Act
select-goal : InfoState → Act
update-agenda : InfoState ×Move→ set Act
Once again, for the general model the internal details of these functions
are left unspecified. In the case of political interviews, the initialisation sets
up the private agenda with the private goals of the agent. For interviewers,
the initial agenda contains the set of questions they aim at asking in the
dialogue. For example3:
initialise-agendair( ) = {Question(q2)}
For interviewees, the private agenda has a set of statements they aim at
including before the conversation is over. These messages could include,
for instance, key points, party policy or a personal position with respect to
current affairs. For example:
initialise-agendaie( ) = {Statement(s1), Statement(s3)}
These initial values mean that the interviewer aims at asking the question
“Could you please tell us the price of a pint of milk in China?” at some point
in the dialogue. Similarly, the interviewee intends to deliver the messages
“The numbers are worse than we expected, but this Government is working
hard to correct the situation.” and “But we are working hard to correct the
situation.”.
Agents might also want to reject or accept specific contributions from
the other party, regardless of whether they are valid or not. In such cases,
3For the surface realisation of Question(q2), see Table 5.1.
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their agendas would contain accept and reject dialogue acts, with the moves
they refer to as content. For an example, if in the dialogue of Figure 5.1 the
interviewee had intended to reject the first question posed by the interviewer
regardless of its validity, the act Reject(Question(q1)) would be part of the
interviewee’s agenda of private goals.
It is worth noting that, contrary to the usual notion of the agenda as a
motivator behind all the actions the agents pursue in dialogue, the private
agenda here motivates only those actions the agents want to perform ego-
istically, with no regard for the limitations imposed upon them by the con-
versational setting. Cooperative agents will perform other actions that do
not originate in their private agendas but that result from the obligations
specified by the dialogue game. In the limit, fully cooperative agents only
behave as determined by the social context. So, interviewers only ask valid
questions and interviewees only respond with valid replies. These actions
could also be in their private agendas, but this is accidental, as they ac-
tually result from the obligations that emerge from the dialogue game and
from the analysis of these obligations given by the conversational domain
module (see Sections 5.1.5 and 5.1.6). The clear case is that of interviewees
having to answer a valid question by saying something that would shed a
negative light upon them or their party. If they are being cooperative, they
are obliged to provide the reply, but we would not expect that statement
to be in their private agenda. On the other hand, the second example in
Section 5.2 shows a case in which one of the messages the interviewee wants
to deliver is performed as a cooperative move, just because the interviewer
asked a question for which the comment worked as a valid reply. When the
statement is uttered out of context, as an invalid reply motivated only by
the private agenda (e.g. the first example of Section 5.2), the model does not
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treat this statement differently in the agenda, but it will result in a different
assessment of cooperation as it constitutes a non-cooperative feature.
The function select-goal chooses one of the goals in the private agenda.
The criteria for selecting the goal can be based on many factors. For in-
stance, an agent could have a notion of utility associated to each goal. This
would make performing goals with higher utility more desirable than those
with lower utility.
In our example, agents use the following criterion for selecting private
goals:
• If there are proposed questions or statements that have not yet been
accepted or rejected, any accept or reject dialogue acts in the private
agenda that refer to such proposals are selected (when more than one
goal meets this criterion, one is selected randomly).
• Otherwise, a goal in the agenda that is not an accept or a reject dia-
logue act is selected at random.
Thus, for either agent s ∈ {ir, ie} and an information state is, we have:
select-goals(is) =

F (move) ∈ is.PrivateAgenda, if (o,move) ∈ is.Proposals
F (c) ∈ is.PrivateAgenda with F /∈ {Accept, Reject}, otherwise
None, if is.PrivateAgenda = {}
The function update-agenda reflects the effects of a dialogue move in
the agent’s agenda of private goals. We will use the following criterion in
the example: independently of the speaker, if a dialogue act in the agent’s
private agenda has been performed by the agent, it is removed from the set.
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So, for s ∈ {ir, ie} and an information state is, it is:
update-agendas(is, (s, act)) = is.PrivateAgenda \ {act}
5.1.5 Conversational Domain
The conversational domain allows agents to link dialogue moves with
the action labels introduced in Chapter 3. This mapping can be thought
of as an interpretation of the agents’ contributions in the context of the
current conversation and of the dialogue type4. The module relies on parts
of the information state (e.g. the current question) and on the dialogue act
performed by a speaker to give an action label. Conversely, it also encodes
what dialogue acts would allow an agent to meet a given obligation in the
current state of the dialogue, characterised by an information state. The
module provides two functions for these purposes:
analyse-move : InfoState ×Move→ Label
analyse-obligation : InfoState ×Obligation→ set Act
The function analyse-move interprets a move in terms of action labels.
The function analyse-obligation works in the opposite direction: given the
current dialogue state and an obligation, i.e. a pair with a speaker and an
action label, it determines what dialogue act(s) correspond to the label –
and would therefore discharge the obligation when performed by the speaker.
The internal details of these function depend closely on the conversational
setting and on topical aspects of a particular dialogue. In a political inter-
view setting, for instance, analyse-move determines whether a question is
valid or invalid, whether a statement is suitable as a reply to the current
4This is the agents equivalent to the decisions made by annotators of the corpus study
in Chapter 4, combined with the automatic mapping of the resulting annotations into
action labels presented in Section 4.4.
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question or just an irrelevant comment, etc. Conversely, analyse-obligation
indicates the statement acts that would constitute a valid reply to the cur-
rent question, the question acts that are valid questions, the dialogue acts
that would be adequate as acceptances, etc.
For the example model, we represent utterances as unique identifiers.
Given the lack of a semantic representation, we specify analyse-move so
that it links the identifiers contained in dialogue acts with an action label.
The information state is part of the input to the function because some
of the results depend on contextual aspects, such as the question currently
under discussion, or the dialogue history. To illustrate this, consider the
following fragment:
The numbers are worse than we expected, but this 
Government is working hard to correct the situation. Interviewee
How do you explain the rise in the inflation rate for the 
last quarter, Mr Chancellor?
Interviewer
This pair is represented as the moves (ir, Question(q1)) and
(ie, Statement(s1)). The interviewee’s contribution is an invalid reply at
this point in the dialogue (cf. Figure 3.7 in Chapter 3), so it should be:
analyse-move(is, (ir, Question(q1))) = (1) : valid-question N
analyse-move(is, (ie, Statement(s1))) = (2) : invalid-reply@(1) I
Now, consider the following alternative:
The numbers are worse than we expected, but this 
Government is working hard to correct the situation. Interviewee
Can you comment on the position of your office regarding 
the inflation rate?
Interviewer
5.1. Non-Cooperative Conversational Agents 229
Here, the moves are (ir, Question(q3)) and (ie, Statement(s1)). Contrary
to the first example, the statement from the interviewee is a valid reply to
the question and it should be:
analyse-move(is, (ir, Question(q3))) = (1) : valid-question N
analyse-move(is, (ie, Statement(s1))) = (2) : valid-reply@(1) C
We achieve this is by making analyse-move look into the information state
when classifying the move. In the first case, Question(q1) is the current
question, for which Statement(s1) does not constitute a valid reply. In the
second case, the current question is Question(q3) for which Statement(s1)
serves as valid reply. Similarly, valid questions are determined not only by
their topical relevance and adequacy in terms of the ability of the interviewee
to answer them, but also by whether they have been asked before, which
would be determined by the information state.
The specification of analyse-move for the example is as follows5:
analyse-move(is, (ir, Question(q1))) =

(i) : valid-question N,
if (ir, Question(q1)) /∈ is.DialogueHistory
(i) : valid-question R, otherwise
analyse-move(is, (ir, Question(q2))) =

(i) : invalid-question N,
if (ir, Question(q1)) /∈ is.DialogueHistory
(i) : invalid-question R, otherwise
5We use (i) to denote the unique identifier generated for each action label and (j) to
denote the identifier of the obvious referent label in responsive actions.
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analyse-move(is, (ir, Question(q3))) =

(i) : valid-question N,
if (ir, Question(q3)) /∈ is.DialogueHistory
(i) : valid-question R, otherwise
analyse-move(is, (ie, Statement(s1))) =

(i) : invalid-reply@(j) I,
if is.CurrentQuestion = Question(q1)
(i) : invalid-reply@(j) I,
if is.CurrentQuestion = Question(q2)
(i) : valid-reply@(j) C,
if is.CurrentQuestion = Question(q3)
analyse-move(is, (ie, Statement(s2))) =

(i) : valid-reply@(j) C,
if is.CurrentQuestion = Question(q1)
(i) : invalid-reply@(j) I,
if is.CurrentQuestion = Question(q2)
(i) : invalid-reply@(j) I,
if is.CurrentQuestion = Question(q3)
analyse-move(is, (ie, Statement(s3))) =

(i) : invalid-reply@(j) I,
if is.CurrentQuestion = Question(q1)
(i) : invalid-reply@(j) I,
if is.CurrentQuestion = Question(q2)
(i) : valid-reply@(j) C,
if is.CurrentQuestion = Question(q3)
In addition, following the restrictions we assumed for the labels in cor-
rectly annotated political interviews, the following holds for any information
state is, speaker s, dialogue move m and content q:
analyse-move(is, (s, (Accept(m))) = (i) : acceptance@(j)
analyse-move(is, (s, (Reject(m))) = (i) : rejection@(j)
analyse-move(is, (ie, Question(q)))) = (i) : invalid-question
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Finally, as there are no statements by the interviewer that would work
as prefaces to questions, the following holds for any content p:
analyse-move(is, (ir, Statement(p))) = (i) : invalid-statement
The function analyse-obligation works in the opposite direction, con-
necting obligations, this is pairs (s, l) where s is a speaker and l an action
label, to the set of dialogue acts that meet the obligation in a given inform-
ation state. For instance at the beginning of the dialogue in Figure 5.1 we
have:
analyse-obligation(is, (ir, valid-question N)) = {Question(q1), Question(q3)}
while later in the dialogue, once Question(q1) has been asked, it is:
analyse-obligation(is, (ir, valid-question N)) = {Question(q3)}
Thus, regarding new valid questions, for any information state is, it is:
analyse-obligation(is, (ir, valid-question N)) =
{q ∈ {Question(q1), Question(q3)} | (ir, q) /∈ is.DialogueHistory}
As for valid complete replies, in the second turn the current questions is
Question(q1), so it should be:
analyse-obligation(is, (ie, valid-reply@(1) C)) = {Statement(s2)}
In the alternative fragment, the current question is Question(q3), so it
should be:
analyse-obligation(is, (ie, valid-reply@(1)) C) = {Statement(s1), Statement(s3)}
Thus, for any information state is, we have:
analyse-obligation(is, (ie, valid-reply@(j)) C) =
{Statement(s2)}, if is.CurrentQuestion = Question(q1)
{Statement(s1), Statement(s3)}, if is.CurrentQuestion = Question(q3)
{}, otherwise
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The assumptions that all questions asked by interviewees are invalid
and that there are no suitable statements for the interviewer in the set of
available utterances mean that, for any information state is, the following
holds:
analyse-obligation(is, (ie, valid-question)) = {}
analyse-obligation(is, (ir, valid-statement)) = {}
Analysing rejection and acceptance obligations, requires connecting them
with the dialogue move to be accepted or rejected. The function uses
is.Proposals to make this connection. The field provides a set of pairs
(o,m) where o is an acceptance or rejection obligation and m a proposed
question or statement move that has not yet been accepted or rejected.
Thus, when analysing one of these obligations, the associated move is re-
turned. If there are several pairs with this obligation on the same speaker, all
of them are returned. Recall that the dialogue game described in Chapter 3
allows for implicit acceptances and rejections. Here we will limit ourselves to
dealing with implicit rejections by repeating the current question. Implicit
acceptances by asking new questions, providing replies or making statements
are left for future consideration. So, for any speaker s and information state
is, it is:
analyse-obligation(is, (s, acceptance@(j))) =
{Accept(m) | ((s, acceptance@(j))), (s,m)) ∈ is.Proposals}
analyse-obligation(is, (s, rejection@(j))) =
{Reject(m) | ((s, rejection@(j)), (s,m)) ∈ is.Proposals} ∪
{is.CurrentQuestion | is.CurrentQuestion 6= None}
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5.1.6 Dialogue Game
As discussed in Chapters 3 and 4, the dialogue game specifies the rules of
the type of conversation the agents engage in. Formally, this is represented
as described at the end of Chapter 3.
This module also deals with elements in the information state that are
equal for both agents but specific to the conversational setting. For this
purpose, it provides a function for updating the information state with the
effects of a move according to the rules of the dialogue game:
play-move : InfoState ×Move→ InfoState
For updating the obligations after a move, the module uses an internal
function:
update-obligations : seq Obligation×Move→ seq Obligation
that, given a sequence of obligations and a move, follows a procedure similar
to that in Algorithm 1 in Chapter 4 to introduce and discharge dynamic
obligations. It uses the action label resulting from calling analyse-move in
the conversational setting module with the move as argument.
In political interviews, play-move updates the obligations, the sequence
of proposed questions and statements that have not yet been accepted or
rejected, and the question currently under discussion.
For updating proposals after a move, the module uses an internal func-
tion:
update-proposals : set Proposal ×Move→ set Proposal
that, given a set of proposals and a move, gives an updated set of proposals
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according to the dialogue game.
Asking a new question or making a statement adds a proposal to the set.
This is a pair with the move and a corresponding obligation for acceptance
or rejection as indicated by the dialogue game. Asking a repeated question,
however, acts as an implicit rejection and removes the corresponding pro-
posal form the set6. So, according to Rules (4), (7), (10), (11) and (15) of
the dialogue game for political interviews (cf. Figure 3.9 in Chapter 3), for
any content c, speaker s and set of proposals props we have7:
update-proposals(props, (s,Question(c))) =
props ∪ {((s, acceptance@(i)), (s,Question(c))},
if analyse-move((s,Question(c))) = (i) : valid-question N
props ∪ {((s, rejection@(i)), (s,Question(c))},
if analyse-move((s,Question(c))) = (i) : invalid-question N
props \ {((s, rejection@(i)), (s,Question(c))},
if analyse-move((s,Question(c))) = (i) : ∗-question R
update-proposals(props, (s, Statement(c))) =
props ∪ {((s, acceptance@(i)), (s, Statement(c))},
if analyse-move((s, Statement(c))) = (i) : valid-reply@(j) C
props ∪ {((s, rejection@(i)), (s, Statement(c))},
if analyse-move((s, Statement(c))) = (i) : invalid-reply@(j)
When a move is accepted or rejected, the corresponding pair is removed
from the set of pending proposals. So, for any content c, speaker s and set
6In future revisions, this should also consider implicit acceptances: a new question
implicitly accepts a statement and a statement implicitly accepts a pending question,
removing them from the list of pending proposals.
7As in the definition of the dialogue game in Chapter 3, the symbol * in an action label
works as a wildcard, in this case matching valid and invalid questions.
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of proposals props, it is:
update-proposals(props, (s,Accept(move))) = props \ {(o,m) ∈ props|m = move}
update-proposals(props, (s,Reject(move))) = props \ {(o,m) ∈ props|m = move}
For updating the current question, the module uses a function:
update-current-question : Act×Move→ Act
that, given the current question and a move, gives an updated current ques-
tion. This field is only updated after questions and statements are accepted.
When a question is accepted, it becomes the current question. So, for any
content c, question q, and speakers s1 and s2, it is:
update-current-question(q, (s1, Accept((s2, Question(c))))) = Question(c)
On the other hand, when a statement is accepted as a reply to a question,
the current questions is set to None:
update-current-question(q, (s1, Accept((s2, Statement(c))))) = None
Asking a question, making a statement or rejecting a move do not change
the current question. So, for any content c, question q, speaker s and move
m:
update-current-question(q, (s,Question(c))) = q
update-current-question(q, (s, Statement(c))) = q
update-current-question(q, (s,Reject(m))) = q
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Agents need to select a single obligation among their obligations in the
sequence when deciding on their next actions. For this purpose, the module
has a function:
select-obligation : seq Obligations× Speaker → Obligation
The internal details of this function depend on the particular conversational
setting, as the game could define a particular order in which obligations are
discharged.
In our political interviews, for instance, acceptances and rejections should
be addressed before any other obligations. So, we follow this criterion:
• If there are any obligations on the speaker for acceptances or rejections,
one of these is selected randomly.
• If there are any obligations on the speaker for other acts, one of these
is selected randomly.
• If there are no obligations on the speakers, then None is returned.
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Hence, for an agent s ∈ {ir, ie} and obligation set os, it is:
select-obligation(os, s) =

o ∈ {(speaker, label) ∈ os | speaker = s
∧ label ∈ {acceptance, rejection}},
if this set is not empty
o ∈ {(speaker, label) ∈ os | speaker = s}
if the above set is empty and this set is not
None, otherwise
The module also provides a function for initialising dynamic obligations
at the start of the conversation:
initialise-game : seq Obligations
In the political interview example, there is an initial obligation on the in-
terviewer to ask a valid question, so the following holds:
initialise-game( ) = 〈(ir, valid-question N)〉
5.1.7 Deliberation Mechanism
The deliberation mechanism is used by the agents to decide on what
dialogue acts to perform each time they hold the floor. The module provides
a function that selects the agent’s next dialogue act by choosing between a
private goal and an obligation:
select-next-act : Act×Act→ Act
It is at this point that we can make our agents behave in different ways
with respect to conversational cooperation as defined in Chapter 3. A co-
operative agent would always favour obligations in the deliberation pro-
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cess, thus following the rules of the dialogue game. On the other hand,
an agent favouring the goal dialogue acts in the private agenda will exhibit
non-cooperative conversational behaviour whenever those acts are in con-
flict with the obligations. If the goal, interpreted under the conversational
domain, does not meet an obligation, then performing that act is a non-
cooperative move. Fully non-cooperative agents will always follow private
goals, regardless of their obligations.
Our aim is to model agents that can exhibit behaviour ranging over
different levels of cooperation. A simple way to achieve this is by allowing
the deliberation mechanism to ignore obligations with probability p ∈ [0, 1]8
each time it selects an act. The probability p is thus a parameter we can
adjust to have agents behave in different ways. The function select-next-act
will then select its first argument (the private goal) with probability p and its
second argument (the obligation) with probability (1−p). We achieve this by
using a p-biased random binary function (a Bernoulli test with probability
of success p), that will independently select either one of the arguments,
each time it is called.
5.1.8 Control Algorithm
The control algorithm defines the interaction cycle that agents follow
in a conversation. It uses the functions in the modules described above
to interpret and generate utterances, update the information state, select
contributions, etc. The algorithm follows essentially the same cycle in both
agents:
1. Wait for an utterance from the other party and interpret it as a dia-
8The notation [a, b] denotes the interval of real numbers between (and including) a and
b, that is, the set {x ∈ R | a ≤ x ≤ b}. Similarly, (a, b) denote the interval of real numbers
between a and b but excluding these, i.e. the set {x ∈ R | a < x < b}.
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logue move.
2. Update the information state (both public and private).
3. Select the next dialogue move or release the floor to the other agent.
4. Update the information state (both public and private).
5. Generate the utterance corresponding to that move and send it to the
other party.
In most conversational scenarios, however, there will be differences in the
starting point of the cycle, as it is assumed that one of the two parties will
initially hold the floor. In political interviews, for example, it is customary
that the interviewer initiates the exchange. Figure 5.4 shows the control
algorithms as a flow chart. For each agent, the algorithm starts with the
oval labelled with the agent’s name. Rectangles represent procedures, par-
allelograms are input/output operations and diamonds (or rhombuses) are
decision points.
In order to make the interaction more realistic, we allow for several acts
to be performed in each turn. Thus, when selecting the next dialogue move,
agents can decide to release the floor instead of performing another act.
These decisions will depend on the particular conversational setting and on
the role of the agent in the dialogue. In the case of political interviews,
for instance, interviewers tend to make contributions that are shorter than
those of interviewees. They can also be thought of as hesitations or invol-
untary turn-yielding cues that allow the other agent to take the floor. In
our model, we achieve this by using another biased random binary function,
release-floor : Bool, with a parameter q that is determined empirically for
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Interviewer


















Is it the 
empty move?
Update information 
state with effects of move
Figure 5.4: Control algorithm for political interview agents.
each agent9. If the trial fails, the agent chooses another act repeating steps
3-5 above. Otherwise, a special token is sent to mark the end of the turn10.
It is worth noting that, releasing or keeping the floor is determined, either
because the biased random function release-floor succeeded, or because the
deliberation mechanism function select-next-act returned None. The latter
can happen when the deliberation favours obligations but there are none left
9For this function, we might prefer that the probability of success started at 0 for the
first move of a turn, and that it increased after each contribution, making it less likely
that the speaker kept the floor later in the turn. We can think of the parameter q ∈ [0, 5]
as the decay rate for an exponential decay function q(k) = e−qk, using r(k) = 1− q(k) as
the probability of success for a trial deciding whether to release the floor in the k-th move
of a turn (taking k = 0 for the first move). For a discussion on this see Appendix D.
10The end-of-turn token, EOT , is a special utterance interpreted as interpret(EOT ) =
(s,None) and generated as generate((s,None)) = EOT . The move (s,None) is called
the empty move.
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to be discharged, or when a private goal is chosen but the private agenda
is empty. A particular case for this is, for instance, when an agent is being
fully non-cooperative and there are no obligations to discharge, or when it
is being fully non-cooperative and it has achieved all the goals in the private
agenda.
The control algorithms for the interviewer and the interviewee are shown
in Algorithms 4 and 5, respectively. They include procedures corresponding
roughly to steps 1-5 above, plus an initialisation. Although the control is
specified as an infinite loop, we assume that a dialogue ends when both
agents have produced consecutive empty turns (i.e. turns in which the only
move is the empty move; see below).
The procedure initialise, receives no arguments and returns a “fresh”
information state with initial values for the set of obligations and the private








The procedure select-next-move takes as arguments an information
state and a speaker and returns the next move for the speaker. In the first
place, it decides whether to release the floor using the biased random func-
tion release-floor introduced above. If this function fails, the procedure
selects the agent’s next dialogue act. To achieve this, it takes a private goal
as specified by the role module. It then takes an obligation as specified by
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Algorithm 4 Control algorithm for the interviewer agent.
is← initialise( )
loop . interaction loop starts
next-move← select-next-move(is, ir) . speaker loop starts




end while . speaker loop ends
next-utterance← generate(next-move) . release the floor
last-move← interpret(last-utterance) . listener loop starts
while last-move 6= (ie, None) do
is← update-information-state(is, next-move)
last-move← interpret(last-utterance)
end while . listener loop ends
end loop . interaction loop ends
Algorithm 5 Control algorithm for the interviewee agent.
is← initialise( )
loop . interaction loop starts
last-move← interpret(last-utterance) . listener loop starts
while last-move 6= (ir, None) do
is← update-information-state(is, next-move)
last-move← interpret(last-utterance)
end while . listener loop ends
next-move← select-next-move(is, ie) . speaker loop starts




end while . speaker loop ends
next-utterance← generate(next-move) . release the floor
end loop . interaction loop ends
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the dialogue game and analyses it using the conversational domain module.
The result is the set of dialogue acts that would discharge the selected oblig-
ation, from which one is chosen randomly11. Finally, it uses the deliberation
mechanism to decide whether to follow the goal or to discharge the oblig-
ation. The act resulting from this decision is turned into a move and the
procedure returns:
procedure select-next-move(is, speaker)











The procedure update-information-state takes as arguments an in-
formation state and a move, and returns an updated information state. To
update the information state, it adds the move at the end of the dialogue
history sequence, updates the private agenda as specified in the role module,
and the obligations, the current question and the set of pending proposals
as specified in the dialogue game module:
11The auxiliary function choice : set T → T selects a random element from a set of
elements of type T . If the set is empty, it returns None.
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procedure update-information-state(is, move)





All communication between the agents takes place through two channels
that can be thought as blocking unidirectional pipes. From the perspective
of each agent, the channels are called last-utterance and next-utterance, for
input and output, respectively. Thus, agents will read their interlocutor’s ut-
terances from last-utterance and write their own utterances to next-utterance.
The output channel of one agent is the input of the other, and vice-versa.
As Figure 5.4 and Algorithms 4 and 5 show, the control loop is essentially
the same for both participants, except that they start at different points in
the interaction cycle. The interviewer agent behaves first as a speaker, until
it releases the floor, when it becomes a listener. The interviewee does this
in reverse order, acting first as a listener and then, after receiving the floor,
as a speaker.
5.2 Dialogue Generation and Levels of Coopera-
tion
In this section we describe in detail how the model presented above could
generate the example in Figure 5.1, hereafter referred to as Dialogue D1. We
also show how it would be possible to produce variations of this dialogue
with different degrees of non-cooperation, solely by changing the parameter
p in the deliberation mechanisms of both agents.
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5.2.1 Generating Dialogue D1
For generating the dialogue in Figure 5.1, we assume that both agents have
a value of p = 0.33. This means that every time the deliberation mechanism
function select-next-act is invoked the private goal will be selected with
probability 0.33.
As specified in the agents’ roles and in the dialogue game modules, in
Sections 5.1.4 and 5.1.6, respectively, after the initialisation, the information













PrivateAgenda = {Statement(s1), Statement(s3)}




After the initialisation, the interviewer agent enters the speaker loop and
deliberates on the next move. This is the first move of the turn, so the func-
tion release-floor fails and a next act is selected. As there are no pending
proposals, the role function select-goal produces the act Question(q2). The
dialogue game function select-obligation returns (ir, valid-question N).
The conversational domain function analyse-obligation returns the dialogue
acts that, if performed, would discharge this obligation: {Question(q1),
Question(q3)}12. One of the two acts is chosen at random, say Question(q1),
12These dialogue acts come from the “stock” of available moves listed in Table 5.1. The
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and the deliberation mechanism function select-next-act is called with ar-
guments Question(q2) and Question(q1). The biased random test with
p = 0.33 fails, and the second argument, that is the one resulting from
the obligation, is selected as next act. The interviewer’s next dialogue move
is then (ir, Question(q1)).
Once the next act is selected, the interviewer agent updates its inform-
ation state to reflect the effects of this move. This involves appending the
move to the dialogue history sequence and updating the private agenda,
the obligations, the current question and the set of pending proposals. As
Question(q1) is not in the interviewer’s private agenda, this field remains the
same after the update. The obligations are updated according to the dia-
logue game as shown in Appendix E for Turn (1)13, so (ir,valid-question
N) is removed from the sequence and (ie,acceptance@(1)) is added to it.
Also, according to the specification of play-move, the current question is
left unchanged, and the pair ((ie, acceptance@(1)), (ir, Question(q1))) is
added to the set of pending proposals. The resulting information state is:
isir =

DialogueHistory = 〈(ir, Question(q1))〉
PrivateAgenda = {Question(q2)}
Obligations = 〈(ie, acceptance@(1))〉
Proposals = {((ie, acceptance@(1)), (ir, Question(q1)))}
CurrentQuestion = None

Next, the interviewer generates the utterance corresponding to the move
and sends it to the interviewee through the channel next-utterance. As spe-
cified in Section 5.1.3, the utterance generated for the move (ir, Question(q1))
is “How do you explain the rise in the inflation rate for the last quarter, Mr
conversational domain module has the knowledge to decide which one of such moves are
valid for discharging a given obligation. Although this approach might seem artificial, in
the sense that it makes agents aware of what can be said by either party at all times, it
should be thought of as an ability to construct and decode utterances and to assess these
utterances in terms of their validity in the current conversational context.
13Appendix E shows the update of obligations after each move for the entire dialogue.
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Chancellor?”.
In a similar vein, after the initialisation, the interviewee agent enters the
listener loop and waits for an utterance from the interviewer by reading from
the channel last-utterance. When the utterance is available in the channel,
it is interpreted as the move (ir, Question(q1)). As this is not the empty
move, the information state is updated much in the same way as for the
interviewer. In this case, the private agenda does not change because the
move is performed by the other agent. The resulting information state is:
isie =

DialogueHistory = 〈(ir, Question(q1))〉
PrivateAgenda = {Statement(s1), Statement(s3)}
Obligations = 〈(ie, acceptance@(1))〉
Proposals = {((ie, acceptance@(1)), (ir, Question(q1)))}
CurrentQuestion = None

The interviewee agent then waits for another utterance to arrive on the
channel.
After successfully sending the previous utterance, the interviewer selects
another move. It starts by deciding whether to release the floor. As we
said above, interviewer turns are usually shorter, so we use a parameter
q = 2 as decay rate for the likelihood that the agent keeps the turn. The
biased random function release-floor then succeeds with probability 0.86
(see Appendix D for details), and the agent ends the turn. This is the
case at this point in the dialogue, so the interviewer takes the empty move
(ir, None) as next move, generating and sending end-of-turn token EOT .
The agent then enters the listener loop.
When the interviewee agent receives and interprets the end-of-turn token,
it takes the floor, entering the speaker loop and selecting a next move.
The agent keeps the floor and, as there are no accept or reject acts in
the private agenda, the role function select-goal chooses one of the two
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statement acts at random, say, Statement(s1). The dialogue game func-
tion select-obligation returns (ie, acceptance@(1)) which, when analysed
by the conversational domain function analyse-obligation, gives the set
{Accept((ir, Question(q1)))}, taking the contents of the act from the pair
in the set of pending proposals, as specified in Section 5.1.5. Next, the
deliberation mechanism function select-next-act is called with arguments
Statement(s1) and Accept((ir, Question(q1))). The biased random test
with p = 0.33 in select-next-act fails, and the second argument is selected as
next act, meaning that the agent chooses to comply with the obligation. The
interviewee’s next dialogue move is then (ie, Accept((ir, Question(q1)))).
The interviewee agent updates the information state with the effects
of this move. The move is added at the end of the dialogue history and
the obligations are updated, discharging the acceptance and introducing an
obligation on the interviewee to provide a valid reply. The accept dialogue
move also causes the pending question proposal to be removed from the set




DialogueHistory = 〈(ir, Question(q1)),
(ie, Accept((ir, Question(q1))))〉
PrivateAgenda = {Statement(s1), Statement(s3)}




Next, the interviewee agent generates the utterance corresponding to the
move and sends it to the interviewer. As specified in Section 5.1.3, the
utterance generated for the move (ie, Accept((ir, Question(q1)))) is “Let
me try to explain this.”.
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The interviewer agent receives and interprets this utterance. As it is
not the empty move, it updates the information state and waits for another
utterance. After the update, the information state is:
isir =

DialogueHistory = 〈(ir, Question(q1)),
(ie, Accept((ir, Question(q1))))〉
PrivateAgenda = {Question(q2)}




The interviewee agent decides whether to release the floor. In this case,
we use a parameter q = 0.8 for the biased random function release-floor, so
the random function would succeed with probability 0.55 (cf. Appendix D).
The trial fails, so the agent keeps the floor and selects another move. Again,
the role function select-goal chooses the act Statement(s1). The dialogue
game function select-obligation returns (ie, valid-reply@(1) C) which,
when analysed by the conversational domain function analyse-obligation,
gives the set {Statement(s2)}, as specified in Section 5.1.5. The delib-
eration mechanism function select-next-act is then called with arguments
Statement(s1) and Statement(s2). This time, the biased random test suc-
ceeds, and the first argument, that is the private goal, is selected as the next
act. The interviewee’s next dialogue move is then (ie, Statement(s1)).
The interviewee agent updates the information state with the effects
of this move, adding it to the dialogue history and updating the private
agenda, the obligations and the set of pending proposals to include the
new statement. As the statement is not a valid reply, this introduces an
obligation on the interviewer to reject it (see Turn (2) in Appendix E). Also,
as the statement is in the interviewee’s private agenda, the act is removed
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from this field. The interviewee’s information state results as follows:
isie =





Obligations = 〈(ir, rejection@(3)), (ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉
Proposals = {((ir, rejection@(3))), (ie, Statement(s1)))}
CurrentQuestion = Question(q1)

Next, the interviewee agent generates the utterance corresponding to the
move and sends it to the interviewer. As specified in Section 5.1.3, the
utterance generated is “The numbers are worse than we expected, but this
Government is working hard to correct the situation.”. The interviewee
again decides whether to release the floor. This time, the trial succeeds and
the end-of-turn token is sent to the interviewer.








Obligations = 〈(ir, rejection@(3)), (ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉
Proposals = {((ir, rejection@(3)), (ie, Statement(s1)))}
CurrentQuestion = Question(q1)

After receiving the end-of-turn token, the interviewer agent selects a new
move. Again, select-goal returnsQuestion(q2). The function select-obligation
returns the only obligation on the interviewer, (ir, rejection@(3)). As
defined at the end of Section 5.1.5, the conversational domain module func-
tion analyse-obligation returns two dialogue acts for this obligation: an ex-
plicit rejection act and the question under discussion which works as an im-
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plicit rejection, {Reject((ie, Statement(s1))), Question(q1)}. One of these
acts is selected at random, in this case Question(q1), and passed on to the
deliberation mechanism. The random trial fails in select-next-act, so the
second act is selected, giving the move (ir, Question(q1)). The information
state is updated with this move, discharging the obligation and removing
the only element in the set of pending proposals:
isir =










The interviewer generates and sends the utterance: “That’s not answering
the question.”. Then, the release-turn random function succeeds and the
interviewer releases the floor and sends the end-of-turn token.
Concurrently, the interviewee receives the first of these moves and up-
dates the information state to:
isie =










After receiving the end-of-turn token, the interviewee agent takes the floor
and selects a next move. This time, select-goal returns Statement(s3). As
before, select-obligation and analyse-obligation give Statement(s2). The
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deliberation mechanism function select-next-act is called with these two
acts as arguments. The trial now fails, favouring the agent’s obligation, and
the second act is returned, making (ie, Statement(s2)) the next move. The
agent then updates the information state, resulting in:
isie =







Obligations = 〈(ir, acceptance@(5))〉
Proposals = {((ir, acceptance@(5)), (ie, Statement(s2)))}
CurrentQuestion = Question(q1)

The utterance corresponding to this act is generated and sent to the other
party: “It was due to a combination of seasonal factors and a sudden rise in
the price of commodities on the international market.”.










Obligations = 〈(ir, acceptance@(5))〉
Proposals = {((ir, acceptance@(5)), (ie, Statement(s2)))}
CurrentQuestion = Question(q1)

The interviewee decides whether to release the floor. The trial fails, so
the agent selects another move. The role function returns Statement(s3),
while the dialogue game function returns None, as there are no obligations
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left on the interviewee. The deliberation mechanism is then called with
Statement(s3) and None as arguments. The trial succeeds, so the first one,
the private goal, is selected to form the next move (ie, Statement(s3)). The
interviewee’s information state, updated with the effects of this move, is:
isie =








Obligations = 〈(ir, rejection@(6)), (ir, acceptance@(5))〉
Proposals = {((ir, acceptance@(5)), (ie, Statement(s2))),
((ir, rejection@(6)), (ie, Statement(s3)))}
CurrentQuestion = Question(q1)

The utterance corresponding to this move is generated and sent to the in-
terviewer agent as: “But we are working hard to correct the situation” (cf.
Table 5.1). The interviewee then decides whether to release the floor. Now
the trial succeeds and the end-of-turn token is sent to the interviewer.
After receiving and interpreting the first of these utterances, the inter-
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viewer updates the information state to:
isir =








Obligations = 〈(ir, rejection@(6)), (ir, acceptance@(5))〉
Proposals = {((ir, acceptance@(5)), (ie, Statement(s2))),
((ir, rejection@(6)), (ie, Statement(s3)))}
CurrentQuestion = Question(q1)

The end-of-turn token follows, so the interviewer takes the floor and select a
new move. The role module gives the goalQuestion(q2) and select-obligation
chooses one of the two obligations on the interviewer, (ir, acceptance@(5))
for instance, which is analysed as the set {Accept(ie, Statements(s2))}. The
deliberation mechanism is then called with arguments Question(q2) and
Accept(ie, Statements(s2)). The random function fails and the second act,
that is the obligation, is selected, making (ir, Accept(ie, Statements(s2)))
the next move. The updated information state for the interviewer is:
isir =









Obligations = 〈(ir, valid-question N), (ir, rejection@(6))〉
Proposals = {((ir, rejection@(6)), (ie, Statement(s3)))}
CurrentQuestion = None

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The utterance for this move is generated and sent as “That’s clear enough.”.
The function release-floor fails, so the interviewer selects another move.
The role gives again the goal Question(q2). The function select-obligation
returns (ir, rejection@(6)), the only obligation on the interviewer, which is
analysed by the conversational domain. As the current question is None, the
analysis results in {Reject((ie, Statement(s3))}. The deliberation mechan-
ism is called and the trial succeeds favouring the private goal. The inter-













Obligations = 〈(ie, rejection@(8)), (ir, valid-question N),
(ir, rejection@(6))〉
Proposals = {((ir, rejection@(6)), (ie, Statement(s3))),
((ie, rejection@(8)), (ir, Question(q2)))}
CurrentQuestion = None

The utterance is generated and sent as “Could you please tell us the price
of a pint of milk in China?”. The interviewer then deliberates on whether
to release the floor, which succeeds, so the end-of-turn token is sent to the
other agent.
Upon receiving the first move, the interviewee agent interprets it and
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updates the information state to:
isie =









Obligations = 〈(ir, valid-question N), (ir, rejection@(6))〉
Proposals = {((ir, rejection@(6)), (ie, Statement(s3)))}
CurrentQuestion = None

After the second move, the interviewee’s information state is :
isie =










Obligations = 〈(ie, rejection@(8)), (ir, valid-question N),
(ir, rejection@(6))〉
Proposals = {((ir, rejection@(6)), (ie, Statement(s3))),
((ie, rejection@(8)), (ir, Question(q2)))}
CurrentQuestion = None

With the end-of-turn token, the interviewee takes the floor, selecting a next
move. As the private agenda is empty, select-goal returns None. The dia-
logue game function select-obligation returns (ie, rejection@(8)), which
analysed by the conversational domain gives {Reject((ir, Question(q2)))}.
The deliberation mechanism is called and the rejection is selected, giving
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(ie, Reject((ir, Question(q2)))) as the next move:
isie =











Obligations = 〈(ir, valid-question N), (ir, rejection@(6))〉
Proposals = {((ir, rejection@(6)), (ie, Statement(s3)))}
CurrentQuestion = None

The corresponding utterance is generated and sent to the interviewer as
“I suppose you don’t expect me to answer that question.”. The agent then
decides whether to release the floor, which succeeds, so the end-of-turn token
is sent to the interviewer.














Obligations = 〈(ir, valid-question N), (ir, rejection@(1))〉
Proposals = {((ir, rejection@(1)), (ie, Statement(s3)))}
CurrentQuestion = None

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After receiving the end-of-turn token, the interviewer takes the floor and
selects a next move. The function select-goal gives None. As before,
select-obligation returns (ir, rejection@(6))14, which analysed by the do-
main becomes the set {Reject((ie, Statement(s3)))}. The deliberation mech-
anism again favours the goal, None, which becomes the end-of-turn move
(ir, None). There is no information state update and the end-of-turn token
is sent to the interviewer.
Upon receiving this the interviewer selects a new move. As the agenda
is empty and there are no obligations on the interviewee, the deliberation
mechanism is called with two None arguments. Regardless of the outcome
of the random trial, the next move is the empty move and the agent releases
the floor.
As the last two turns were empty turns, the dialogue ends.
5.2.2 Generating a Fully Cooperative Alternative
Let us now see how we to generate the dialogue in Figure 5.5, in which
both participants follow the rules of the game. We make both agents fully
cooperative we set p = 0 in their deliberation mechanism. This means that
the function select-next-act will always choose the argument corresponding
to an obligation when selecting a dialogue act.
14This option might appear unrealistic at this stage in the dialogue. The invalid reply
is quite far back in the dialogue history what could affect the coherence of a rejection
at this point – although good phrasing could make it fit naturally (e.g. “Your earlier
remark on the position of the Government was not dealing with my question, but could
you please answer the following...”). An alternative would be to incorporate a dialogue
history threshold as we did in Chapter 4, letting agents disregard their obligations after
these have been in is.Obligations for a certain number of turns.
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Let me try to explain this.
It was due to a combination of seasonal factors and a 
sudden rise in the price of commodities on the 
international market. Interviewee
How do you explain the rise in the inflation rate for the 
last quarter, Mr Chancellor?
Interviewer
Right.
The numbers are worse than we expected, but this 
Government is working hard to correct the situation. Interviewee
That's clear enough.




Figure 5.5: A fully cooperative political interview (D2).












PrivateAgenda = {Statement(s1), Statement(s3)}




The interviewer then select the next act between Question(q2) and
Question(q1). The random trial with p = 0 fails in select-next-act , fa-
vouring the obligation, and the agent sends the utterance: “How do you
explain the rise in the inflation rate for the last quarter, Mr Chancellor?”
260 Chapter 5. Modelling Non-Cooperative Conversational Agents
and releases the floor. The updated information states are:
isir =

DialogueHistory = 〈(ir, Question(q1))〉
PrivateAgenda = {Question(q2)}
Obligations = 〈(ie, acceptance@(1))〉





DialogueHistory = 〈(ir, Question(q1))〉
PrivateAgenda = {Statement(s1), Statement(s3)}
Obligations = 〈(ie, acceptance@(1))〉
Proposals = {((ie, acceptance@(1)), (ir, Question(q1)))}
CurrentQuestion = None

Now, the interviewee agent selects a dialogue act between Statement(s1)
and Accept(ir, Question(q1)). The random trial fails in select-next-act and
the second act is chosen for the next move, favouring the agent’s obligation.




DialogueHistory = 〈(ir, Question(q1)),
(ie, Accept((ir, Question(q1))))〉
PrivateAgenda = {Question(q2)}






DialogueHistory = 〈(ir, Question(q1)),
(ie, Accept((ir, Question(q1))))〉
PrivateAgenda = {Statement(s1), Statement(s3)}




The interviewee keeps the floor, selecting a new act. The deliberation mech-
anism is called with arguments Statement(s3) and Statement(s2). The
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second is selected and the agent utters “It was due to a combination of
seasonal factors and a sudden rise in the price of commodities on the inter-
national market.”. The updated information states are:
isir =





Obligations = 〈(ir, acceptance@(3))〉





DialogueHistory = 〈(ir, Question(q1)),
(ie, Accept((ir, Question(q1)))),
(ie, Statement(s2))〉
PrivateAgenda = {Statement(s1), Statement(s3)}
Obligations = 〈(ir, acceptance@(3))〉
Proposals = {((ir, acceptance@(3)), (ie, Statement(s2)))}
CurrentQuestion = Question(q1)

The interviewee releases the floor and the interviewer selects a next
act between Question(q2) and Accept((ie, Statement(s2)). The second is
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isie =





PrivateAgenda = {Statement(s1), Statement(s3)}




The interviewer keeps the floor and chooses the second of Question(q2) and
Question(q3), uttering “Can you comment on the position of your office
regarding the inflation rate?”. The information states are:
isir =







Obligations = 〈(ie, acceptance@(5))〉










PrivateAgenda = {Statement(s1), Statement(s3)}
Obligations = 〈(ie, acceptance@(5))〉
Proposals = {((ie, acceptance@(5)), (ir, Question(q3)))}
CurrentQuestion = None

The floor is released and the interviewee selects the next contribution
between Statement(s3) and Accept((ir, Question(q3))). The second is
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chosen and the agent utters “Right.”. The resulting information states are:
isir =




















PrivateAgenda = {Statement(s1), Statement(s3)}




The interviewer keeps the floor and chooses another act between
Statement(s3) and Statement(s1). The second is selected by the delib-
eration mechanism and the agent utters “The numbers are worse than we
expected, but this Government is working hard to correct the situation.”.
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The information states after this move are:
isir =









Obligations = 〈(ir, acceptance@(7))〉













Obligations = 〈(ir, acceptance@(7))〉
Proposals = {((ir, acceptance@(7)), (ie, Statement(s1)))}
CurrentQuestion = Question(q3)

Note that in this case, one of the elements of the interviewee’s private agenda
was removed, as the goal was achieved by following the obligation.
The interviewer releases the floor and the interviewee selects a next move.
The private goal is again Question(q2) and the obligation act
Accept((ie, Statement(s1))). The second is chosen and the interviewer ut-
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ters “Thank you.” and releases the floor. The information states are:
isir =





























The interviewee takes the floor and chooses the next act between
Statement(s3) and, as there are no obligations to discharge, None, select-
ing the second and sending the end-of-turn token to the other agent. Then,
the interviewer chooses between Question(q2) and, as there are no valid
questions left in the conversational domain, None, selecting the second and
sending the end-of-turn token to the interviewee. As turns were empty twice
in a row, the dialogue ends.
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5.2.3 A Note on p and the Degree of Non-Cooperation
Following the process described above, it would be possible to generate dia-
logues in which the agents exhibit different levels of cooperation by changing
the value of the parameter p. For instance, to generate an interview similar
to dialogue D3 (cf. Section 5.1.6), in which the interviewer is fully cooper-
ative but the interviewee does not always follow the rules of the dialogue
game, we would set p = 0 for the interviewer agent and p = 0.5 for the
interviewee agent.
Moreover, the values for p not necessarily need to remain constant through-
out the dialogue. By incorporating the mechanism for measuring coopera-
tion that we presented in Chapter 4, at any point in the dialogue, agents
could assess each other’s behaviour and adjust their own p values accord-
ingly15. This would allow, for example, the implementation of a tit-for-tat
strategy, in which an agent starts behaving cooperatively (p = 0) and later
on, e.g. after every other turn, adopts the degree of non-cooperation of the
other party as the new value for p. A similar approach would allow us to
simulate escalation, a situation in which both agents adjust the value of p
to be slightly higher than the degree of non-cooperation of the other party.
With such a mechanism, agents could also measure their own degree
of non-cooperation, and make adjustments accordingly. As we use random
probabilistic functions, it would be possible for an agent to act significantly
more or less cooperatively than the value suggested by p, especially in rather
short exchanges in which the probability distribution of the actual random
trials might not be sufficiently close to that indicated by the parameter.
15As the interpretation of moves in terms of actions levels depends on the current
information state, agents would also have to keep the action labels corresponding to the
moves they perform as part of the dialogue history. These would then be readily available
as input to the mechanism for measuring de degree of non-cooperation.
5.3. Comparison with Related Approaches 267
Agents could then increase or decrease the value of p dynamically to allow
for adjustments.
5.3 Comparison with Related Approaches to Mod-
elling Conversational Agents
The modelling approach for conversational agents described and illustrated
in the previous sections bears some similarities with previous research:
• The interaction structured in terms of the performance of dialogue
acts follows on Traum and Hinkelman’s (1992) conversation acts, on
the dialogue acts of the Discourse Resource Initiative (Initiative,
1997; Poesio and Traum, 1998) and on the ISO 24617-2 standard
recently proposed by Bunt and others (Bunt et al., 2012). These are
extensions of speech act theory (Searle, 1969) to account for turn-
taking, grounding, the exchange of information, the management of
underlying task, etc.
• The use of a central structure, the information state, to keep track
of the informational elements throughout the conversation can be
traced back to Poesio and Traum’s conversational score (Poesio
and Traum, 1997; Poesio and Traum, 1998), to Ginzburg’s dialogue
gameboard (Ginzburg, 1996; Ginzburg, 1997; Ginzburg, 2012), to
Piwek’s (1998) conversational store, to Beun’s cognitive state –
which he also refers to as game-board (Beun, 2001) –, and more
closely to the information state update tradition put forward in
the context of the Trindi project (Poesio et al., 1999; Traum et al.,
1999; Larsson and Traum, 2000; Traum and Larsson, 2003; Kreutel
and Matheson, 2003b).
• The notion of a current question to condition the adequacy of replies is
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distantly inspired by Ginzburg’s question under discussion (Gin-
zburg, 1997; Ginzburg, 2012).
• The structure and management of proposals, introduced by one of the
dialogue participants and either accepted or rejected by the other is
based on Clark’s joint actions, more specifically on those at level 4
of the action ladder, that is the notion of joint projects (Clark,
1996, Chapter 7).
• The focus on discourse obligations to deal with non-cooperation in dia-
logue was first proposed by Traum and Allen (1994). Discourse obliga-
tions are part of PTT, the theory of dialogue developed by Poesio and
Traum (1997; 1998) and partially implemented in the EDIS dialogue
system (Matheson et al., 2000), with emphasis on grounding. Dis-
course obligations are central to obligation-driven dialogue mod-
elling (Kreutel and Matheson, 1999; Kreutel and Matheson, 2000;
Kreutel and Matheson, 2003b) where they are proposed as the primit-
ives from which other structures such as intentions and local dialogue
games can be derived.
Nonetheless, our modelling approach departs from those mentioned above
in several key aspects:
• The taxonomy of dialogue acts is minimalistic in comparison to those
in the Discourse Resource Initiative, Poesio and Traum’s theory and
Bunt and others’ ISO standard. Instead of a hierarchy in which a move
can be decomposed into several moves at lower levels of interaction,
we consider a flat taxonomy of the dialogue acts for the purpose of
analysing the dynamics of discourse obligations. This is even simpler
than the taxonomy we used in Chapter 4 to annotate the corpus of
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political interviews and the one used in the prototypes described in
the next section. The lack of an explicit semantic representation for
the content of dialogue acts and the omission of responsive dialogue
acts beyond acceptances and rejections are the main differences. This
is in line with the simplifying assumptions listed at the beginning of
Section 5.1 and compensated by the use of action labels that operate as
pragmatic interpretations of the performance of these simple dialogue
act in context.
• In the information state update tradition, state changes are specified
by a collection of independent update rules, whose preconditions ac-
tivate after certain dialogue moves and in certain values of the inform-
ation state. A second set of selection rules then determines which rules
are applied from the set of active rules until no rules can be applied.
This approach is well-suited for the construction of experimental dia-
logue system, allowing for incremental escalation and improvement by
the addition, subtraction or modification of these independent rules.
However, the resulting dynamics is harder to describe and analyse, as
the extent to which these rules interfere with each other is difficult to
trace – something noted by Bos et al. (2003) when describing DIP-
PER, a Java reimplementation of the TrindiKit information update
engine that dispenses with selection rules. We abandoned the use of
independent rules to update the information state in favour of a cent-
ralised control algorithm that determined the sequence in which the
functions in each module are activated.
• While Ginzburg’s question under discussion (qud) is represented as a
stack, allowing for several questions to be open for discussion at the
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same time, our current question holds a single value. The mechanism
by which questions are placed and removed from this field is also con-
siderably simpler than Ginzburg’s. In our model a question becomes
the current question only after it is proposed by one of the parties and
accepted by the other. The question ceases to be the current ques-
tions either by being resolved, that is after a statement by one of the
parties is accepted as a reply by the other participant, or by being
replaced by a new question. This is considerably simpler than Gin-
zburg’s qud-downdating, especially as acceptances and rejections
are not negotiated in our model, in part to prevent potentially infin-
ite chains (e.g. the acceptance of a rejection of an acceptance of an
acceptance. . . ).
• Clark’s joint actions ladder considers four levels of interaction, three of
which are not part of our model as per the assumptions listed in Section
5.1 that the coding and decoding of the participant’s utterances in
terms of dialogue acts is flawless (so no grounding mechanisms are
needed) and that the conversational domain and the dialogue game are
equal, so the interpretations of those dialogue acts in terms of action
labels and discourse obligations is the same for both participants. It
is only at level four, that of proposing and taking up or declining a
joint project that our agents can operate. Clark (1996, Chapter 7)
considers four possible outcomes to the joint actions in level 4:
1. Success: the hearer takes up on the proposed task
2. Partial success: the hearer takes up on an alternative project
3. Failure: the hearer declines
4. Breakdown: the hearer abandons the exchange
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The second of these outcomes is not explicitly part of our model, but
could result, for instance from hearers accepting a proposal but then
failing to carry out their part of the task (e.g. an interviewer accepting
a question but failing to provide a valid answer).
• Our treatment of discourse obligations is more straightforward than
in Poesio and Traum’s theory (Poesio and Traum, 1998) and in the
implementation as a dialogue system described by Matheson et al.
(2000). In their approach, obligations are passed through a grounding
mechanism in the same way as dialogue acts. Instead, in our approach
they are outside the scope of any grounding mechanisms: discourse
obligations are a direct consequence of the dialogue acts performed by
the speakers and operate immediately once those dialogue acts have
been grounded. Kreutel and Matheson (2003b) also dispense with
grounding obligations, although they suggest that a future extension
of their approach would incorporate grounding mechanism in the tra-
dition of Poesio and Traum’s theory. A second simplification with
respect to these authors is the absence of conditional updates that can
introduce obligations based on the performance of subsequent dialogue
acts. This effect is instead specified in the rules of the dialogue game
which in turn is the most salient difference between our treatment of
obligations and that in the work mentioned above. All the research fol-
lowing Traum and Allen’s (1994) introduction of discourse obligations
has regarded the rules that govern the introduction and discharge of
obligations as part of the theory of dialogue under consideration. As
far as we know, this is the first approach in which these rules are made
explicitly dependent of the type of interaction and detached from other
aspects of conversational interaction.
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5.4 Prototype Implementation
In devising the concepts and mechanisms presented in this chapter and many
of those discussed earlier in the thesis, we implemented a prototype of non-
cooperative conversational agents that can interact with each other and also
separately with a human user simulating a political interview.
The agents borrow some elements from py-trindikit (Ljunglo¨f, 2009),
a Python implementation of the TrindiKit dialogue toolkit (Larsson et al.,
2000; Larsson and Traum, 2000). Changes were made so that two agents
could interact with each other, as well as with the user as originally intended
in TrindiKit. The system consists of three modules:
nca types.py: defines basic data structures (e.g. stack, stackset) and types
for representing semantic and pragmatic data, independent of the dia-
logue theory (e.g. Move, Question, Prop). Follows closely the imple-
mentation of their elements in py-trindikit (Ljunglo¨f, 2009).
nca.py: defines abstract and domain-independent aspects of a theory of
conversational agents able to display and deal with non cooperative
behaviour16: InfoState, Game, Domain, Deliberation, Agent (Role)
and Moves (Dialogue Act Taxonomy). The dialogue acts are organised
as follows:
• Turn taking: Greet, Quit
• Core: Ask (containing a Question), Assert (containing a Prop),
Answer (containing a Question), Address (Reject or Accept, con-
taining another move)
16These roughly correspond to the elements described in Section 5.1 given in parenthesis
when the name differs significantly.
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twist.py : implements the system, with concrete classes for the game (In-
terview), which is shared by both agents and specifies what happens
after each move, plus other domain-specific aspects (e.g. relevance of
answers with respect to questions, the topical agenda); the roles (In-
terviewer and Interviewee), with a specification of the control sequence
and instances of the deliberation mechanism; the user (User), to al-
low for interaction with either of the pre-defined roles; and the main
function that creates two child processes running each participant and
connects them through bidirectional pipes.
The level of cooperation of each agent is chosen by setting a runtime
parameter called lnc that can take 5 possible values:
• lnc = 0, favouring obligations
• lnc = 1, random choice with bias towards obligations
• lnc = 2, random choice without bias
• lnc = 3, random choice with bias towards private goals
• lnc = 4, favouring private goals
The implementation of the agents departs from the information state
update approach in that the changes in the state are controlled explicitly,
rather than by means of update rules that are triggered automatically by the
dialogue management engine once their preconditions are met. However, it
is possible to put these in terms of transition rules in a finite state machine
as sketched in Figures 5.6 and 5.7. The notation is as follows:
• Green states are initial.
• Red states are final.
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• Blue states are deliberation points in which the agent must decide
between favouring obligations or private goals.
• Preconditions to a transition appear before the symbol ---> and are
dialogue acts performed by others or auxiliary functions that evaluate
to a boolean value.
• Effects of transitions appear after the symbol ---> and can be dialogue
acts performed by self, auxiliary functions or changes to the informa-
tion state (obligations only).
The code of the current prototype system is available from the author. Fu-
ture work includes updating it to include all the elements in the model
described above and an analysis-by-synthesis study on the resulting simu-
lations, to assess the extent to which the degree of cooperation effectively
grows as we increase the value of the runtime parameters that control the
level to which each agent favours discourse obligations over private goals.
5.5 Summary
This chapter proposed a model of conversational agents that can deal and
exhibit linguistic behaviour with varying degrees of cooperation. With a
focus on dialogue management, we achieve this by incorporating and reason-
ing about the concepts, structures and algorithms introduced and evaluated
earlier in the thesis.
We started with a description of the elements that make up the cognitive
architecture of the agents and explained the simplifying assumptions that
we made in order to focus the discussion on the management of coopera-

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































    











    











    


















    












    












    


















    









    









    



































































































































































































































































Figure 5.6: A finite state machine specifying the interviewer prototype






























































































































































































































    











    











    


















    












    












    



















    









    









    









    

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5.7: A finite state machine specifying the interviewee prototype
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assumptions. By allowing potential mismatches in the understanding of ut-
terances it would be possible to explore the relation between grounding and
linguistic cooperation. Considering small differences in the dialogue games
or in the conversational domains held by each agent would allow for an ex-
ploration of cases in which departures from expected behaviour result from
different mindsets and cultural backgrounds rather than from egoistic goals.
We will come back to this in the next chapter.
The way in which the components of the agents operate with each other
to model dialogue behaviour was illustrated by showing in detail how a
hand-crafted political interview could result from a simulation. We also
showed how a simple change of parameters can lead to interactions with very
different degrees of linguistic cooperation. These exercises use two biased
random functions to decide whether agents favour their obligations or their
private goals and whether they release the floor after each contribution.
Although these design decisions introduced non-determinism, they allowed
us to abstract from the reasons why dialogue participants decide one way
or another and to focus on the management of their actual behaviours with
respect to the expectations specified by the rules of the dialogue game.
Incorporating a mechanism by which agents can reason on the desirability
of their actions in terms of utilities and negative consequences is left as
future work.
We continued with a discussion on the differences and similarities of our
approach with related research. Particular attention is paid to the line of
research in which dialogue management is modelled on the basis of discourse
obligations (Traum and Allen, 1994; Poesio and Traum, 1998; Matheson et
al., 2000; Kreutel and Matheson, 2003b) and of information state updates.
The chapter closes with the description of a prototype that incorporates
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some of the elements in the conversational agents. The implementation of
the system informed the research and helped devising the approach presen-
ted in the thesis. A complete implementation of the model as described
above is left as future work. It should be a straightforward task, given the
level of detail in the formalisation of each module. A natural next step
would then be to generate a large set of dialogues which could be automat-
ically analysed by applying the measure described in Chapter 4 to check
that the degree of cooperation effectively grows as we increase the value of
the runtime parameters that control the extent to which each agent favours




This thesis addresses a range of phenomena in natural language dialogue
that we referred to as linguistic non-cooperation. Owing to the assumption
that dialogue participants cooperate fully in order to complete a task by
means of linguistic interaction, these phenomena are often neglected in dia-
logue research. We identify and characterise them formally by means of a
global dialogue game (i.e a set of rules for introducing and discharging dis-
course obligations), which captures the behaviour conventionally expected
from each participant for a given type of conversation as adopted by a com-
munity of language users. Linguistic non-cooperation is defined to occur
when participants break these rules by failing to discharge their discourse
obligations. We propose a semi-automatic empirical measure of the extent
to which the actions of each participant are within the rules of the dialogue
game – that is, the degree of linguistic cooperation of a speaker with respect
to a conversational setting. This measure is instantiated for a specific dia-
logue type, political interviews, and evaluated by means of a corpus study.
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We assess the reliability and validity of the measure, by testing, respectively,
inter-annotator agreement and correlation with human judgement. Finally,
we propose an architecture for conversational agents that incorporate these
concepts and mechanisms as part of their dialogue management model. We
show how this model allows for the simulation of a dialogues in which the
degree of cooperation of the participants varied notably, by controlling how
often the agents favoured their private goals versus their obligations.
6.1 Original Contributions of the Thesis
This thesis makes the following original contributions to knowledge:
• A definition of cooperative and non-cooperative linguistic behaviour
in dialogue, which combines the notions of discourse obligations and
dialogue games to specify appropriate behaviour, and allows for the
detection of inappropriate actions. The definition is formalised and
fully specified for the political interview conversational setting.
• A coding scheme for the manual segmentation, annotation and clas-
sification of linguistic behaviour in political interviews. The coding
scheme is supported by domain-independent tools, and evaluated for
reliability on a corpus of political interviews.
• A domain-independent, automatic method for measuring non-coop-
erative linguistic behaviour empirically in annotated dialogue. The
method is fully implemented, and evaluated for validity on a corpus of
political interviews.
• A domain-independent, formal and implementable model of conversa-
tional agents that incorporates the concepts and mechanisms above,
combining them with the other elements and functions involved in con-
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versation. We show how this addition allows for the generation of a
wider range of dialogues, by manipulating parameters that control how
agents weigh discourse obligations and private goals when deciding on
their contributions.
Let us see where these contributions stand with respect to the research
question stated in Chapter 1:
RQ: What elements are needed in a computational model of
conversational agents so that they can exhibit and cope
with non-cooperative as well as cooperative linguistic
behaviour in dialogue, in particular in the domain of
political interviews?
The answer to this question, in the light of the results presented in previous
chapters, consists of the following elements:
• A set of dialogue acts which are the conversational actions that
agents can perform and interpret, such as asking questions, making
statements, etc. This is a basic requirement both for cooperative and
non-cooperative dialogue.
• A global dialogue game: the set of rules that establishes how dis-
course obligations resulting from the performance of dialogue acts are
introduced and discharged throughout the conversation. In partic-
ular for political interviews these rules state that interviewers are
bound to asking questions and politicians to providing answers. Ques-
tions should be neutral, relevant and reasonable, while answers should
provide all the information requested, and so forth.
• A specification of the agents’ conversational roles, including their
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agendas of private goals. In political interviews the roles are the inter-
viewer and the interviewee. Respectively, their goals include asking a
specific set of questions and delivering a specific set of key messages.
• A structure, the information state, for maintaining a record of the
dialogue history, pending obligations and private goals, and a set of
update rules specifying how the state changes after the performance
of each dialogue act.
• A cooperation measuring mechanism for interpreting dialogue
acts – their own and those of the other party – in terms of how ap-
propriate they are with respect to the dialogue game. In political
interviews this mechanism will allow the agent to establish whether a
question is adequate or not, whether a statement constitutes a valid
reply to a question, etc.
• A deliberation mechanism allowing the agents to decide whether
to discharge an obligation or favour a private goal at the moment of
producing their contributions.
6.2 Future Work
The research presented in this thesis opens up several lines of future work,
from extensions to the model to address aspects of dialogue we have not
dealt with, to a complete implementation of the agents, to the application
of the approach to other conversational domains, to practical – and even
commercial – exploitation.
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6.2.1 Extensions to the Model
We have made a few simplifying assumptions in order to scope the research
to a project of manageable size. Basing the analysis on dialogue transcripts
means that we have not dealt with prosody, gestures and other multi-modal
aspects of dialogue interaction, as well as sub-utterance elements such as
interruptions, incomplete and overlapped speech, etc. Also, the assumption
that generation and interpretation are flawless and the omission of clarifica-
tion subdialogues allowed us to avoid dealing with grounding issues and their
connection with linguistic non-cooperation. The relaxation of each of these
assumptions would lead to extensions of the model, using the same approach
for dealing with non-cooperation: identifying a set of rules that capture ex-
pected behaviour at these levels of interaction, and detecting instances in
which these rules are broken.
A further line of exploration in this regard would be towards the auto-
mation of the empirical measure. Data-driven techniques using machine
learning could potentially be used to automatically annotate the dialogues
with the labels needed to assess the degree of cooperation. Further, we spec-
ulate that the rules of the dialogue game could be learned from a sufficiently
large corpus of interviews that are deemed conventional.
6.2.2 Implementation of Conversational Agents
The implementation described at the end of the previous chapter is incom-
plete and worked more as an aid to the research than as a testbed on which
to evaluate the feasibility of the model. However, the level of detail at which
the components of the agents have been described should allow for a rather
straightforward implementation. A complete implementation would involve
the development of one or more topical domains for the agents to talk about.
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The use of ontologies for knowledge representation, and of robust, state-of-
the-art natural language generation and understanding, would result in more
realistic interactions. This would in turn lead to the possibility of evaluating
the approach in practice, for instance by having human judges score the res-
ulting interactions between two artificial agents, and also between an agent
and a human interlocutor.
6.2.3 Applications of the Approach to other Domains
Although presented as generally domain-independent, the approach has been
proposed and evaluated in great detail for the domain of political interviews.
Similar applications to other conversational domains in which it is possible
to identify a set of rules of expected interaction would be most beneficial
in further assessing the suitability of the approach. Examples of such do-
mains include courtroom interrogations, tutoring sessions, doctor-patient
exchanges, customer care and many more.
6.2.4 Practical and Commercial Exploitation
The findings reported in this thesis can have a significant impact in real-
world scenarios. Practical applications include the semi-automatic – and
perhaps, eventually, automatic – analysis of political discourse in terms of
speaker compliance1, and the creation of virtual characters that interviewers
and politicians could use to train their interviewing and public speaking
skills. In other domains, including these mechanisms in existing dialogue
1This also applies to other domains in which it would be useful to automatically or semi-
automatically assess the behaviour of participants. In courtroom interaction, for instance,
the detection of violations of interrogation rules by either party would be of assistance to
judges in charge of keeping order. In customer care, the possibility of detecting deviation
from the expected conversation flow, or even instances of abuse and altercation, would
contribute in improving the quality of the service and prevent damages to the image of
the company.
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systems would lead to more natural and robust tutoring, personal assistant
and customer care agents. This prospect is appealing not only from the point
of view of academic research but also in commercial settings, potentially
increasing the quality of available solutions and leading to novel products
or services.
6.3 Concluding Remarks
Looking for an answer to the research question behind this thesis has shed
light on several areas of research in computational linguistics and political
dialogue. We revisited the works of conversational analysts, social psycholo-
gists and political scientists, providing a better understanding of the actions
of interviewers and politicians during an interview, of the consequences these
actions have on the dynamics of the dialogue, and of how all this is perceived
by the audience. The accuracy of our model of non-cooperative linguistic be-
haviour has implications beyond political interviews, and suggests that the
approach can be usefully applied to other conversational domains. In the
area of dialogue systems, a generalization of our results would lead to the de-
velopment of systems that can both perform and respond to non-cooperative
conversational behaviour, and that can act non-cooperatively, resulting in
increased flexibility, robustness and closeness to human behaviour. Finally,
as for general knowledge, this research provides a better understanding of
dialogue structure and pragmatics by looking at phenomena that have not
been addressed before. It is our hope that this work will attract the atten-
tion of an increasingly large number of researchers in politics, linguistics,
the computational modelling of conversation and beyond.
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Si el honor y la sabidur´ıa y la felicidad no son para mı´, que
sean para otros. Que el cielo exista, aunque mi lugar sea el
infierno. Que yo sea ultrajado y aniquilado, pero que en un
instante, en un ser, Tu enorme Biblioteca se justifique.
La Biblioteca de Babel
Jorge Luis Borges
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This appendix contains the materials involved in the annotation study de-
scribed in Section 4.3. These include the transcript of one of the interviews
fragments in the corpus as given to the annotators in each stage, the an-
notation guidelines and a description of the annotation tool used in the
study. Further materials are available at http://mcs.open.ac.uk/nlg/
non-cooperation/.
A.1 Corpus of Political Interviews
The following six interview fragments were used in the annotation study:
Interview Turns Words
1. Brodie and Blair 16 734
2. Green and Miliband 9 526
3. O’Reilly and Hartman 19 360
4. Paxman and Osborne 16 272
5. Pym and Osborne 10 595
6. Shaw and Thatcher 18 1069
Total 88 3556
The transcripts were selected from a larger set of 15 interviews collected
from publicly available sources (BBC News, CNN, Youtube, etc.)1. When
1Copyright of all media and transcripts belongs to the respective broadcasting com-
pany. Interviews 1, 2, 4 and 5 are property of the British Broadcasting Company (BBC).
Interview 3 is property of Fox News Network, L.L.C. Interview 6 is property of Cable
News Network, Inc. (CNN).
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available, official transcripts from the original source were used, with minor
modifications to reduce the number of functionally empty or split turns (e.g.
due to interruptions or overlapped speech). Otherwise, the interviews were
transcribed from video or audio taken from the source. The following table
lists the sources for the interview fragments in the corpus2:
Interview Source
1. Brodie and Blair http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/1552265.stm
2. Green and Miliband http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-13971770
3. O’Reilly and Hartman http://mediamatters.org/items/200801220012
4. Paxman and Osborne http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XGWcSkCu69c
5. Pym and Osborne http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-12275973
6. Shaw and Thatcher http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9706/30/thatcher.transcript/
The transcript and a brief description of the context of Interview 1
are given below as received by the annotators in each annotation stage.
The rest of the corpus is available online at http://mcs.open.ac.uk/nlg/
non-cooperation/.
A.1.1 First Annotation Stage: Segmenting Turns
In the first stage, annotators received the transcripts without any annota-
tions, other than the division of turns as spoken by each speaker.
Interview 1: Brodie and Blair
Context. Shortly after 11 September 2001, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair
is interviewed by Alex Brodie for BBC World Service’s Newshour on the role
of the UK after the terrorist attacks.
Transcript.
Turn Spkr. Speech
0 ir Is Osama Bin Laden your prime suspect?
1 ie He is the prime suspect. We are still assembling the evidence and we
have said we will do so in a careful and measured way. But we’ve
known for some time of his activities and those of his associates, that
have been designed to spread terror around the world that are I believe
fundamentally contrary to the basic teachings of Islam. And in respect
of this particular incident there’s no doubt at all, as both ourselves and
President have said, he is the prime suspect.
2 ir Him alone or anybody else?
3 ie Well, when we assemble the evidence finally, we will present it to people.
But as we have said he is the prime suspect.
4 ir Have you seen evidence yourself?
2Online sources were last accessed in August 2013.
A.1. Corpus of Political Interviews 309
Turn Spkr. Speech
5 ie Yes of course, all the time we are going through evidence that comes
to us from various sources and what is important, as I said the other
day, is that when we proceed, we proceed on the basis of a hard-headed
assessment of that evidence. But I think, people are still taking in the
enormity of what happened last week. Thousands of people killed in the
worst terrorist incident of all time. This was the worst terrorist incident
in respect of British citizens, incidentally 200, 300 killed, since World
War II. When you think that Britain went through the Blitz when we
were under attack, day in day out, for several years and we lost just over
20,000 of our citizens. Here were 5,000 or more murdered, literally, in
a day and I think some impression is given of just how serious this is.
Let’s be quite clear as well, the thing that we have to confront and the
reason why we have to take action against this apparatus of terrorism
at every level, is that if these people were able to kill more people they
would. The only limits on their actions are not moral in any sense at
all, they are practical or technical.
6 ir Is it Osama Bin Laden who you have the evidence against that he was
actively involved in planning what happened in the United States or is
it just that you have evidence that he has set up a network?
7 ie Well Alex, when we are in a position to put evidence before people, we
will put it before them then. What we have said so far, because people
have asked us and it’s right because this is where the evidence tends,
that he is the prime suspect.
8 ir Anybody else?
9 ie There may be various other people but that is a matter that we can deal
with when we come to present the evidence fully.
10 ir And do you know where he is?
11 ie We know that he is in Afghanistan. We know the various places that
he has been. But it is important that other people co-operate with us
in ensuring that he is brought to justice and this is a situation in which
those who have been harbouring him or helping him have a very simple
choice. They either cease the protection of Bin Laden or they will be
treated as people helping him.
12 ir This is echoing what George Bush said isn’t it about how we will go not
just for the perpetrators but for those who harbour him, and you are
talking about the Taliban?
13 ie Well, for all those people who have been in a position where they have
been helping or harbouring terrorism, the way that it operates, camps
that are dedicated to training people in it. These are people trained
in these camps who go out and basically wreak havoc wherever they
can, killing many, many innocent people. And although what happened
last week is obviously an atrocity almost beyond our imagination, it is
not an isolated incident, in that sense, there has been a history going
back over several years. Now you mention the Taliban, the Taliban
have a very clear choice, the Taliban either cease to help or harbour
those that are fermenting terrorism or they will be treated as part of
the terrorist apparatus themselves. Now they have that choice and they
should consider very, very carefully the consequences that they face at
this moment of choice.
14 ir If they don’t give him up, what are those consequences?
15 ie Those are the consequences again that we will consider and we will
announce the appropriate response when we have made up our minds.
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A.1.2 Second Annotation Stage: Selecting Content Features
In the second stage, annotators received the dialogues segmented and annot-
ated with dialogue act functions and, when applicable, referent segments.
These partial annotations were obtained automatically as described in Sec-
tion 4.3.3.
Legend. Partial annotations are marked directly on the speech transcript.
Segment boundaries are indicated using square brackets and numbered se-
quentially. Inside the opening brackets, dialogue act functions are shown






Referent segments are indicated after the dialogue act function using the
“@” symbol and the number of the segment they point to. The following
marking in Interview 1, for example, identifies segment (4), with dialogue
act function Resp-Inform and referent segment (2):
(4)[3@(2) But as we have said he is the prime suspect.]
Interview 1: Brodie and Blair
Context. Shortly after 11 September 2001, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair
is interviewed by Alex Brodie for BBC World Service’s Newshour on the role
of the UK after the terrorist attacks.
Segmented and Partially Annotated Transcript.
Turn Spkr. Annotated Speech
0 ir (0)[2 Is Osama Bin Laden your prime suspect?]
1 ie (1)[3@(0) He is the prime suspect. We are still assembling the evidence
and we have said we will do so in a careful and measured way. But we’ve
known for some time of his activities and those of his associates, that
have been designed to spread terror around the world that are I believe
fundamentally contrary to the basic teachings of Islam. And in respect
of this particular incident there’s no doubt at all, as both ourselves and
President have said, he is the prime suspect.]
2 ir (2)[2 Him alone or anybody else?]
3 ie (3)[3@(2) Well, when we assemble the evidence finally, we will present
it to people.] (4)[3@(2) But as we have said he is the prime suspect.]
4 ir (5)[2 Have you seen evidence yourself?]
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5 ie (6)[3@(5) Yes of course, all the time we are going through evidence that
comes to us from various sources and what is important, as I said the
other day, is that when we proceed, we proceed on the basis of a hard-
headed assessment of that evidence.] (7)[3@(5) But I think, people
are still taking in the enormity of what happened last week. Thousands
of people killed in the worst terrorist incident of all time. This was
the worst terrorist incident in respect of British citizens, incidentally
200, 300 killed, since World War II. When you think that Britain went
through the Blitz when we were under attack, day in day out, for several
years and we lost just over 20,000 of our citizens. Here were 5,000 or
more murdered, literally, in a day and I think some impression is given
of just how serious this is.] (8)[3@(5) Let’s be quite clear as well, the
thing that we have to confront and the reason why we have to take
action against this apparatus of terrorism at every level, is that if these
people were able to kill more people they would. The only limits on their
actions are not moral in any sense at all, they are practical or technical.]
6 ir (9)[2 Is it Osama Bin Laden who you have the evidence against that he
was actively involved in planning what happened in the United States
or is it just that you have evidence that he has set up a network?]
7 ie (10)[3@(9) Well Alex, when we are in a position to put evidence before
people, we will put it before them then. What we have said so far,
because people have asked us and it’s right because this is where the
evidence tends, that he is the prime suspect.]
8 ir (11)[2 Anybody else?]
9 ie (12)[3@(1)1 There may be various other people but that is a matter
that we can deal with when we come to present the evidence fully.]
10 ir (13)[2 And do you know where he is?]
11 ie (14)[3@(1)3 We know that he is in Afghanistan. We know the various
places that he has been.] (15)[3@(1)3 But it is important that other
people co-operate with us in ensuring that he is brought to justice and
this is a situation in which those who have been harbouring him or
helping him have a very simple choice. They either cease the protection
of Bin Laden or they will be treated as people helping him.]
12 ir (16)[1 This is echoing what George Bush said isn’t it about how we will
go not just for the perpetrators but for those who harbour him] , (17)[2
and you are talking about the Taliban?]
13 ie (18)[3@(1)7 Well, for all those people who have been in a position
where they have been helping or harbouring terrorism, the way that it
operates, camps that are dedicated to training people in it. These are
people trained in these camps who go out and basically wreak havoc
wherever they can, killing many, many innocent people. And although
what happened last week is obviously an atrocity almost beyond our
imagination, it is not an isolated incident, in that sense, there has been
a history going back over several years.] (19)[3@(1)7 Now you men-
tion the Taliban, the Taliban have a very clear choice, the Taliban either
cease to help or harbour those that are fermenting terrorism or they will
be treated as part of the terrorist apparatus themselves. Now they
have that choice and they should consider very, very carefully the con-
sequences that they face at this moment of choice.]
14 ir (20)[2 If they don’t give him up, what are those consequences?]
15 ie (21)[3@(2)0 Those are the consequences again that we will consider
and we will announce the appropriate response when we have made up
our minds.]
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A.2 Annotation Tool
The annotation was carried out using a special-purpose tool3, deployed to
each annotator containing the annotation data. Among other features, the
tool guides the annotators through the dataset in a fixed order and can be
configured to operate according to each annotation stage.
The main window of the tool (Figure A.1) shows the interview context,
the turn transcripts and the annotations. Clicking on the annotation next
to a turn opens a window that allows the to segment and annotate the
turn. The tool, user guide and annotated examples are available at http:
//mcs.open.ac.uk/nlg/non-cooperation/.
Figure A.1: Annotation Tool (main window)
A.3 Annotation Guidelines
Annotators were given a set of guidelines for each stage with the definitions
and examples presented in Section 4.2. These can can be found at http:
//mcs.open.ac.uk/nlg/non-cooperation/. Together with the guidelines,
annotators received a brief introduction to the instructions and examples
before starting their annotations. They were asked to read the document
in detail and had a chance to ask questions about anything that needed
clarification.
3The tool was built based on the CODA D2MTool developed by Svetlana Stoyanchev





The method for automatically measuring the degree of cooperation and non-
cooperation of each speaker in annotated political interviews described in
Chapter 4 has been implemented in Java and applied to a corpus of annot-
ated interviews for evaluation. This appendix presents the output produced
by the implementation. It corresponds to Interview 1 in the corpus, which is




** Obligation (IR, valid-question) explicitly discharged by action (0) valid-question
OBL (1) [(IE, acceptance@0)]
DCF (1) [(IR, valid-question)]
DNF (1) []
SCF (1) [(0) valid-question ;]
SNF (1) []
(2)
IE (1) valid-reply @0 (C)
** Acknowledgment obligation (IE, acceptance@0) implicitly discharged by action (1) valid-reply @0 (C)
** Implicit obligation (IE, valid-reply@0) introduced.
** Obligation (IE, valid-reply@0) explicitly discharged by action (1) valid-reply @0 (C)
OBL (2) [(IR, acceptance@1)]
DCF (2) [(IE, acceptance@0),(IE, valid-reply@0)]
DNF (2) []




** Acknowledgment obligation (IR, acceptance@1) implicitly discharged by action (2) valid-question
** Implicit obligation (IR, valid-question) introduced.
** Obligation (IR, valid-question) explicitly discharged by action (2) valid-question
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OBL (3) [(IE, acceptance@2)]
DCF (3) [(IR, acceptance@1),(IR, valid-question)]
DNF (3) []
SCF (3) [(2) valid-question ;]
SNF (3) []
(4)
IE (3) valid-reply @2 (I)
IE (4) invalid-reply @2 (R) (I) {Reason: Repeated}
** Acknowledgment obligation (IE, acceptance@2) implicitly discharged by action (3) valid-reply @2 (I)
** Implicit obligation (IE, valid-reply@2) introduced.
OBL (4) [(IR, acceptance@3),(IR, rejection@4),(IE, valid-reply@2)]
DCF (4) [(IE, acceptance@2)]
DNF (4) [(IE, valid-reply@2)]
SCF (4) [(3) valid-reply @2 (I) ;]
SNF (4) [(4) invalid-reply @2 (R) (I) {Reason: Repeated};]
(5)
IR (5) valid-question
** Acknowledgment obligation (IR, acceptance@3) implicitly discharged by action (5) valid-question
** Implicit obligation (IR, valid-question) introduced.
** Obligation (IR, valid-question) explicitly discharged by action (5) valid-question
OBL (5) [(IE, acceptance@5),(IR, rejection@4),(IE, valid-reply@2)]
DCF (5) [(IR, acceptance@3),(IR, valid-question)]
DNF (5) [(IR, rejection@4)]
SCF (5) [(5) valid-question ;]
SNF (5) []
(6)
IE (6) valid-reply @5 (C)
IE (7) invalid-reply @5 (C) {Reason: Irrelevant}
IE (8) invalid-reply @5 (C) {Reason: Irrelevant}
** Acknowledgment obligation (IE, acceptance@5) implicitly discharged by action (6) valid-reply @5 (C)
** Implicit obligation (IE, valid-reply@5) introduced.
** Obligation (IE, valid-reply@5) explicitly discharged by action (6) valid-reply @5 (C)
OBL (6) [(IR, acceptance@6),(IR, rejection@7),(IR, rejection@8),(IR, rejection@4),(IE, valid-reply@2)]
DCF (6) [(IE, acceptance@5),(IE, valid-reply@5)]
DNF (6) [(IE, valid-reply@2)]
SCF (6) [(6) valid-reply @5 (C) ;]
SNF (6) [(7) invalid-reply @5 (C) {Reason: Irrelevant}; (8) invalid-reply @5 (C) {Reason: Irrelevant};]
(7)
IR (9) valid-question
** Acknowledgment obligation (IR, acceptance@6) implicitly discharged by action (9) valid-question
** Implicit obligation (IR, valid-question) introduced.
** Obligation (IR, valid-question) explicitly discharged by action (9) valid-question
OBL (7) [(IE, acceptance@9),(IR, rejection@7),(IR, rejection@8),(IR, rejection@4),(IE, valid-reply@2)]
DCF (7) [(IR, acceptance@6),(IR, valid-question)]
DNF (7) [(IR, rejection@7),(IR, rejection@8),(IR, rejection@4)]
SCF (7) [(9) valid-question ;]
SNF (7) []
(8)
IE (10) invalid-reply @9 (R) (I) {Reason: Repeated}
** Acknowledgment obligation (IE, acceptance@9) implicitly discharged
by action (10) invalid-reply @9 (R) (I) {Reason: Repeated}
** Implicit obligation (IE, valid-reply@9) introduced.
OBL (8) [(IR, rejection@10),(IE, valid-reply@9),(IR, rejection@7),(IR, rejection@8),
(IR, rejection@4),(IE, valid-reply@2)]
DCF (8) [(IE, acceptance@9)]
DNF (8) [(IE, valid-reply@9),(IE, valid-reply@2)]
SCF (8) []
SNF (8) [(10) invalid-reply @9 (R) (I) {Reason: Repeated};]
(9)
IR (11) repeated-valid-question (R)
** Acknowledgment obligation (IR, rejection@10) implicitly discharged
by action (11) repeated-valid-question (R)
OBL (9) [(IE, valid-reply@9),(IR, rejection@7),(IR, rejection@8),(IR, rejection@4),(IE, valid-reply@2)]
DCF (9) [(IR, rejection@10)]
DNF (9) [(IR, rejection@7),(IR, rejection@8),(IR, rejection@4)]
SCF (9) [(11) repeated-valid-question (R) ;]
SNF (9) []
(10)
IE (12) invalid-reply @11 (R) (I) {Reason: Repeated}




DNF (10) [(IE, valid-reply@9),(IE, valid-reply@2)]
SCF (10) []
SNF (10) [(12) invalid-reply @11 (R) (I) {Reason: Repeated};]
(11)
IR (13) valid-question
** Implicit obligation (IR, valid-question) introduced.
** Obligation (IR, valid-question) explicitly discharged by action (13) valid-question
OBL (11) [(IE, acceptance@13),(IR, rejection@12),(IE, valid-reply@9),(IR, rejection@7),(IR, rejection@8),
(IR, rejection@4),(IE, valid-reply@2)]
DCF (11) [(IR, valid-question)]
DNF (11) [(IR, rejection@12),(IR, rejection@7),(IR, rejection@8),(IR, rejection@4)]
SCF (11) [(13) valid-question ;]
SNF (11) []
(12)
IE (14) valid-reply @13 (C)
IE (15) invalid-reply @13 (C) {Reason: Irrelevant}
** Acknowledgment obligation (IE, acceptance@13) implicitly discharged by action (14) valid-reply @13 (C)
** Implicit obligation (IE, valid-reply@13) introduced.
** Obligation (IE, valid-reply@13) explicitly discharged by action (14) valid-reply @13 (C)
OBL (12) [(IR, acceptance@14),(IR, rejection@15),(IR, rejection@12),(IE, valid-reply@9),(IR, rejection@7),
(IR, rejection@8),(IR, rejection@4),(IE, valid-reply@2)]
DCF (12) [(IE, acceptance@13),(IE, valid-reply@13)]
DNF (12) [(IE, valid-reply@9),(IE, valid-reply@2)]
SCF (12) [(14) valid-reply @13 (C) ;]




** Acknowledgment obligation (IR, acceptance@14) implicitly discharged by action (16) valid-statement
** Implicit obligation (IR, valid-question) introduced.
** Obligation (IR, valid-question) explicitly discharged by action (17) valid-question
OBL (13) [(IE, acceptance@16),(IE, acceptance@17),(IR, rejection@15),(IR, rejection@12),(IE, valid-reply@9),
(IR, rejection@7),(IR, rejection@8),(IR, rejection@4),(IE, valid-reply@2)]
DCF (13) [(IR, acceptance@14),(IR, valid-question)]
DNF (13) [(IR, rejection@15),(IR, rejection@12),(IR, rejection@7),(IR, rejection@8),(IR, rejection@4)]
SCF (13) [(16) valid-statement ; (17) valid-question ;]
SNF (13) []
(14)
IE (18) valid-reply @17 (I)
IE (19) valid-reply @17 (C)
** Acknowledgment obligation (IE, acceptance@16) implicitly discharged by action (18) valid-reply @17 (I)
** Acknowledgment obligation (IE, acceptance@17) implicitly discharged by action (18) valid-reply @17 (I)
** Implicit obligation (IE, valid-reply@17) introduced.
** Obligation (IE, valid-reply@17) explicitly discharged by action (19) valid-reply @17 (C)
OBL (14) [(IR, acceptance@18),(IR, acceptance@19),(IR, rejection@15),(IR, rejection@12),(IE, valid-reply@9),
(IR, rejection@7),(IR, rejection@8),(IR, rejection@4),(IE, valid-reply@2)]
DCF (14) [(IE, acceptance@16),(IE, acceptance@17),(IE, valid-reply@17)]
DNF (14) [(IE, valid-reply@9),(IE, valid-reply@2)]




** Acknowledgment obligation (IR, acceptance@18) implicitly discharged by action (20) valid-question
** Acknowledgment obligation (IR, acceptance@19) implicitly discharged by action (20) valid-question
** Implicit obligation (IR, valid-question) introduced.
** Obligation (IR, valid-question) explicitly discharged by action (20) valid-question
OBL (15) [(IE, acceptance@20),(IR, rejection@15),(IR, rejection@12),(IE, valid-reply@9),(IR, rejection@7),
(IR, rejection@8),(IR, rejection@4),(IE, valid-reply@2)]
DCF (15) [(IR, acceptance@18),(IR, acceptance@19),(IR, valid-question)]
DNF (15) [(IR, rejection@15),(IR, rejection@12),(IR, rejection@7),(IR, rejection@8),(IR, rejection@4)]
SCF (15) [(20) valid-question ;]
SNF (15) []
(16)
IE (21) valid-reply @20 (I)
** Acknowledgment obligation (IE, acceptance@20) implicitly discharged by action (21) valid-reply @20 (I)
** Implicit obligation (IE, valid-reply@20) introduced.
New obligations not introduced (last turn): [(IR, acceptance@21)]
OBL (16) [(IE, valid-reply@20),(IR, rejection@15),(IR, rejection@12),(IE, valid-reply@9),(IR, rejection@7),
(IR, rejection@8),(IR, rejection@4),(IE, valid-reply@2)]
DCF (16) [(IE, acceptance@20)]
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DNF (16) [(IE, valid-reply@20),(IE, valid-reply@9),(IE, valid-reply@2)]
SCF (16) [(21) valid-reply @20 (I) ;]
SNF (16) []
DC for IR: 0.5227272727272727 (DCFs: 14.0; DNFs:21.0; SCFs: 9.0; SNFs:0.0)
DC for IE: 0.5 (DCFs: 12.0; DNFs:13.0; SCFs: 7.0; SNFs:6.0)
Appendix C
Survey for Eliciting Human
Judgement of Cooperation in
Dialogue
This appendix presents the online survey described in Chapter 4 for
eliciting human judgement on cooperation in political interviews.
C.1 Facsimile of Online Survey
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3. Bernard Shaw and Margaret Thatcher Exit this survey
 
Context
On Sunday 29 June 1997, CNN News anchor Bernard Shaw interviews former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in the context of the transfer
of sovereignty over Hong Kong from the United Kingdom to China.
Shaw What is the difference between negotiation, say, with the Russians and the Chinese?
Thatcher Well, right now, Russia proved what we always said would happen, although it came quicker than we thought. We knew the communist system eventually would collapse.
You can't ignore human rights eventually, without the system collapsing, particularly in the modern world where they can't keep out information on the Internet about what's
happening to other countries. And also, Mr. Gorbachev, he doesn't get enough credit, realised the communist system wasn't working economically, was not producing
prosperity, was meant to be the system that produced the greatest prosperity because it was all planned. It doesn't produce prosperity because it offers no stimulus or
incentive to people to build up their own prosperity. So it came faster in Russia. China has no history of liberty at all. She has always been under tyranny. She went from
being under Chiang Kai Shek and Kuomintang, to come under communism in 1949. It will eventually collapse also.
Shaw Do you think this system of government here in China-
Thatcher (Interrupting) Communsim will eventually collapse. Indeed, it is starting. Deng Xiaoping realized it couldn't go on. So he said right, economic liberty. You can start up your
own business. If you produce more than your target in the factories you can set out to sell it. They are born traders the Chinese. Beijing is so different from what it was in
1977. It has got the economic liberty. It has not yet got a full rule of law, although they are having to supply now and create a law of contract so that you can in fact enforce
your own contract. Law is coming too, to China, initiative is coming to China, enterprise is coming to China. It won't stop.
Shaw Might things have been better had there been better chemistry between you and Deng Xiaoping? During the 1982 talks, referring to you, Mr. Deng said 'that woman should
be bombarded out of her obstinance.'
Thatcher Well, that is what he'd want to say, wouldn't he? If you had argued with him you are obstinate. He was obstinate, he argued with me. But I didn't complain about that. We
survive on argument, that is how come to the right conclusions. Yes, I was obstinate and because of that at any rate we didn't get a good agreement because of dependent
detail. Because he knew we produced prosperity and he didn't and he started to change. Why? Of course, I am obstinate in defending our liberties and our law. That is why I
carry a big handbag.
Shaw Following the Falklands War, did hubris from having won that war make you believe that you could persuade the Chinese that Britain should continue administering Hong
Kong with an umbrella of Chinese sovereignty?
Thatcher No, there was no hubris in Falklands, only a fantastic relief that our people were once again free and we were not going to have an aggressor taking over British land and
British people. And we don't like aggression anywhere in the world, that is why we believe in strong defense.
Shaw Well, Sir Percy Craddock, Britain's Ambassador to China said that you had to be persuaded, that you had to be told, that there was no way Britain was going to remain an
administrative force of Hong Kong with the Chinese being the mere sovereigns.
Thatcher Well, that Deng Xiaoping told me. I'll tell you what he told me. I have written it. I said that we have done so well for Hong Kong, for Hong Kong people, that can we not have
another lease say for another 50 years? He reacted very quickly. He said no. I said can we not have another lease? I said we have done so well on a territory which I know
will eventually return to you. Wouldn't you really let us have, it would be an act of sovereignty to give us a management contract?
Shaw They were outraged. Is that when Mr. Deng told you that if the Chinese wanted to they could walk right in here and take Hong Kong?
Thatcher Oh yes he said he could. But I know that I didn't need to be told. That is why I had to ask him. But, he said to me, which really rather shook me 'I would rather recover Hong
Kong poverty stricken than let the British have another period of administration over Hong Kong.' Now, that shows you the communist mind, not concerned about the
prosperity, about the well being of the people.
Shaw You don't trust him, do you?
Thatcher I don't trust a communist, do you?
Shaw I can't answer that, I am the reporter asking questions.
Thatcher It is interesting that you asked it. Just make an assessment of the person you are negotiating with. What I had to do was, I knew that Hong Kong was valuable to him. I knew
that they could do a lot through Hong Kong that they couldn't do otherwise. And so eventually he agreed. And when he said to me 'I could take it over, I could take it over this
afternoon', I said 'yes, you could, and it would become poverty stricken, because there would be alarm, people would leave, and the world would know it was the dead hand
of communism that ruined it.' So, he said 'what did you have on that piece of paper, Mrs. Thatcher?' And I had written out a possible communique which said that we had
decided to negotiate about the future of Hong Kong. Perhaps not that we'd negotiate that we'd have a series of meetings about the matters that would come up. This is 15
years, because we could not get any loans from banks for properties, anyone, in less than 15 years, so we had to negotiate. And we did the communique which I had
drafted and the negotiations started and it took two years.
Shaw At these historic ceremonies, will you be fighting back tears?
Thatcher I hope the tears won't flow. My mind and heart will just be very full for the people of Hong Kong. And just tremendous hope that all will be well, and a determination that,
along with other democratic countries in the world, we observe very carefully what is going on in Hong Kong. And we don't hesitate to speak out for the people of Hong Kong
and do what we can to see that that international agreement I made with Deng Xiaoping, registered in the United Nations, is fully observed and upheld.
Based on your intuitions on how participants ought to behave in a political interview, how do you rate their performance in this fragment?
Incorrect Mostly incorrect Somewhere in the middle Mostly correct Correct
Shaw
Thatcher
Please answer the following questions about your familiarity with the interview.
Yes No Not Sure
Have you watched or read this interview before?
Are you familiar with the political/historical context?
Have you heard of the interviewer?
Have you heard of the interviewee?
Next
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4. Damon Green and Ed Miliband Exit this survey
 
Context
In June 2011, ITV News correspondent Damon Green interviewed UK Labour leader Ed Miliband on his position
regarding a strike action organised by public sector workers. The action was a protest against planned pension
changes. The strike action resulted in the closure of almost half of the state schools across the UK. The interview
starts with Miliband stating his position with regards the matter.
Miliband These strikes are wrong at a time when negotiations are still going on. But parents and the public have been let down by both sides
because the government has acted in a reckless and provocative manner. After today's disruption, I urge both sides to put aside the
rhetoric, get round the negotiating table and stop it happening again.
Green I listened to your speech in Wrexham where you talked about the Labour Party being a movement. A lot of people in that movement
are the people who are on strike today and they'll be looking at you and thinking 'well, you're describing these strikes as wrong, why
aren't you giving us more leadership as the leader of the Labour movement?'
Miliband At a time when negotiations are still going on I do believe these strikes are wrong. And that's why I say both sides should, after
today's disruption, get round the negotiating table, put aside the rhetoric, and sort the problem out. Because the public and parents
have been let down by both sides. The government has acted in a reckless and provocative manner.
Green I spoke to Francis Maude before I came here and the tone he was striking was a very conciliatory one. Do you think there's a
difference between the words they are saying in public and the attitudes they strike in private behind the negotiations? Are the
negotiations in good faith would you say?
Miliband What I say is that the strikes are wrong at a time when negotiations are still going on. But the government has acted in a reckless and
provocative manner in the way it has gone about these issues. After today's disruption, I urge both sides to get round the negotiating
table, put aside the rhetoric, and stop this kind of thing happening again.
Green It's a- it's a statement you've made publicly, and you've made to me and this will be broadcast, obviously, but have you spoken
privately to any union leaders and expressed your view to them on a personal level, would you say?
Miliband What I say in public and in private, to everybody involved in this, is get round the negotiating table, put aside the rhetoric, and stop
this kind of action happening again. These strikes are wrong because negotiations are still going on. But parents and the public have
been let down by the government as well, who've acted in a reckless and provocative manner.
Green You're a parent. I'm a parent. People who will be watching this are parents. Umm, has it affected you personally, this action? Has it
affected your family, your friends, I mean? What is the net effect of that going to be on parents having to take a day off work today?
Miliband I think parents up and down the country have been affected by this action, and it's wrong at a time when negotiations are still going
on. Parents have been let down by both sides because the government has acted in a reckless and provocative manner. I think that
both sides should, after today's disruption, get round the negotiating table, put aside the rhetoric, and stop this kind of thing
happening again.
Based on your intuitions on how participants ought to behave in a political interview, how do you rate their







Please answer the following questions about your familiarity with the interview.
Yes No Not Sure
Have you watched or read this interview before?
Are you familiar with the political/historical context?
Have you heard of the interviewer?
Have you heard of the interviewee?
Next
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5. Alex Brodie and Tony Blair Exit this survey
 
Context
Shortly after 11 September 2001, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair is interviewed by Alex Brodie for BBC World Service's Newshour
on the role of the UK after the terrorist attacks.
Brodie Is Osama Bin Laden your prime suspect?
Blair He is the prime suspect. We are still assembling the evidence and we have said we will do so in a careful and measured way. But we've known for
some time of his activities and those of his associates, that have been designed to spread terror around the world that are I believe fundamentally
contrary to the basic teachings of Islam. And in respect of this particular incident there's no doubt at all, as both ourselves and President have said,
he is the prime suspect.
Brodie Him alone or anybody else?
Blair Well, when we assemble the evidence finally, we will present it to people. But as we have said he is the prime suspect.
Brodie Have you seen evidence yourself?
Blair Yes of course, all the time we are going through evidence that comes to us from various sources and what is important, as I said the other day, is that
when we proceed, we proceed on the basis of a hard-headed assessment of that evidence. But I think, people are still taking in the enormity of what
happened last week. Thousands of people killed in the worst terrorist incident of all time. This was the worst terrorist incident in respect of British
citizens, incidentally 200, 300 killed, since World War II. When you think that Britain went through the Blitz when we were under attack, day in day
out, for several years and we lost just over 20,000 of our citizens. Here were 5,000 or more murdered, literally, in a day and I think some impression
is given of just how serious this is. Let's be quite clear as well, the thing that we have to confront and the reason why we have to take action against
this apparatus of terrorism at every level, is that if these people were able to kill more people they would. The only limits on their actions are not moral
in any sense at all, they are practical or technical.
Brodie Is it Osama Bin Laden who you have the evidence against that he was actively involved in planning what happened in the United States or is it just
that you have evidence that he has set up a network?
Blair Well Alex, when we are in a position to put evidence before people, we will put it before them then. What we have said so far, because people have
asked us and it's right because this is where the evidence tends, that he is the prime suspect.
Brodie Anybody else?
Blair There may be various other people but that is a matter that we can deal with when we come to present the evidence fully.
Brodie And do you know where he is?
Blair We know that he is in Afghanistan. We know the various places that he has been. But it is important that other people co-operate with us in ensuring
that he is brought to justice and this is a situation in which those who have been harbouring him or helping him have a very simple choice. They
either cease the protection of Bin Laden or they will be treated as people helping him.
Brodie This is echoing what George Bush said isn't it about how we will go not just for the perpetrators but for those who harbour him, and you are talking
about the Taliban?
Blair Well, for all those people who have been in a position where they have been helping or harbouring terrorism, the way that it operates, camps that are
dedicated to training people in it. These are people trained in these camps who go out and basically wreak havoc wherever they can, killing many,
many innocent people. And although what happened last week is obviously an atrocity almost beyond our imagination, it is not an isolated incident, in
that sense, there has been a history going back over several years. Now you mention the Taliban, the Taliban have a very clear choice, the Taliban
either cease to help or harbour those that are fermenting terrorism or they will be treated as part of the terrorist apparatus themselves. Now they have
that choice and they should consider very, very carefully the consequences that they face at this moment of choice.
Brodie If they don't give him up, what are those consequences?
Blair Those are the consequences again that we will consider and we will announce the appropriate response when we have made up our minds.
Based on your intuitions on how participants ought to behave in a political interview, how do you rate their







Please answer the following questions about your familiarity with the interview.
Yes No Not Sure
Have you watched or read this interview before?
Are you familiar with the political/historical context?
Have you heard of the interviewer?
Have you heard of the interviewee?
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6. Bill O'Reilly and Hermene Hartman Exit this survey
 
Context
During the American Presidential campaign in January 2008, Fox News host Bill O'Reilly interviews Hermene Hartman, the
editor of an African-American newspaper in Chicago. The interview is about Obama's pastor Jeremiah Wright and his
connections with Nation of Islam's leader Louis Farrakhan.
O'Reilly How would you describe Dr Wright's church?
Hartman It's a middle-class church. It is a superb church. Reverend Wright started a church with 87 people; today, has 8,000 in that particular
congregation. United Church of Christ is basically a white denomination. And I think there's been just a lot of miscasting here. Seventy ministries
within the church, to include Girl Scouts, prison outreach, marital counselling, education, children's counselling, a lot of Adopt-A-School. They
have done a lot to empower that community and to improve that community.
O'Reilly OK. But you could make the same argument about Louis Farrakhan, that he's done, you know, some good things, yet you know, his anti-semitic
in his rhetoric and sometimes anti-white or whatever. And-
Hartman (Interrupting) But that is, that is not Jeremiah Wright.
O'Reilly No, but it is association there. And the association, you can draw your own conclusion.
Hartman But what - what's the emphasis? I mean, you could also, you know, it's the twist. It's the turn that's being taken. You could also look at a
wonderful sermon that Dr Wright gave and a book developed out of it, The Audacity of Hope.
O'Reilly But you can't, you can't do that, though.
Hartman But we're, but here's what, you can do that if you wanted to do that.
O'Reilly No, no, no, no.
Hartman (Overlapping) You could. Here's what, but Bill-
O'Reilly (Overlapping) Because every despot, and I'm not calling the man a despot, but every despot in history has done some good things. Here, look-
Hartman (Interrupting) But he's not a despot. Come on, Bill.
O'Reilly No, I'm not, I'm not calling him that.
Hartman That's, that's out of order.
O'Reilly I made that clear.
Hartman (Overlapping) Well, what are you saying?
O'Reilly (Overlapping) But the things that he has said are very, very troubling. And I think that Senator Obama, if he's going to continue to associate with
the Doctor, and he says he will-
Hartman (Interrupting) Obama is a- is running against a political couple. That is what is going on now. And true enough, obviously he's got to be judged
just like everybody else, but you've got to bring the truth. If you're going to do Obama's church, let's do everybody's church.
O'Reilly All right.
Based on your intuitions on how participants ought to behave in a political interview, how do you rate their







Please answer the following questions about your familiarity with the interview.
Yes No Not Sure
Have you watched or read this interview before?
Are you familiar with the political/historical context?
Have you heard of the interviewer?
Have you heard of the interviewee?
Next
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7. Bill O'Reilly and Hermene Hartman Exit this survey
 
Context
During the American Presidential campaign in January 2008, Fox News host Bill O'Reilly interviews Hermene Hartman, the
editor of an African-American newspaper in Chicago. The interview is about Obama's pastor Jeremiah Wright and his
connections with Nation of Islam's leader Louis Farrakhan.
O'Reilly How would you describe Dr Wright's church?
Hartman It's a middle-class church. It is a superb church. Reverend Wright started a church with 87 people; today, has 8,000 in that particular
congregation. United Church of Christ is basically a white denomination. And I think there's been just a lot of miscasting here. Seventy ministries
within the church, to include Girl Scouts, prison outreach, marital counselling, education, children's counselling, a lot of Adopt-A-School. They
have done a lot to empower that community and to improve that community.
O'Reilly OK. But you could make the same argument about Louis Farrakhan, that he's done, you know, some good things, yet you know, his anti-semitic
in his rhetoric and sometimes anti-white or whatever. And-
Hartman (Interrupting) But that is, that is not Jeremiah Wright.
O'Reilly No, but it is association there. And the association, you can draw your own conclusion.
Hartman But what - what's the emphasis? I mean, you could also, you know, it's the twist. It's the turn that's being taken. You could also look at a
wonderful sermon that Dr Wright gave and a book developed out of it, The Audacity of Hope.
O'Reilly But you can't, you can't do that, though.
Hartman But we're, but here's what, you can do that if you wanted to do that.
O'Reilly No, no, no, no.
Hartman (Overlapping) You could. Here's what, but Bill-
O'Reilly (Overlapping) Because every despot, and I'm not calling the man a despot, but every despot in history has done some good things. Here, look-
Hartman (Interrupting) But he's not a despot. Come on, Bill.
O'Reilly No, I'm not, I'm not calling him that.
Hartman That's, that's out of order.
O'Reilly I made that clear.
Hartman (Overlapping) Well, what are you saying?
O'Reilly (Overlapping) But the things that he has said are very, very troubling. And I think that Senator Obama, if he's going to continue to associate with
the Doctor, and he says he will-
Hartman (Interrupting) Obama is a- is running against a political couple. That is what is going on now. And true enough, obviously he's got to be judged
just like everybody else, but you've got to bring the truth. If you're going to do Obama's church, let's do everybody's church.
O'Reilly All right.
Based on your intuitions on how participants ought to behave in a political interview, how do you rate their







Please answer the following questions about your familiarity with the interview.
Yes No Not Sure
Have you watched or read this interview before?
Are you familiar with the political/historical context?
Have you heard of the interviewer?
Have you heard of the interviewee?
Next
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8. Hugh Pym and George Osborne Exit this survey
 
Context
In January 2011, BBC political correspondent Hugh Pym interviews UK Chancellor George Osborne after official
figures show the UK economy unexpectedly shrank by half of one per cent between October and December 2010.
The Treasury said the contraction could be explained by December's wintry weather. The Office for National Statistics
appeared to back that up, saying that without the heavy snow, GDP would have been broadly flat.
Pym The ONS has said if you stripped out the effect of bad snow, that left a figure of about zero flat, which is still pretty weak, isn't it?
Osborne Well, I've said these are disappointing numbers, but the weather clearly had a huge effect and the office of national statistics, who put
these numbers together, flagged that up very carefully and clearly, and said as a result the numbers are somewhat uncertain. I think
it's interesting if you look at the areas of the economy that are not so affected by the weather, like manufacturing, that is actually
performing pretty strongly at the moment and that is an important part of rebalancing our economy, a process that has to take place.
So look, we had bad weather. It's the worst December for a hundred years, people remember that, but you shouldn't be blown off
course by bad weather and we are not going to be.
Pym Won't this add weight to Ed Ball's argument that by embarking on these cuts you are putting growth at risk?
Osborne Well, if you look at the December period, with the very bad weather, the worst weather for a hundred years, of course actually the tax
rises and the spending review process had not kicked in then, and so that is not an excuse that people can make. We are very clear
that to abandon the budget plans, as the Labour Party would have us do, would put us back into the financial crisis zone, which is
where the Labour Party left us. We are not going to do that. We are not going to be blown off course by bad weather. The economy
needs to rebalance and you see manufacturing growing at the moment.
Pym Isn't there every chance that this quarter, the first quarter of 2011, there'll be persistent weaknesses, partly because of the VAT rise?
Osborne Well, as I say, we got these figures today. They are very uncertain, and the impact of the weather has clearly been enormous, as the
office of national statistics, who put together the forecast, has made very clear. And it was the coldest December for a hundred years,
people couldn't get to work, businesses were closed, and that has had a bigger impact than anyone forecast. But if you look at areas
not so affected by the weather, like manufacturing, they are growing. That is an important part of rebalancing the British economy,
and if we were to abandon our budget plans, and not face up to the debts, as the way that Labour suggests, then we would be back
in a financial crisis. That would be a disaster for Britain, and this Government is not going to be blown off course by bad weather.
Pym Can I ask you one question about the talks with the banks, as the final one? I mean, are you close to an agreement with the banks on
lending and bonuses and so on?
Osborne Well, we are engaged in a conversation with the banks. I've made that very clear. What we want to see is more lending, we want to
see small bonuses, and we want to see the banks paying more taxes; and that's what I hope we can achieve. That'd be good for the
British economy, good for the British taxpayer and actually also good for British financial services, which employs hundreds of
thousands of people.
Pym Are you nearly there with those talks?
Osborne Well, we are having those conversations and I hope we can reach a settlement, but we've set out the terms of that settlement very
clearly.
Based on your intuitions on how participants ought to behave in a political interview, how do you rate their







Please answer the following questions about your familiarity with the interview.
Yes No Not Sure
Have you watched or read this interview before?
Are you familiar with the political/historical context?
Have you heard of the interviewer?
Have you heard of the interviewee?
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9. Conclusion Exit this survey
 
All done!
Thank you for completing this survey. Please answer the following question.
Have you read the interview fragments you responded to in detail?






If you have any comments, please leave them in the box below.
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C.2 Dissemination
The survey was disseminated via email to the mailing lists of four research
special interest groups2, the Postgraduate Student Forum at the Open Uni-
versity Computing Department and via a series of posts on the social net-
working site Facebook3. Volunteers were invited to share the post with their
contacts on the site.
C.2.1 Email Message Sent to Research Email Lists
(Apologies for cross-postings)
Dear SIGDIAL/SIGSEM/CLUK/ELSNET members,
If you can spare a few minutes, please help our research by completing this
survey on how people perceive verbal behaviour in political interviews:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/2ZTCT6B
The entire survey should take about 20 minutes to complete, *but* if you do
not have that amount of time to spare, please complete as much of it as you
can and then skip through the rest until you get to the final page
There is a treat at the end of the survey, where you can watch a few rather
amusing interactions we have come across during our research.
Thanks for your help!
------------
Brian Pluss







2SIGIAL (http://www.sigdial.org/), SIGSEM (http://www.sigsem.org/), CLUK




Dear friends, this is serious business...
If you are fluent in English, please (please!) help my research by
completing this survey on how people perceive verbal behaviour in
political interviews:
https://www.surveymonkey.com/s/2ZTCT6B
Feel free to share the link above and spread the word... This is
one of those the-more-the-merrier kind of things.
Thank you!
PS: there’s small a treat at the end of the survey.
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Appendix D
A Discussion on Modelling
Turn Length
We discuss here an idea on how to model the number of contributions
agents make in each turn. As described in Section 5.1.8, when deciding on
their next dialogue move, agents use a biased random function to choose
whether they actually make a move or whether they release the floor. Each
agent has a a parameter q to influence the likelihood of releasing the turn
each time they select a next dialogue move. However, using a Bernoulli trial
with probability of success q, as we do in the deliberation mechanism, could
lead to agents releasing the floor immediately after taking it. To avoid this,
we take a different approach, making the probability of success change along
the turn.
We propose using an exponential decay function to model a decrease in
likelihood that an agent keeps the floor after each move in a same turn. This
is a function q(k) = e−qk, where k is the number of moves in the current
turn (the first move being 0) and q is the decay rate parameter chosen for
the agent. The higher the value for q the steeper the decay, so values closer
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to 0 will make it more likely that the agent performs more moves after the
initial one. Figures D.1 to D.4 show this function for different values of q.
For the function release-floor we would use a Bernoulli trial with prob-
ability of success r(k) = 1 − q(k) = 1 − e−qk. This means that in the first
move of a turn, the trial will succeed with probability r(0) = 1 − q(0) =
1 − e−q0 = 0, regardless of the parameter q chosen for the agent, meaning
that the function will fail and the agent will select a move. For the second
move of the turn, the probability of success would be r(1) = 1 − e−q. For
q = 0.2, it is r(1) ≈ 0.18; for q = 0.8 it is r(1) ≈ 0.55; for q = 2 it is
r(1) ≈ 0.86; and for q = 5 it is r(1) ≈ 0.99. This means that, the higher
the value of q ∈ [0, 5] the more likely it is that the agent releases the floor
after the first move. In the second move within a turn, for q = 0.2, it is
r(2) ≈ 0.33, while for q = 2 it is r(2) ≈ 0.98. Figure D.5 shows r(k) for
these four values of q.
In order to determine the value of q for each agent, we can look at the
distribution of turn length over n trials of the release-floor function. This
is like a binomial distribution of failures of the function (meaning that the
floor is not released) over n attempts. Using the probability mass function
















A graphic of this function for the four values of q above and n = 10 is shown
in Figure D.6.
1The probability mass function for the binomial distribution with parameters n and k















Figure D.1: Exponential decay function for decay rate q = 0.2.




Figure D.2: Exponential decay function for decay rate q = 0.8.




Figure D.3: Exponential decay function for decay rate q = 2.




Figure D.4: Exponential decay function for decay rate q = 5.
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Figure D.5: Probability of success r(k) for q ∈ {0.2, 0.8, 2, 5}.
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Figure D.6: Distribution of turn length over 10 trials of the release-floor




This appendix shows the update of dynamic obligations for the (hand-
crafted) political interview in Figure E.1. The example was first introduced
in Figure 3.7 and used in Chapter 5 to illustrate the proposed model of
Let me try to explain this.
The numbers are worse than we expected, but this 
Government is working hard to correct the situation. Interviewee
How do you explain the rise in the inflation rate for the 
last quarter, Mr Chancellor?
Interviewer
But how do you explain the increase in the inflation rate?
Interviewer
It was due to a combination of seasonal factors and a 
sudden rise in the price of commodities on the 
international market. 
But we are working hard to correct the situation. Interviewee
I suppose you don't expect me to answer that question.
Interviewee
That's clear enough.
Could you please tell us the price of a pint of milk in 
China?Interviewer
Figure E.1: A hand-crafed political interview transcript
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conversational agents. Recall the formalisation in terms of action labels
given in Chapter 3:
D1 = 〈(ir, 〈(1) : valid-question N〉);
(ie, 〈(2) : acceptance@(1); (3) : invalid-reply@(1) I〉);
(ir, 〈(4) : valid-question R〉);
(ie, 〈(5) : valid-reply@(1) C; (6) : invalid-reply@(1) C〉);
(ir, 〈(7) : acceptance@(5); (8) : invalid-question N〉);
(ie, 〈(9) : rejection@(8)〉)〉
and the dialogue game: GPI = (AllowPI , IntroducePI , DischargePI), with:
AllowPI = {[ir : {valid-statement, valid-question, acceptance, rejection}],
(1)
[ie : {valid-statement, valid-reply, acceptance, rejection}]} (2)
IntroducePI = {[(ir, (s) : valid-statement); (ie, acceptance@(s))], (3)
[(ir, (q) : valid-question N); (ie, acceptance@(q))], (4)
[(ie, acceptance@(q)); (ie, valid-reply@(q) C)], (5)
[(ie, (s) : valid-statement); (ir, acceptance@(s))], (6)
[(ie, (r) : valid-reply@(q)); (ir, acceptance@(r))], (7)
[(ir, acceptance); (ir, valid-question N)], (8)
[(ir, (s) : invalid-statement); (ie, rejection@(s))], (9)
[(ir, (q) : invalid-question); (ie, rejection@(q))], (10)
[(ir, (r) : invalid-reply); (ie, rejection@(r))], (11)
[(ie, (s) : invalid-statement); (ir, rejection@(s))], (12)
[(ie, (q) : invalid-question); (ir, rejection@(q))], (13)
[(ie, (r) : invalid-reply); (ir, rejection@(r))]} (14)
DischargePI = {[∗-question R  rejection], (15)
[∗-statement  acceptance], (16)
[∗-question N  acceptance], (17)
[∗-reply  acceptance]} (18)
The sequence of dynamic obligations for each turn is computed as shown
below1:
OD1 = 〈〈(ir, valid-question N)〉〉 (0)
Turn 1−−−−→ [[(ir, (1) : valid-question N) + discharge]]
OD1 = 〈〈(ir, valid-question)〉; (0)
〈〉〉 (1)
1The reasons for each change are given in double square brackets next to the arrows
labelled with the turn in which they occur. The numbers on the right indicate the turn
to which the sequence of obligations corresponds.
335
Turn 1−−−−→ [[(ir, (1) : valid-question N) + introduction Rule (4)]]
OD1 = 〈〈(ir, valid-question N)〉; (0)
〈(ie, acceptance@(1))〉〉 (1)
Turn 2−−−−→ [[(ie, (2) : acceptance@(1)) + discharge]]
OD1 = 〈〈(ir, valid-question N)〉; (0)
〈(ie, acceptance@(1))〉; (1)
〈〉〉 (2)
Turn 2−−−−→ [[(ie, (2) : acceptance@(1)) + introduction Rule (5)]]
OD1 = 〈〈(ir, valid-question N)〉; (0)
〈(ie, acceptance@(1))〉; (1)
〈(ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉〉 (2)
Turn 2−−−−→ [[(ie, (3) : invalid-reply@(1) I) + introduction Rule (14)
OD1 = 〈〈(ir, valid-question N)〉; (0)
〈(ie, acceptance@(1))〉; (1)
〈(ir, rejection@(3)); (ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉〉 (2)
Turn 3−−−−→ [[(ir, (4) : valid-question@(3) R) + discharge Rule (15)]]
OD1 = 〈〈(ir, valid-question N)〉; (0)
〈(ie, acceptance@(1))〉; (1)
〈(ir, rejection@(3)); (ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉; (2)
〈(ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉〉 (3)
Turn 4−−−−→ [[(ie, (5) : valid-reply@(1) C) + discharge]]
OD1 = 〈〈(ir, valid-question N)〉; (0)
〈(ie, acceptance@(1))〉; (1)
〈(ir, rejection@(3)); (ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉; (2)
〈(ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉; (3)
〈〉〉 (4)
Turn 4−−−−→ [[(ie, (5) : valid-reply@(1) C) + introduction Rule (7)]]
OD1 = 〈〈(ir, valid-question N)〉; (0)
〈(ie, acceptance@(1))〉; (1)
〈(ir, rejection@(3)); (ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉; (2)
〈(ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉; (3)
〈(ir, acceptance@(5))〉〉 (4)
Turn 4−−−−→ [[(ie, (6) : invalid-reply C) + introduction Rule (14)]]
OD1 = 〈〈(ir, valid-question N)〉; (0)
〈(ie, acceptance@(1))〉; (1)
〈(ir, rejection@(3)); (ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉; (2)
〈(ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉; (3)
〈(ir, rejection@(6)); (ir, acceptance@(5))〉〉 (4)
Turn 5−−−−→ [[(ir, (7) : acceptance@(5)) + discharge]]
336 Appendix E. Computing Dynamic Obligations for D1
OD1 = 〈〈(ir, valid-question N)〉; (0)
〈(ie, acceptance@(1))〉; (1)
〈(ir, rejection@(3)); (ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉; (2)
〈(ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉; (3)
〈(ir, rejection@(6)); (ir, acceptance@(5))〉; (4)
〈(ir, rejection@(6))〉〉 (5)
Turn 5−−−−→ [[(ir, (7) : acceptance) + introduction Rule (8)]]
OD1 = 〈〈(ir, valid-question N)〉; (0)
〈(ie, acceptance@(1))〉; (1)
〈(ir, rejection@(3)); (ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉; (2)
〈(ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉; (3)
〈(ir, rejection@(6)); (ir, acceptance@(5))〉; (4)
〈(ir, valid-question N); (ir, rejection@(6))〉〉 (5)
Turn 5−−−−→ [[(ir, (8) : invalid-question N) + introduction Rule (10)]]
OD1 = 〈〈(ir, valid-question N)〉; (0)
〈(ie, acceptance@(1))〉; (1)
〈(ir, rejection@(3)); (ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉; (2)
〈(ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉; (3)
〈(ir, rejection@(6)); (ir, acceptance@(5))〉; (4)
〈(ie, rejection@(8)); (ir, valid-question N); (ir, rejection@(6))〉〉 (5)
Turn 6−−−−→ [[(ie, (9) : rejection@(8)) + discharge]]
OD1 = 〈〈(ir, valid-question N)〉; (0)
〈(ie, acceptance@(1))〉; (1)
〈(ir, rejection@(3)); (ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉 (2)
〈(ie, valid-reply@(1) C)〉; (3)
〈(ir, rejection@(6)); (ir, acceptance@(5))〉; (4)
〈(ie, rejection@(8)); (ir, valid-question N); (ir, rejection@(6))〉; (5)
〈(ir, valid-question N); (ir, rejection@(6))〉〉 (6)
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